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Moving Thumos: Emotion, Image, and the Enthymeme
Eric D. Mason
ABSTRACT
This dissertation connects classical theories regarding the enthymeme and
thumos (a Greek word commonly translated as “heart,” “mind,” or one’s “capacity
for emotion”) to modern theories of images and emotion in order to reconsider the
central role of visual discourse in persuasion, ideology, and subject formation.
Since “enthymeme” comes from en and thymos, meaning “in heart,” etymologically
the enthymeme is an argument that is realized in an individual’s thumos. This
dissertation thus attempts to establish the notion of thumos in rhetorical studies by
developing a theory of visual enthymemes.
The understanding of the enthymeme used within this dissertation works
less from the Aristotelian model of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism, and
more from the sophistic use (particularly that of Gorgias, Anaxamines, and
Isocrates) of enthymêmata—the kairotic “emotively charged reasons” that rely on
stylistic force to create an “enthymemic moment” in the audience’s experience that
produces persuasion or belief. In other words, where Aristotelians envision
enthymemic discourse as a structure, the sophists see it as an event. This
sophistic enthymemic tradition is evident in the visual rhetoric of modern social
activists, particularly in what Kevin DeLuca calls “image events”—the visually
iii

based rhetorical efforts of those attempting to move people to action. These
activities embody a form of “biopolitics” in which the traditional binaries between
emotion and rationality, between body and mind, and between text and image no
longer hold.
The visual enthymeme is offered as one way to understand the affective
power of visuals without returning to conventional understandings that situate
images and emotional appeals primarily as immoral or otherwise underhanded
rhetorical strategies opposed to reason. Depictions of thumos in both classical
rhetoric and poetics exemplify a type of “internal rhetoric” in which subjects identify
with one “package” of reason and emotion over other possible packages. This
packaging holds significant implications for understanding how multimodal texts
function enthymemically, and how teachers participate in the education of student
emotion.

iv

Chapter 1
Introduction: A Vision of Thumos
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the recovery of the notion of
thumos in rhetorical studies. Thumos, in its broadest sense, is one’s capacity for
emotion—a dunamis, according to Aristotle, that incorporates both activity and
characteristic disposition. While this Greek term (spelled either thumos, or
thymos) is relatively unknown to modern rhetoric scholars, this dissertation will
integrate thumos into rhetoric and composition studies through a concept much
more familiar to rhetoricians: the enthymeme. In particular, Jeffrey Walker’s work
in ancient rhetoric reveals a significant relationship between thumos and the
enthymeme (the word enthymeme being from en and thymos, or “in heart”).
Etymologically, an enthymeme is an argument that is realized in an individual’s
thumos (171).
The involvement of one’s capacity for emotion is not the understanding of
an enthymemic argument that is most familiar to academics. For most
academics, the enthymeme is primarily associated with the logical structure of
the syllogism, and, thus, the mode of the audience’s participation is strictly
rational and linguistic. There is a small amount of scholarship that has sought to
reinvigorate our discipline’s understanding of the enthymeme by reconsidering its
pre-Aristotelian roots in affective persuasion. But none of this scholarship has
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sought to connect the enthymeme to one of the most pervasive forms of
persuasion and argument in contemporary public discourse—the image.
In addition to contributing to the long-standing disciplinary debate over the
nature and function of the enthymeme, this dissertation will engage current
conversations in rhetoric and composition related to emotion and visual studies.
As will be clear later, the value of a notion of thumos to these domains is that it
provides a way of speaking about the work of rhetoric in ways that do not depend
on the traditional binary hierarchies between emotion and rationality, that
between body and mind, or that between text and images. It also contributes to
current models of subjectivity and belief in composition theory by recognizing
how the emotion-based enthymeme is part of the visual heteroglossia through
which individuals identify themselves as subjects. While an understanding of the
thumos-based enthymeme will contribute to the current scholarly interest in
emotion and visual rhetoric, thumos also promises to be a productive term for
many interests often grouped under the rubric of cultural studies, including
studies of race, class, gender, ideology, and politics, as well as the many
branches of visual studies.
Barbara Koziak has shown the potential of the concept of thumos in her
book, Retrieving Political Emotion, in which she uses it to examine gendered
political practices and the politics of gender in drama and criticism. Koziak does
not argue that emotion is absent from public discourse. Rather, she argues that
we need to overcome the “dread of political emotion” in public discourse without
calling for the “overthrow of reason,” and develop instead a sense of political
2

emotion that enables political action rather than discouraging it (2). Koziak
chronicles a “sea change in the scholarly understanding of emotion” that has
drawn from work being done across several disciplines, noting that scholars
“have gone from viewing the passions or emotions as universally wild, irrational,
dangerous, subjective bodily phenomena that impair good practical and
theoretical judgment, to posing emotions as rational, cognitive, evaluative, and
essential to good moral character and action” (13). This dissertation extends
Koziak’s valuation of the political work made possible through a concept of
political emotion to consider the significance of the reception and production of
visual discourse as part of this political work.
This dissertation is also undeniably about rhetoric and, to some degree,
the historiography of rhetoric. By reconstructing the enthymeme based on the
pre-Aristotelian notion of thumos, it participates in the recovery of sophistic
rhetorical theory in order to shed light on modern rhetorical practices. Linking
discussions of images, persuasion, and emotion allows one to articulate, for
instance, how the rhetorical and ideological practices that engage emotions
through the use of images do so by creating visual enthymemes. This leap from
emotion to enthymeme is enabled by the pre-Aristotelian notion of the
enthymeme which includes discourse that affects someone in his or her thumos.
One could argue that this alternate version of the enthymeme is available even in
Aristotle, but it is most visible in sophistic works such as those of Isocrates,
Gorgias, and Anaxamines, and thumos is well-represented in the narrative works
of Greek poets, such as Homer’s Iliad.
3

This updated version of the enthymeme continues a long tradition of
reformulating the enthymeme to match contemporary scholarly interests, a
history that Carol Poster has chronicled in her essay “A Historicist
Reconceptualization of the Enthymeme.” As she writes, the continual
redefinitions of the enthymeme are “typical of the process by which rhetorical
theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into
conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period” (6). Rather
than see this as a reason to discount the enthymeme as a rhetorical concept, I
view this as one of the theoretical strengths of the enthymeme, especially in view
of William Covino’s observation in The Art of Wondering that the “major figures of
classical rhetoric—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as
the elaboration of ambiguity” (2). If the definition of the enthymeme were not
ambiguous, it would not be of much use to rhetorical theorists. In other words,
the ambiguity of the enthymeme makes it a productive concept in rhetorical
studies.
The term “visual enthymeme” is not new, but it may be new to some
rhetoricians as it has been primarily defined and deployed by scholars working
and publishing in journals only indirectly associated with the field of rhetoric and
composition. While I believe there is much value in the work being done in these
fields, I also believe that these approaches would benefit from a greater
engagement with the conversations within the field of rhetorical studies about the
nature of the enthymeme. Although the definition of a “visual enthymeme” has
been attempted before, grounding a definition of the visual enthymeme in thumos
4

has not. Adopting the pre-Aristotelian relation between thumos and enthymeme,
visual enthymemes would be images that work by engaging the thumos, or
emotional capacity, of the viewer. Compared to the “enthymeme-as-rhetoricalsyllogism” derived from Aristotle and preserved in so many textbooks and
articles, the visual enthymeme has been barely theorized. In fact, those scholars
who have gestured toward the possibility of visual enthymemes have been
(universally, as far as I can tell) housed in philosophy, communication, and
speech departments.
In the scholarship emerging from these departments, “visual enthymeme”
seems to be a synonym for “visual argument,” the equation of which strips the
enthymeme of all the characteristics which have made it worthy of recovery in
rhetoric and composition over the last half century—namely, the engagement of
the audience in the construction of the meaning of the event in ways not entirely
bound to the discursive structure presented by the rhetor. The prevailing
understanding of a visual enthymeme, seemingly, is limited both by a lack of
engagement with scholarship in rhetoric and composition, and by the assumption
of a hierarchical distinction between argument and persuasion—a relationship
that might alternately be figured as a hierarchy between philosophy and rhetoric.
The enthymeme required by philosophical logic is dependent on a definition of
the enthymeme as a linguistic structure (an incomplete or deficient syllogism).
This formalistic and systematic (i.e. Aristotelian, or structural) understanding of
the enthymeme is not conducive, I argue, to effectively theorizing the rhetorical
force of emotions and images.
5

Even Aristotle’s extensive commentary on the enthymeme is typically left
unaddressed by scholars in other disciplines proclaiming the possibility of visual
enthymemes, and the disciplinary debate over the enthymeme’s forms and
functions is even less likely to appear. This means that many of these scholars
simply consider the enthymeme a type of syllogism in which the viewer
participates by supplying the missing premise. One of the scholars of the “visual
enthymeme” presents the resulting “authoritative” approach toward the
enthymeme when he writes that the enthymeme is “a form of argument . . . in
which the arguer deliberately leaves unstated a premise that is essential to its
reasoning. Doing so has the effect of drawing the audience to participate in its
own persuasion by filling in that unexpressed premise” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 41).
While this is one view of the enthymeme (garnered most often from the
survey work on the enthymeme done by Lloyd Bitzer), it is one that ignores totally
the sophistic notion of the enthymeme which focuses on the emotional
engagement of the viewer. In other words, it ignores thumos. Admittedly, this is a
common understanding adopted by scholars in many fields, rhetoricians
included. Thus, the goal of this dissertation is not simply to dismiss academic
work being done in certain departments, but to provide an expanded
understanding of the visual enthymeme by recalling an alternate construction of
the enthymeme itself.
This ignorance of thumos is unfortunate since thumos is directly implicated
in the capacity for individuals to be moved by discourse—to respond to rhetoric—
as well as to the active circulation of desire through discourse. It is the thumos6

enabled potential for movement that forms the basis of politics and, for some,
confirms the existence of such a thing as “effective rhetoric” (Jacobs and
Micciche 3). If thumos does indeed describe an effective venue for the work of
discourse, then it is easy to agree with Ellen Quandahl that “this heart-word
[thumos] ought to become a key term for rhetoric” (14). By bringing a sophistic
understanding of thumos to bear on the enthymemes that circulate in
contemporary public discourse, I hope to facilitate the recognition of this concept
as a productive term in contemporary rhetorical theory.
Internal Di-visions
Preceding the chapters below, the subsequent sections of chapter 1 will
situate the methodology of this dissertation. Part of that methodology is the
serious consideration of sophistic positions on knowledge, emotions, and
discourse–what ironically might be charged by some to be itself a type of
sophism, by making “the worse case appear the better.” Sophistic rhetoric has
been attacked both in classical and modern times as being relativistic,
materialistic, and immoral. Some scholars have even charged that all classical
rhetoric is ultimately “unassimilable to a contemporary context (Knoblauch and
Brannon, S. Miller)” (Jarratt xix). But this dissertation is also an appropriation of
sophistic texts and concepts, if not a deliberate misreading, without the intent of
remaining faithful to the intentions of the original authors. This is a practice now
more commonly practiced and accepted than it was, for instance, in 1991 when
Susan Jarratt wrote Rereading the Sophists, or as evidenced in the work of
Jasper Neel, but it is one that still encounters resistance. The introduction will
7

explore the conventional forms of this resistance and establish to what extent this
dissertation (or any recovery of sophistic rhetoric) can be considered to be within
the sophistic rhetorical tradition. The organization and content of the subsequent
chapters are explained in brief below.
The first chapter, “Reconsidering the Heart of Enthymematic Rhetoric,”
considers the recurrent question in rhetorical studies regarding what an
enthymeme is and how it functions, and provides an overview of the various
approaches to defining and implementing the enthymeme as a rhetorical concept
that have been active in the field of rhetoric and composition studies. While most
of these approaches have focused on what might be called technical issues
related to the structure of the enthymeme and its relation to the syllogism, I argue
that the heart of the enthymeme is the experience of ambiguity and that, since an
engagement with ambiguity is a traditional objective of rhetoric, the enthymeme
is a rhetorical event that defies assimilation to a structural definition (as in its
definition as a “rhetorical syllogism”). The ambiguity sets the stage for the
dialogue between emotion and rationality that is often ignored or disparaged by
conventional accounts of persuasion.
The second chapter, “Recovering Thumos in Rhetoric,” investigates the
ancient notion of thumos and modern debates over emotion and cognition in
order to better understand why thumos is deserving of recovery at this time. It
looks to rhetorical treatises and classical Greek epic to generate an
understanding of this “heart word” that defies traditional valuations of emotion,
reason, and images. By considering the place of thumos within the psychological
8

and rhetorical theories of the Greeks, as well as current conversations regarding
discourse and ideology, it seeks to offer insight into the role and utility of thumos
in rhetorical theory.
The third chapter, “Re-seeing the Visual Enthymeme for the First Time,”
addresses how the visual enthymeme has previously been theorized through the
lens of communication studies and argues for the possibility of a visual
enthymeme based in thumos. Specifically, it critiques the constructions of visual
argument that reference the enthymeme yet limit it to a formal linguistic structure
that mirrors the logical structure of syllogistic argument. It also addresses the
approaches to persuasion and images that have emerged through the various
fields contributing to visual studies, ones that have downplayed the role of
emotion in the meaning of visual discourse. It builds upon critiques of reader
response theory, and the work of Kevin DeLuca on “image events” produced by
activist environmental groups to theorize the visual enthymeme as an event
rather than a structure.
The final chapter, “Touching Thumos,” contemplates briefly the usefulness
of thumos and the visual enthymeme to other areas of study within the fields of
rhetoric and composition and cultural studies. Specifically, it looks at the status
and description of movement within these fields as a way of illustrating the need
for a concept like thumos—one that embraces the complexity of subjectivity over
the need to reduce emotion, reason, and identity into a static knowable
formation.
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On Reconstructing the Sophists
This dissertation attempts to separate the enthymeme from its history as a
linguistically deficient logical structure (a structured lack based in Aristotle’s
description of the enthymeme as a type of syllogism), and to reconceptualize it
as an emotionally sufficient image event (an organized excess based on the
sophistic understandings of thumos and the enthymeme). This project,
admittedly, relies primarily on sophistic and pre-Aristotelian understandings in
order to appropriate classical discourse “to provide critical insight to
contemporary theorists”—what Edward Schiappa, in his essay, “Neo-Sophistic
Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?”,
would refer to as “rational reconstruction” (Schiappa’s term for the less
appropriative practice of studying classical discourse to determine the meaning
of the original author is “historical reconstruction”) (194). Schiappa has taken
pains to argue his understanding and acceptance of postmodern approaches to
historiography such as those practiced by neosophists. But many still maintain
that Schiappa ultimately denies the validity of neosophistic approaches to
classical texts and figures, treating such approaches as either unknowable or
less worthy than traditional approaches to historiography.1
Victor Vitanza, for instance, argues that Schiappa himself appropriates the
work of Richard Rorty on the history of science and philosophy in order to
privilege “’historically grounded’ (would-be responsible) historiography over and
against fictionalized, therefore, ungrounded (irresponsible) historiography” (31).
According to Vitanza, Schiappa constructs a binary between the responsible
10

“historical reconstruction” of sophistic doctrine—historiography that attempts to
be faithful to the meaning of the Sophists—and the irresponsible “rational
reconstruction” of sophistic doctrine—historiography that holds some other value
above one’s faithfulness to historical meaning.
One might ask: (where) would the present work fit in to this classification
system? The punctum, to use Roland Barthes’ term, of this dissertation through
which thumos is being explored, is the enthymeme. And the main classical
source for the dominant definitions of the enthymeme is Aristotle (primarily his
Rhetoric and Prior Analytics). And it is Aristotle’s commendation of the
importance of the enthymeme in his works that has made the enthymeme “the
most intensively studied” element of Aristotle’s rhetorical treatises (Gaines 5). So,
it may at first seem that I am addressing a topic lacking the need for
reconstruction. But this dissertation ultimately rejects the conceptions of the
enthymeme developed from Aristotle as being unsuited to the highly visual
nature of modern discourse, favoring instead the sophistic understanding of the
enthymeme derived from the works of Isocrates, Gorgias, and Anaxamines. But
the ultimate goal is not simply to understand what these rhetors meant in their
use of the term “enthymeme,” but to motivate these alternative approaches in the
study of modern discourse. The debates over the historiographic methods used
to construct sophistic and neo-sophistic rhetoric is thus relevant to this
dissertation’s development of an understanding of visual enthymemes born from,
but not beholden to, sophistic accounts of enthymemic discourse.
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Edward Schiappa, in “Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?”, contends that
despite efforts by neosophistic scholars such as John Poulakos to produce a
coherent sophistic definition of rhetoric, that sophistic rhetoric is a “mirage—
something we see because we want and need to see it” (5).2 Later in his essay,
Schiappa critiques attempts to distinguish a “sophistic rhetoric” by pointing out
several difficulties inherent in such work. Among these difficulties lie the most
basic of questions, including how one defines who was a sophist. Some scholars,
including Poulakos, adopt the list compiled by Herman Dielz and Walther Kranz
in their work Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, which identifies the following
rhetors as sophists: Gorgias, Hippias, Protagoras, Critias, Antiphon, Prodicus,
and Thrasymachus.
This list is easily criticized, since many ancient Greek texts identify other
individuals as sophists, and any set of evaluative criteria will always be open to
the charge of being arbitrary. Truly, the figures on the Diels-Kranz list have
garnered more attention than others in modern scholarship (partially due to their
placement on the list), but various scholars have included on their lists of
sophists the following: Prometheus, Homer, Hesiod, Damon, Solon, Thales,
Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Zeno, Plato, Socrates, Isocrates,
Gorgias, Antiphon, Thrasymachus, Hippias, Prodicus, Aeschines, Eudoxus,
Protagoras, Critias, Polus, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Callicles, Antisthenes,
Alcidamas, Anaxamines, Alcidamas, and Lycophron, as well as several as-yetunnamed authors of ancient rhetorical treatises (“Mirage” 5–7).
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Schiappa focuses on three questions one must confront when attempting
to discuss sophistic rhetoric: First, are there any ideological or political views
common to the sophists? Poulakos does argue in “Sophistical Rhetoric as a
Critique of Culture” that sophists shared a liberatory purpose that was subversive
of the dominant social order. And Sharon Crowley has called for the revival of
sophistry based exactly on its tradition of socio-political critique in her essay, “A
Plea for the Revival of Sophistry.” But Schiappa argues that the evidence of
socio-political subversion is undercut, despite their challenge to orthodox
understandings of knowledge, for instance, by the high fees that would have
restricted such rhetorical education to only the rich (“Mirage” 10).
Even the charging of fees, though often cited, was not universal, and
therefore makes it difficult to answer in the affirmative Schiappa’s second
question: are there any professional behaviors common to sophists? Other
behaviors attributed to the sophists are arguably even less consistent than the
charging of fees. Often, specific sophists are held up as exemplars of a more
general sophistic practice. For example, Roger Moss argues, based mostly on
Gorgias’ highly poetic style, that one of the defining characteristics of sophistic
rhetoric was the “highly-wrought use of alliteration, assonance, rhyme, and other
parisonic devices, [and] parallelisms of all kinds” (213). But Gorgias was as
popular as he was exceptional, and such generalizations may obscure more than
they illuminate. Also, the attention given to Gorgias is partially a function of the
status of Plato’s work of the same name, so that placing him at the center of a
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definition of sophistic theory is ultimately a deference to Plato and his
(evaluative) definition of what it means to be a sophist.
Schiappa’s third question concerns whether it is possible to say of the
sophists (however defined) that they had anything adding up to a unified (or at
least, organized) sophistic rhetoric. Barring any material commonalities yet
unknown, Schiappa calls the desire to see sophistry as a unified project “simply
wishful thinking” (“Mirage” 5–10). The difficulty of defining a sophistic rhetoric is
compounded by the fact that the term from which we derive our modern word
rhetoric—rhêtorikê— was coined by Plato; “the sophists used not rhetoric but
logos to refer to their art of discourse” (McComiskey, Gorgias 7). Schiappa writes
of the word “logos” that it is “one of the most equivocal terms in the Greek
language” (“Mirage” 8). In fact, Schiappa has been a vocal proponent of the
argument that the word we now translate as “rhetoric” was most likely “coined by
Plato in the process of composing Gorgias around 385 B.C.” and is therefore
unsuitable for application to the practices of sophists (“Did” 457). Of course, as
mentioned above, if we are always already viewing the notion of sophistry
through works like Plato’s Gorgias, then perhaps it is more acceptable to use the
word rhetoric in reference to their art of discourse.
Even if one could identify a group one was willing to label sophists, one
must still deal with their being a diverse set of individuals with divergent views
and methods. Even the sophistic use of “logos” rather than “rhetoric” does not
provide a solid basis on which to build a sophistic rhetoric. McComiskey notes
that the two most prominent sophists, Gorgias and Protagoras, each held a “very
14

different conception of logos” and, therefore, any conception of sophistic rhetoric
is admittedly a “generic fiction with little historic validity” (Gorgias 7). As Schiappa
puts it, the construction of neosophistic rhetoric, especially one with the goal of
socio-political critique, is simply a sign that “it is we who have formulated the
rhetoric” (“Mirage” 15, emphasis added).
Here is where I would like to part with Schiappa, not by denying his claim
that we actively formulate (the history of) rhetoric to match our purposes, but by
arguing that he doesn’t acknowledge the full implications of this claim for all of
rhetorical theory. Schiappa’s critique of neosophistic rhetoric seems to want to
bypass the neosophistic claim that “every historical account is itself a historically
conditioned act of inventive writing and that every historian is inescapably
situated in his or her own contingent historical perspective” (Consigny 255,
emphasis added). The recognition of this claim by Schiappa would call into
question not only conceptions of sophistic rhetoric, but of all rhetorical theory. As
Covino reminds us, all conceptions of rhetoric are a product of interpretation
practiced by historically-situated selves, not only conceptions of sophistic
rhetoric. He writes:
. . . until recently, students and teachers were acquainted with an Aristotle
whose Rhetoric prescribed the style and arrangement of prose, and
whose Poetics reduced Tragedy quite neatly to rising and falling action
punctuated by catharsis. This was an Aristotle who had reached us
through centuries of interpreters, the Aristotle made congenial to Medieval
formulae for eloquence, Renaissance logic, and Enlightenment positivism.
15

This rather tidy, decisive Aristotle was quite appropriate to mid-century
American classrooms that mimicked the military virtues that won the war
and saved the peace: a codified, schematized philosopher who gave us
rules. (Art 1–2)
If all conceptions of rhetoric are products of interpretation (which Schiappa does
elsewhere admit), then it seems odd for him to single out neosophistic
conceptions of rhetoric for special treatment. In other words, it makes sense to
problematize the construction of a neosophistic rhetoric that appeals to the needs
of contemporary rhetoricians, but only if one is equally willing to problematize the
construction of all rhetorical theory and the positions advanced by its historical
formulations.
Perhaps the challenge to articulating a description of sophistic rhetoric
would be partially alleviated by treating each sophist individually (to study
Gorgian rhetoric, Critian rhetoric, Hesiod rhetoric, etc., separately). After all, part
of the reason that the dominant rhetorical traditions seem fixed is that they focus
almost exclusively on the works of only a few individuals (i.e., Aristotle and
Plato). But even the works of these two have been interpreted variably by
theorists over time. Looking at the historiography of rhetoric, Covino concludes
that the “very instability of the ‘rhetorical tradition’” should signify to us that “[h]ow
we read the history of rhetoric, and what we read, and the implications for
teaching we derive, can change” (2). Any attempt to identify a group of Greek
thinkers to whom we can apply a generic label, and a group of Greek thinkers to
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whom we can not apply these labels, thus seems unlikely to hold up under
historical analysis.
Taxonomies of Historiography
“SOCRATES: I am a great lover of these processes of division and
generalization; they help me to speak and to think.”
– Plato, Phaedrus
Schiappa makes a distinction between studying sophistic rhetoric through
“historical reconstruction” and “rational reconstruction,” terms borrowed from
Richard Rorty’s “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres.” Schiappa
distinguishes these approaches, respectively, as the desire either to interpret or
to appropriate ancient texts, claiming that “both ought to be done, but done
‘separately’” (“Neo-Sophistic” 196). Schiappa compares his distinctions to those
made by Stephen Malkin between historical and rational reconstruction:
“historical reconstruction of some philosopher’s thought gives an account of what
some past thinker said, or would have said, to his contemporaries” while a
“rational reconstruction treats a thinker (in many cases, dead) as within our own
philosophical framework” (Qtd. in “Neo-Sophistic” 193–194).
Schiappa describes the appropriative practice of rational reconstruction
thusly: “Since the goal of rational reconstruction is to provide critical insight to
contemporary theorists, the needs and values of current audiences justify less
rigidity and more creativity in the process of interpreting how dead authors
through their texts speak to live, contemporary authors (“Neo-Sophistic” 194). As
postmodern theory confirms, it’s not possible to have a value-free description,
and Schiappa’s is no exception. Schiappa depends on hierarchical oppositions
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(creative/academic, formal/informal, rigid/flexible) to describe rational
reconstruction, oppositions where one term is typically favored in any given
discourse community. Since value-embedded descriptions are inevitable,
perhaps the greatest indictment of Schiappa’s description, then, is not that he
uses such oppositions, but that he associates rational reconstruction with terms
that his own discourse community does not favor.
Bruce McComiskey critiques Schiappa’s taxonomy, arguing that “historical
reconstruction and rational reconstruction are fluid points on a continuum, not allor-nothing categories, and this continuum is best understood as historical
interpretation” (Gorgias 10). Furthermore, McComiskey refuses even to allow that
all examples of “neosophistic appropriation” fall within the category of rational
reconstruction, arguing that some writers “search the past for contributions to
modern theoretical problems and problematics” without necessarily “treating a
thinker ‘as within our own philosophical framework.’” Furthermore, not even all
neosophistic appropriation is performed in order to “appropriate ancient doctrines
in the same way,” and thus those desiring to categorize historicist work in rhetoric
cannot maintain a “clear distinction between the goals and methods of historical
scholarship that interprets ancient doctrines and ‘neo’ historical scholarship that
appropriates ancient doctrines for contemporary purposes” (Gorgias 11, 8). In
Vitanza’s words, the application of such exclusionary categories “disenable
history-writing and historiography” (352).
Victor Vitanza is less kind to Schiappa than McComiskey is (or,
apparently, I am), stating that Schiappa is a “traditional-philological18

‘metaphysical’ formalist” who, in his opposition of rational and historical
reconstructions of sophistic doctrine, is attempting to sort “sheep from goats” (32,
31). Vitanza’s disapproval of Schiappa’s distinctions is part of his greater inquiry
into what he calls the “negative dialectic” in his book Negation, Subjectivity, and
the History of Rhetoric. The negative dialectic includes various mechanisms of
exclusion, including the “dividing practices” (diaerisis) that Vitanza claims
Schiappa employs “to do history” (12). For Vitanza, the negative “enables, it
disenables . . . [but it is] mostly a disenabler because it excludes.” Vitanza finds
such a disenabling in Schiappa’s essay mentioned earlier, “Sophistic Rhetoric:
Oasis or Mirage?”:
Let me in/cite in historiography one general example: Schiappa asks the
question: The Sophists, oasis or mirage? He employs a dividing practice,
either oasis or mirage. No matter how anyone, including Schiappa, needs
or wants to say otherwise, with this formulation of the question, Schiappa
destroys the conditions of possibilities of the Sophists. (13)
In view of the dividing practices being applied to sophists, Vitanza feels his own
work in the history of rhetoric serves to “resurrect, or recreate the conditions of
the possibilities for, the Sophists as sublime, sovereign subjects that-are-notsubjects” (11).
Vitanza argues that by opposing historical reconstruction “over and
against fictionalized, therefore, ungrounded (irresponsible) historiography,”
Schiappa privileges historical reconstruction in ways that are not supported by
Rorty’s more pragmatic views from whom Schiappa takes his terms (Vitanza 31).
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According to Vitanza, Rorty is more of an “‘ironic’ formalist” and the difference
between Schiappa’s and Rorty’s approaches to historiography can be summed
up in this way:
The difference here, then, lies between the new philology (as practiced,
say, by Nietzsche and Rorty) and the old philology (as practiced by Ulrich
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Schiappa). The two have radically different
notions of ‘describing’ the world: Again, for Rorty, the ironist believes in no
‘final vocabulary’ and, thus, [believes] in redescriptions (anything can be
made to look either good or bad, like an oasis or mirage, a fact or fiction)
while the metaphysician, [believes] in descriptions (anything is either good
or bad, etc.). (32)
This raises the question of whether the success of the negative dialectic is
restricted by the possibility embedded in Vitanza’s own words—that, for the
ironist, “anything can be made to look either good or bad, like an oasis or mirage,
a fact or fiction” (emphasis altered). Although Vitanza seeks to expand the
possibilities of emergence of sophistic rhetoric, his own language reproduces a
dividing practice by limiting the ironist’s redescriptions to binary sets of either-or
constructions.
Sorting Antifoundationalist Sheep from Foundationalist Goats
If McComiskey’s critique challenges the very possibility of categorizing
scholarship easily by the degree of interpretation, it also suggests the
impossibility of the easy application of the labels “anti-foundationalist” and
“foundationalist” in the debate over the theorization of sophistic rhetoric
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(admittedly, I write this with the full realization that neosophistic theorists have
been widely, perhaps exclusively, associated with antifoundationalism). In a
response to Schiappa, Scott Consigny writes with remarkably high confidence
that
. . . we may characterize Schiappa’s neosophistic rivals, a group
including John Poulakos, Sharon Crowley, Victor Vitanza, Kathleen
Welch, and Susan Jarratt as ‘antifoundationalist’; and we may identify
Schiappa’s own camp, one including Eric Havelock, G. B. Kerferd,
Jacqueline de Romilly, and Thomas Cole, as ‘foundationalist.’ This
distinction is illuminating, for it situates their battle within the war raging in
the intellectual community over the nature and scope of rational inquiry
and of knowledge itself. (253)
As McComiskey critiques the bifurcation of all theorists of sophistic rhetoric into
responsible and irresponsible historiographers, so would I critique the automatic
labeling of those who doubt the existence of a coherent system of sophistic
rhetoric with foundationalism (as long as this doubt is qualified as a lack of
current persuasive account of sophistic rhetoric, not the impossibility of such an
account).
Significantly, the association of sophism with antifoundationalism is related
to the recovery of rhetoric as a field of critical inquiry in the twentieth century. As
Stanley Fish writes, “another word for antifoundationalism is rhetoric, and one
could say without too much exaggeration that modern antifoundationalism is old
sophism writ analytic” (Doing 347). The eagerness to engage in a debate over
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the viability of a concept of sophistic rhetoric is thus a marker of the valuation of
rhetoric itself, and engaging in such a debate, regardless of the side taken, could
be taken as an affirmation of antifoundational principles. As Schiappa himself
writes, the “worst fate in academia is to have one’s work ignored” (“Some” 272).
In some ways, the conversation of rhetoric can only continue to the degree that it
is antifoundational.
The “war raging in the intellectual community” between foundationalists
and antifoundationalists that Consigny identifies may exist, although the
differences among factions in this “war” are unlikely to boil down to two opposing
and contradictory groups, one of which is wrong and the other right. Such
classification seems incompatible with some of the sophistic pronouncements
favored by neosophists, such as Protagoras’ assertions that “of all things the
measure is man,” that one can make the “weaker logos stronger,” and that
“contradiction is impossible,” since these assertions suggest that “there are no
absolute, context-independent criteria that exist independently of the human
beings who hold them” and, thus, the “truth of any assertion derives from the
persuasiveness with which it is presented to a particular audience” and not in any
disinterested realm of abstract truth (Consigny 256). What this suggests, rather,
is the dependence of the persuasiveness of any claim on the standards of
specific communities of scholars. If one accepts that even foundational accounts
are persuasive to some communities of scholars, then one can see that
foundationalism and antifoundationalism are similar in that that they are both
deployed rhetorically.
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Consigny claims that “many neosophists tend to describe their fifthcentury Greek precursors with the pivotal topos of ‘philosophy and rhetoric,’”
where philosophy is identified with the “search for ontological or epistemological
foundations” and rhetoric is identified with the “antifoundational world view itself”
(255). At the least, Consigny’s description elides one central point—that despite
the meta-differences among historiographic communities, they both proceed to
defend their views rhetorically. Consigny states that sophists advocated a
“rhetoricist model of language in which ‘truth’ is a sobriquet awarded by particular
audiences to persuasive, partisan fabrications rather than a condition of the world
that some statements accurately represent.” But Consigny’s dismissal of
Schiappa’s account of sophistic rhetoric overlooks the manner in which
Schiappa’s foundationalist discourse is part of the vocabulary found persuasive
by a certain historiographic community. Stated another way, foundationalist
discourse (even if “wrong”) is entirely rhetorical, since it appeals to the search for
foundations espoused by members of a community of scholars. To set such a
community against another community that is supposedly committed to rhetoric
is to limit rhetoric to only that with which you agree.
The Primacy of Rhetoric in Rhetorical Theory
I will return to Consigny’s defense of the work of neosophists and the need
to view these theories as rhetorical endeavors below, but want to here point out
that I bring up this debate, not simply to justify attention given later to a nonAristotelian (“sophistic” seems too loaded at this point) account of the
enthymeme grounded in thumos, but to temper my own dismissal of the
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enthymeme tradition derived from the work of Aristotle. According to James
McBurney’s early retrospective, “The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical
Theory,” scholars have traditionally concerned themselves with six areas of
inquiry regarding discussions of the enthymeme in the works of Aristotle:
(1) The passages in which Aristotle explains that the materials of the
enthymeme are probabilities (είκότα) and signs (δηµεία);
(2) the passages in which Aristotle declares example to be a form of the
enthymeme;
(3) the passages in which he discusses the relationship of the enthymeme
to the topics or topoi;
(4) those in which we may see the relation of the enthymeme to ethos and
pathos;
(5) the passages in which demonstrative and refutative enthymemes are
distinguished; and
(6) the passages relating to the suppression of a proposition in the
enthymeme. (56)
It is not uncommon to find entire essays devoted to one of the above concerns,
essays that seek to answer limited inquiries such as how many premises must be
present for an audience to construct a syllogism from, or whether the enthymeme
makes use of fallible or infallible signs. It is not my goal to show that theorists
interested in these conventional questions and characteristics are wrong (or that
they’re foundationalists), only that such considerations are not as useful to
contemporary scholars interested, for instance, in the field of visual rhetoric, as a
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conception of the enthymeme understood through thumos can be. The easy
designations of groups into extreme positions—both Schiappa’s separation of
scholars into rational and historical reconstructionists as well as Consigny’s
division of scholars into either antifoundationalists or foundationalists—is likely to
be inaccurate and, to use Vitanza’s word, “disenabling.”
I am less interested in clarifying what Aristotle “meant” the enthymeme to
be (and, honestly, not entirely committed to what Gorgias or Anaxamines or
Isocrates “meant” by it either), than in a more expansive view of the practices
found in enthymemic rhetorical practices. And while I believe that the theorization
of the visual enthymeme may further certain antifoundational projects, I’m not
convinced that its derivation from sophistic approaches to the enthymeme or
thumos make it automatically antifoundational. It seems unlikely that much of
what Consigny characterizes as foundational principles—that “there are rational
laws and standards immune from the vagaries of time and chance and that
knowledge is more secure than the transient beliefs of contingent human beings,”
for instance—is evident in any strong sense in the works of the authors he labels
as foundational (253–254). Rather, these are absolute statements to which few, if
any, scholars in rhetoric would ascribe. In fact, Schiappa has argued quite
forcefully for his antifoundational chops and the acknowledged situatedness of
his own inquiry in his “Some of My Best Friends Are Neosophists: A Response to
Scott Consigny.”
One way to restate the incongruity at the heart of antifoundationalist
critiques such as Consigny’s is that, though they assume that the “the art of
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reading is thoroughly ‘rhetorical’ in that it involves using the vocabulary of one’s
own community in order to invent a persuasive account,” they do not allow that,
for some communities, the language of foundationalism is such a vocabulary
(254). So, while I generally agree with the observations of antifoundationalists, it
is hard to agree with Consigny’s dismissal of Schiappa’s work on the grounds
that it “presents a highly partisan interpretation” when antifoundationalism itself
reveals that “’truth’ is a sobriquet awarded by particular audiences to persuasive,
partisan fabrications” (253, 255). According to antifoundational principles,
persuasive arguments can only ever be “partisan fabrications.” To insist
otherwise would be to deny the situatedness of speakers in what Stanley Fish
calls interpretive communities, communities that ensure that “every interpretation
is a provisional fabrication whose validity depends solely on its ability to elicit
commendation or approval from members of the community” (Consigny 254).
Consigny’s claim that Schiappa “fails to make [his reading of the sophists]
stronger than that of his neosophistic rivals,” disregards the basic insight of
antifoundational theory—that the determination of what makes one argument
stronger than another is only possible within the evaluative standards of some
community (253).3 By not distinguishing between the standards of what is
persuasive to the communities being addressed by the foundationalists and the
communities addressed by the antifoundationalists, this claim deploys a universal
standard (of what makes an argument strong), even as it repudiates the notion of
universal standards. Just as Aristotle’s description of the sophists enabled “future
rhetoricians to vilify the sophists as opponents to everything right and good . . .
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regardless of its actual resemblance to what many of the sophists might have
professed,” the contemporary specter of foundationalism promoted by Consigny
may enable the vilification of historical reconstructionists (McComiskey, Gorgias
3).
I am cautioned here by Foucault’s explanation of repression in The History
of Sexuality in which he posits that there is a “speaker’s benefit” embedded in the
belief that sex is repressed which ensures that the “mere fact that one is
speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression” (6). It is
possible that advocates of antifoundationalism have often benefited from a
characterization of foundationalism as more uniform, more entrenched, and more
influential—in a word, more foundational—than its practitioners achieve. I have
no desire to defend foundationalism, only to remind myself that the disciplinary
history of the enthymeme, and of all historiography, is based within a “war” (to
use Consigny’s description) among various discourse communities, each of
which, as antifoundationalism teaches us, is “inescapably situated in [its] own
contingent historical perspective” (Consigny 255). To dismiss the arguments of
situated scholars on the basis that they are situated within communities with
which one does not share founding beliefs is to construct unnecessary impasses
among scholars, and to grossly underestimate the dialogic potential located
within the play of signification, which regularly overcomes the incommensurability
of situated language games.4
Arguing for the recovery of a concept of thumos in order to reform our
understanding of what an enthymeme is, and what a visual enthymeme might be,
27

will undoubtedly break with current dominant accounts of the enthymeme. But
where this endeavor will most strongly align with past attempts at theorizing the
enthymeme is in the rhetorical nature of the endeavor. In regards to Poster’s
claim cited earlier—that the history of the enthymeme shows that “rhetorical
theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories into
conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period”—it should now
be clear that such reinterpretation is consonant with an antifoundational view of
discourse as rhetorical, regardless of the specific community addressed or the
principles invoked (6). With this understanding, there is more to gain by exposing
continuity between this and past accounts of the enthymeme, than by a strictly
oppositional framework.
In the terms used by Vitanza and Rorty above, this dissertation is
admittedly a redescription of the enthymeme that is also an appropriation of
thumos, conceiving of it as a notion which “can be made” to apply to today’s
visually saturated discourse. My evaluative criteria becomes thus to be useful, or
to be interesting, or to be provocative, but not necessarily to be correct. The
redescription of visual enthymemes is intentionally an act of theorizing—“the act
of engaging in critical, philosophical, hermeneutic speculation about a subject”—
as opposed to theory-building—“the attempt to arrive at a generalizable
explanation of how something works” (Olson 8). By theorizing the circulation of
visual enthymemes, I do not anticipate being able to describe how all visuals
work, or even how all enthymematic visuals work, but rather to speculate as to
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the connections between our understandings of emotion, images, and a Greek
concept over 2500 years old.
The desire to understand the relationships among images, emotions, and
persuasion by (re)theorizing (visual) enthymemes matches Vitanza’s desire to
“redescribe so as to create the conditions for the possibility of new
configurations” (33). The reconfiguration of the enthymeme made available will
hopefully better accommodate the widespread use of images in modern
discourse and recognize the role of the audience’s capacity for emotion in the
reception of these images. This is a speculative act with no intention to remain
within the traditional bounds of the ancient rhetorical texts from which it
proceeds. Thus, this text is probably best viewed as “provocation rather than
information, as interruptions in the long-standing conversation about the
elements of rhetoric” (Covino 3).
The redescription of the enthymeme in this text could be considered a
form of rational reconstruction that probably falls further towards the
appropriation pole of McComiskey’s continuum of historical interpretation.
Although it does make use of sophistic texts, it primarily appropriates a notion
from classical rhetoric proper, the enthymeme, thereby reinforcing the notion that
every rhetorical concept is brought to us through a process of interpretation. And,
therefore, it focuses also on the reception and uses of these theories by various
scholars, rather than their original contexts. This text will not establish a “theory
with a big T” capable of translating all images into a formally structured model of
the visual enthymeme or even necessarily arrive at an applicable model
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appropriate to the teaching of college-level argument (Olson 8). In fact, one of
the key features of the enthymeme explored here will be it’s ambiguity—its
conceptualization as a “rich set of relationships with the potential of being
expressed in a multitude of ways”—a quality that makes the enthymeme, despite
its classical heritage, uniquely suited to theorizing connections among
postmodern argumentation, visual persuasion, and the experience of emotion
(Emmel 132). It is the enthymeme’s malleability, rather than its specificity, that
makes it of interest here.
Further Di/vision
Discussions of the enthymeme are often characterized by the same type
of dividing practices as those identified by Vitanza and practiced by Consigny in
discussions of the sophists. The following examples provide insight into how the
features identified above with the debate over the recovery of sophistic rhetoric
have been deployed in debates specifically concerning with the enthymeme.
Richard Lanigan writes, for instance, that the “scholarly preoccupation with
enthymematic definition is a continuing attempt to explicate faithfully or radically
depart from the corpus of Aristotelian writings” (207, emphasis added). Such a
characterization misrepresents the nuanced differences among the various
approaches to defining the enthymeme. It also perpetuates, without naming it so,
the binary between the historical reconstruction and rational reconstruction of
rhetorical theory. In practice, what it provides is simply a way to dismiss certain
scholarly work or approaches as inferior or misguided.
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Another scholar who is interested in sorting sheep from goats in the
context of the defining of the enthymeme is Robert Gaines. In his essay,
“Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Contemporary Arts of Practical Discourse,” Gaines
produces an overview of the scholarly works on the enthymeme, attempting to
show that most of them “exploit their chosen subject merely as the platform to
launch a doctrine that is either foreign or antithetical to explicit doctrines in
Aristotle's position” (10). Gaines softens this statement with the following:
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong in holding views that oppose
Aristotle—about enthymemes or anything else. But insofar as argument
theorists directly or indirectly attribute such views to Aristotle himself, a
problem arises; for they put words in Aristotle's mouth that he would have
refused to speak. The result is a misappropriation of Aristotle's authority
and, ultimately, the demotion of the Rhetoric to a shallow heuristic, devoid
of consistency or theoretical force. (10)
Here, Gaines is defending the legitimacy only of reconstructing the ideas of
Aristotle, and he does so by assuming that most of the scholarly works he
consults are attempting historical reconstruction in order to level his criticism that
they claim “Aristotelian authority for a position that Aristotle could not have
accepted” (17). But even Gaines admits that the Rhetoric reveals that Aristotle is
“openly committed to contrary views” regarding the enthymeme (8). Despite this,
Gaines displays a clear willingness to criticize scholars for attempting rational
reconstruction. For instance, in response to Jasper’s Neel’s statement in
Aristotle’s Voice that “Of this one claim, however, I am certain: whatever an
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enthymeme may be, it is not a syllogism” (63), Gaines writes that “Regrettably,
Neel was not at pains to specify the non-syllogistic nature of enthymeme” (15).
Rather than read Neel’s work as an intentional misreading of the passages Neel
cites, Gaines chooses to “infer [Neel’s] view from the Aristotelian passages he
stresses.”
Gaines’ criticism of Neel is especially ill-aimed considering the fact that
Neel makes it exceptionally clear that his goal is not to reconstruct Aristotle’s (or
any other figure’s) original meaning. Neel explicitly contrasts the “professional”
discourse of scholars like Gaines and Schiappa with what he calls “mere
sophistry” (190). He writes:
One alternative to such professionalization is sophistry, which seems to be
the place where I always end up. The most obvious way to become a
sophist is to articulate and then inhabit the theory and the pedagogy of
previous sophists. . . . Increasingly, I prefer a second, perhaps less
obvious, way of seeking out a theory and a pedagogy with the name
"sophist." And I find the second way more reliable and more productive
than trying to figure out what Protagoras or Gorgias or some other sophist
meant or thought. I prefer to inhabit the notions of "sophistry" created by
Plato and Aristotle. Whether Plato and Aristotle described "sophistry"
accurately matters little to me. What matters is that the theoretical frame
(up) that Plato and Aristotle left for us exists through its exclusion of
something that they called "sophistry." (190–191)
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Rather than try to walk in the shoes of past sophists by reproducing specific
pedagogies or theories, Neel chooses instead to (dis)identify with the
characterization of sophists as passed down from rhetoric’s “founding fathers”
(191). The historical figure of the sophist is one that, as Neel admits, is “quite
difficult to pin down.” Aristides, a Greek rhetorician of the second century, writes
of this term skeptically in his Orations:
Did not Herodotus call Solon a “sophist,’ and in turn Pythagoras? . . . Does
not Lysias call Plato a ‘sophist,” and again Aeschines? By way of reproach
in the case of Lysias, one might say. But the rest of the authors at any rate
were not reproaching those other distinguished individuals; nevertheless
they called them this name. . . . No, I think that ‘sophist’ was probably a
general term . . . . (Qtd. in McComiskey, Gorgias 3)
Although the historical accuracy of the term sophist is debatable, the description
of sophistry given us by Plato and Aristotle is something that Neel can engage
(and inhabit), without feeling the need to explicate the works of specific
individuals to find the most accurate interpretation or most faithful translation.
Besides, this pursuit would most definitely be hindered by the fact that “the
ancient Greek term sophist simply meant ‘wise man,’ until, that is, Plato and his
fourth-century BCE contemporaries changed its usage to a term of reproach”
(McComiskey, Gorgias 3).
It is only by adopting the definition of sophist passed down by Plato that
one has a specific approach to rhetoric to contend with. Thus, the study of
sophistry is for Neel a way to recognize how “Plato and Aristotle located rhetoric
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in a certain place and oriented it in a certain direction. I am not content either with
the place or the direction, and I would very much like to know what happens
when that foundation is moved and the orientation turned” (191). It is difficult to
see how Gaines, in defense of his own interpretation of the enthymeme, could
legitimately accuse Neel and others of being “shot through with misappropriation
. . . [because, for instance, their] reading conflicts with Aristotle's sharp distinction
between logical and expressive matters within the Rhetoric” (18). Such an
accusation assumes that Neel is attempting to produce a historical reconstruction
of the sophists, which obviously he is not.
Recovering Thumos
Rather than align the recovery of thumos in rhetorical studies via the
enthymeme with antifoundational or foundational thinking, it may be more
accurate to say that this recovery will be rhetorical. The connection of thumos to
the visual enthymeme is useful, not only because it allows one to bring the
enthymeme into line with contemporary rhetorical thinking and forms of
discourse, but because it enables the linkage of the discourses of emotion and
images to classical persuasion. Although my goal is to construct a space for
theorizing the visual enthymeme, a concept I believe would be useful to rhetorical
theorists, I imagine no ultimate telos for it (nor for the conventional enthymeme)
within rhetoric and composition studies. As Michel Foucault has said, “If you
knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that
you would have the courage to write it? . . . The game is worthwhile insofar as we
don’t know what will be the end” (Technologies 9).
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In the discussion below, the enthymeme may emerge primarily as a
practice to be resisted due to its ability to obscure the workings of ideology
because of “how natural enthymematic reasoning is in the arguments we make”
(Emmel 134). Or the reconsideration of the enthymeme may needlessly reaffirm
tenets of reader-response theory that now comprise the “foundational
assumptions” of much modern day scholarship (Harkin 416). Or the enthymeme
may appear irrelevant once it emerges that the enthymeme is a “condensed,
mediated, and now ubiquitous, form” of public argumentation, a banal feature of
the always “already said” condition of fragmented postmodern discourse (Aden
62, 55). If any of these outcomes occurs, I will not be entirely disappointed or
surprised.
In terms set forth by Gregory Ulmer, the transformation of the enthymeme
from a linguistic model to an affective model constitutes the “choral work” of
heuretics—the creation of a space in which a new method can be invented, work
that is “only preclusive, a mere beginning, a proposal, an experiment” (33).
Heuretics is Ulmer’s answer to the oft-cited divide between theory and practice.
While method is often considered a prior condition to theory, heuretics is a
project of “generating a method out of theory,” a method that is based on the
work of avant-garde artists and therefore applies “performance strategies to
research” (xii). It focuses on production rather than interpretation, prompting us to
ask not, “what is the meaning of an existing work?”, but “[b]ased on a given
theory, how might another text be produced?” (xiii).
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According to Ulmer, the enthymeme of Aristotle is part of a discourse
focused on the creation of unassailable (because correctly structured)
arguments. In this type of “argumentative writing the reader deals with the
product or end result of a reasoning process” (38). Rather than introducing the
audience to the potential meanings and knowledge accessible through dialogue,
argument “provided one path and suppressed everything else . . . the goal of the
enthymeme was to convince the reader that the solution offered to the problem
was the only one possible.” Reinventing the enthymeme is thus also an
opportunity to place it beyond the realm of argumentative writing. The visual
perhaps represents a method that is valuable exactly because it can be an
enthymeme without being an argument.
Due to the speculative nature of attempting to reinvent the enthymeme,
application is not an explicit goal. In other words, the goal is not to produce a
Theory of the visual enthymeme that will allow one to explicate individual images
in a mechanical manner. As Brian Massumi writes: “The first rule of thumb if you
want to invent or reinvent concepts is simple: don’t apply them. If you apply a
concept or system of connection between concepts, it is the material you apply it
to that undergoes change, much more markedly than do the concepts” (17).
Massumi’s charge perhaps takes postmodern accounts of
incommensurability to an unnecessary extreme, suggesting that rethinking
concepts is only possible within the arena of a single assembly of language
games. But it does draw attention to the fact that the most contested areas of
theoretical work are not likely to be in the application of concepts, the
36

consequences of which, he claims, are mostly limited to the objects of criticism.
Because new objects lack hierarchical distinction within a discipline, the work of
theory is most contentious when practiced within a discipline’s recognized
borders. Such is the work of recovering the enthymeme, not through applying a
conventional definition to a new field of objects (images), but through the
recovery of a suppressed conception of the enthymeme made visible by inquiry
into our modern reliance on visual discourse.
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Chapter 2
Reconsidering the Heart of Enthymemic Rhetoric
“What then was an Enthymeme? Oxford! Thou wilt think us mad to ask.”
– Thomas De Quincey, Selected Essays on
Rhetoric by Thomas de Quincey
In William Covino and David Jolliffe’s 1995 collection, Rhetoric: Concepts,
Definitions, Boundaries, which attempts to introduce students to the “‘scope’ and
‘circumference’ of the field of rhetoric” by illuminating the “presence of rhetoric in
intellectual and institutional history and as a shaping force in contemporary
intellectual, academic, and political domains,” the enthymeme does not appear in
any of the collected excerpts of scholarly articles and books (xi). According to the
text’s index, the single mention of the enthymeme is in the opening glossary. The
opening words of the first three of the five paragraphs in this glossary definition
reveal the approach of the editors in defining the enthymeme: “In his Rhetoric,
Aristotle proposes the enthymeme . . . “; “For Aristotle, the enthymeme . . .”;
“Aristotle’s proposal that the enthymeme . . . “ (Covino and Jolliffe 48).
The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the enthymeme’s glossary definition
focus on two examples that illustrate Lloyd Bitzer’s reconsideration of the
enthymeme from his essay “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited” (emphasis added).
Obviously, the heart of enthymemic rhetoric is here defined by Aristotle and his
interlocutors. In Keywords in Composition Studies, the enthymeme garners just a
single mention in the section on argument, where it is given the sole definition as
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“a syllogism from probabilities and signs” (a structural definition derived from
Aristotle) (Heiker and Vandenberg 14). In the race for contemporary rhetorical
theory, the enthymeme appears to be an “also ran.”
It seems that despite the contemporary resurgence of interest in classical
rhetoric, of which Covino and Jolliffe’s text is a part, the enthymeme has not lived
up to Aristotle’s claim that the enthymeme constitutes the soma, or fundamental
body or substance, of persuasion.5 Charles Mudd writes that if we believed
Aristotle’s claims that “the enthymeme is the heart of this rhetoric . . . we should
expect to find the enthymeme at the very basis of our teaching of argumentation
and persuasion. Such, however, is not the case” (409). In fact, only one textbook
has made the enthymeme a central part of its pedagogy, John Gage’s 1991 The
Shape of Reason (Gage has also authored several well-known articles on the
enthymeme). Before considering the various pedagogies built upon the
enthymeme (not much evident in textbooks, but evident in scholarship, and
presumably, therefore, in individual classrooms), the recent history of the
enthymeme within the field and the record of its transformations as a rhetorical
concept should be addressed, since it is here that one finds the theoretical bases
for these pedagogies.
Open up handbooks of rhetorical theory, classically-based writing
textbooks, or the many journal volumes in which discussions of the enthymeme
have appeared throughout the 20th century, and you will find a range of
descriptions of what lies at the heart of enthymemic rhetoric. And this is not due
to the fact that there exist in these documents sophistic and Aristotelian
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understandings of the enthymeme in competition with one another. In most
cases, the range of definitions and approaches derive solely from the work of
Aristotle. Aristotle’s trend toward systematizing may provide many things, but,
historically, one of them has not been an authoritative understanding of the
enthymeme. In the absence of such an authoritative definition of the enthymeme,
one encounters definitions like the following:
•

“The enthymeme was understood to be a syllogism of which one
proposition is suppressed” (Seaton 113)

•

“[by enthymeme, Aristotle] means concrete proof, proof applicable to
human affairs, such argument as is actually available in current
discussions” (Baldwin, qtd. in Bitzer 400)

•

“The enthymeme is defined as a syllogism with one (or more) premises
missing” (Simonson 303)

•

“[Aristotle] defines the enthymeme as a syllogism with a specific
subject matter, namely syllogisms from probabilities (eikos) and signs
(semion)” (Madden, “Treatment” 167).

In looking at the various accounts of the enthymeme (and there are dozens
more, to be sure), one finds that even the most straightforward descriptors are
found in incongruous and sometimes contradictory forms. For instance, scholars
don’t agree on the number of premises that can be missing from a syllogism in
order for an enthymeme to exist. Some scholars claim that only one premise can
be missing, while other scholars claim that more than one premise can be
missing from the original syllogism.
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One could support the former claim that only one premise can be missing
by arguing that any two propositions of a syllogism do contain all three elements
that are being related. Therefore, deductive syllogistic reasoning that does not
diverge from the original syllogism can be constructed enthymemically from only
two propositions because all three terms will be explicit even in only two of the
three propositions that make up the syllogism. The caveat to this approach which
supports the latter claim is the recognition that, in any speech situation, there are
always a host of unarticulated assumptions or premises that could provide the
basis for the elaboration of deductive reasoning, even from just one premise of a
syllogism, which will necessarily establish some relation between two elements.
The enthymemic elaboration of an argument from only one premise
understandably allows more flexibility in the connections drawn between the
terms, but the standards of the discourse community in which these premises
circulate effectively limit the possible connections that community members will
construct.
Of course, there are many other constructions of the enthymeme that do
not depend on whether one or more than one premise can be missing. As Covino
and Jolliffe’s text mentions, current “scholarship has called into question the
practice of defining an enthymeme in terms of the number of its parts” (48). Other
sources refer to the enthymeme as a “rhetorical syllogism,” a “dialectical
syllogism,” the “very body of proof,” or the “substance of rhetorical persuasion”
(Miller and Bee 201). These definitions alternatively stress the incompleteness,
the mode of reasoning, the materials used, the concreteness (i.e. probability) of
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these materials, or the extent or type of audience participation necessary to
consider a statement an enthymeme. While these distinctions are important to an
understanding of the enthymeme’s disciplinary history, the two paradigms of the
enthymeme that are of primary importance here are what will be referred to as
the structural and rhetorical paradigms of the enthymeme.
Obviously, from the competing definitions mentioned above, it would be
mistaken to claim that the enthymeme has been ignored in the discipline of
rhetoric and composition. But neither has it been embraced in any standardized
manner. One theorist claims it is the “the most intensively studied of all
Aristotelian subjects among communication and English scholars” (Gaines 5).
But the amount of scholarly attention given to the enthymeme is no measure of
its disciplinary status. Rather, since the enthymeme is generally theorized via the
works of Aristotle, this more likely says something about the disciplinary status of
Aristotle himself. As Thomas Conley claims, “nowhere outside of Aristotle does
any notion of the enthymeme as a syllogistic creature or as a stylistic turn play a
very important role in rhetorical theory” (180).
The two notions that Conley mentions above represent two common
approaches to the syllogism—that which treats as its heart the logical structure of
deductive reasoning (a “syllogistic creature”), and that which treats as its heart an
aesthetic or emotional effect. Scholarly definitions of the reasons for using
enthymemes rarely focus on the logical structure, but do tend to focus on the
interpersonal or situational aspects of communication, as when one scholar
writes that the “shared communal perception“ on which the enthymeme is based
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is so familiar that to mention it would “insult the reader's intelligence, advertise
the writer's ineptitude, and slow down the discourse” (Green 624). The first
concern above is most closely related to pathos, as a desire to avoid insulting the
audience; the second concern above is most closely related to ethos, as a desire
to maintain the writer’s aura of intelligence; while the third concern above is most
closely related to stylistic concerns. In none of these conventional explanations
for why the enthymeme is used in persuasive discourse do formal qualities play a
significant role.
The opposition between descriptions of the logical form of the enthymeme
and the contextual explanations for its existence and use—earlier likened to the
opposition of rhetoric and logic—has provided a productive dichotomy for
rhetorical scholars exactly because it reproduces the boundary between
objective and subjective models of communication, a barrier that scholars are
perpetually fond of transgressing. Similar boundaries saturated the debates over
process and product, for example. In some cases, these boundaries were
transcended by introducing a third term. In the work of James Berlin, the writing
pedagogies based in the objective and subjective epistemological theories of
reality and rhetoric are considered in the light of a third (arguably superior)
category that he calls “transactional.” While objective approaches located truth in
the material world and subjective approaches located truth in the internal
experience of the subject, transactional approaches locate truth in the interaction
of the elements of the rhetorical situation. As Berlin writes:
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Transactional rhetoric does not locate reality in some empirically verifiable
external phenomenon (sense impression or the quantifiable) or within
some realm apart from the external (ideas or vision). It instead discovers
reality in the interaction of the features of the rhetorical process itself—in
the interpretation of material reality, writer, audience, and language. (155)
The distinction is important to the discussion of the enthymeme here because,
since scholars have been preoccupied with defining what an enthymeme is—
regardless of whether they base this definition in syllogistic structure or in the
audience’s reaction—they often ignore the rhetorical contexts in which
enthymemes circulate. It is interesting that Berlin singles out vision as one of the
realms of interior subjectivity (although, oddly, “sense impression” is associated
with external phenomena despite the less-than-objective condition of most
sensory experience; seemingly, vision is not one of the objective senses).
Berlin’s association of vision with subjective approaches to reality
suggests that our experience of an image is highly individualized. But scholars
such as John Berger, Laura Mulvey, Roland Barthes, and Stuart Hall have
detailed how ways of seeing are socially constructed, reproduced through codes
suffused, for instance, with ideologies of race, class and gender. Whether a
theory of the visual enthymeme based in the notion of transactional rhetoric has
been or could be developed remains to be seen. But just because the two
dominant versions of the enthymeme are opposed along traditional lines of
objective and subjective approaches does not mean they have been given equal
weight in composition theory.
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A Problem of Definition
Claims that the enthymeme has been understudied or overstudied lack
any easy criteria for how much a discipline should pay to a particular concept. It
can be said with surety, however, that within the texts that have sought to
address the enthymeme and its role and potential in rhetorical theory, there is no
single agreed-upon definition of the enthymeme. Carol Poster recognizes this
when she states that “Despite the frequency with which the enthymeme has been
discussed in contemporary rhetorical literature . . . there seems to be no general
agreement on the precise nature of what it is that is under discussion when the
term enthymeme is used” (1). Even “most of what we have read about the
enthymeme in the literature,” Conley states, “proves on closer examination to be
simplistic” (183).
Many essays focusing on the enthymeme begin with a declaration of the
ambiguity surrounding its definition, echoing the incredulity expressed by de
Quincey above. Nancy Harper begins her essay on the enthymeme by stating
that “[a]s most students of rhetoric eventually learn, everyone knows what an
enthymeme is and no one knows what an enthymeme is” (304). Conley echoes
this dilemma of students when he writes that “A great deal of what circulates
these days as settled opinion about the nature of the enthymeme . . . is less
secure than most students of rhetoric seem to realize” (168). Daniel Goulding
simply states that the “concept of the enthymeme continues to be an enigma”
(104).
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In a sense, the ambiguity identified is the exigence the author cites to
justify the imminent essay, lending support to the idea that the enthymeme’s
ambiguity is indeed productive—at least of scholarship in rhetorical theory. The
“problem of definition” is the comfortable port of entry for many a scholar into the
scholarly conversation surrounding the enthymeme. These authors acknowledge
the ambiguity of the enthymeme, yet do not always attribute this lack of
consensus to any specific cause, leaving readers merely with the sense that
there exists a disciplinary lack of a systematic or resolute definition of the
enthymeme. In many cases, this ambiguity regarding the enthymeme is seen as
something that can be eliminated through rigorous scholarship, rather than as a
necessary component of the enthymeme’s function.
Besides modern scholars’ lack of agreement over the definition of the
enthymeme, other grounds exist for substantiating the need to re-examine this
concept. For instance, some scholars locate the cause of the uncertainty
regarding the enthymeme in the content or shape of Aristotle’s work. As Brad
McAdon writes, Aristotle’s accounts of the materials that constitute enthymemes
are “never reconciled into a coherent account (or theory) in the Rhetoric. Rather,
each conception of materials for the enthymeme is presented in a way that
obscures, rather than facilitates, our understanding” (223). Lanigan points to
Aristotle’s placement of discussion of the enthymeme in separate texts (in the
Organon and in the Rhetoric) as contributing to the widespread belief in the
“bifurcation of formal and material causes,“ a belief which obscures the actual
“unity of conceptualization” achieved in Aristotle’s discussions of the enthymeme
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(209). Lloyd Bitzer states plainly that “the reader of Aristotle’s Rhetoric will find no
unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme” (399).
Others scholars suggest that the lack of agreement regarding the
enthymeme signifies confusion, incompetence, or even opportunism among
scholars. As mentioned in the opening chapter, Gaines leans toward the latter
when he accuses scholars of the enthymeme of “exploit[ing] their chosen subject
merely as the platform to launch a doctrine that is either foreign or antithetical to
explicit doctrines in Aristotle's position” and putting “words in Aristotle's mouth
that he would have refused to speak” (10). It’s not clear that such attacks on
theorists are to be taken seriously, however. While not every instance of theory is
equally interesting, reasonable, or even ethical, it is commonplace to attack
theorists for, basically, being theorists. For instance, the editors of the recent
anthology, Theory’s Empire: An Anthology of Dissent, mount an attack on the
dominance of theory in the field(s) of English studies over the last few decades
by claiming that
. . . today’s theoretical vocabulary has led to an intellectual void at the core
of our educational endeavors, scarcely masked by all the posturing,
political zealotry, pretentiousness, general lack of seriousness, and the
massive opportunism that is particularly glaring in the extraordinary
indifference to or outright attacks on logic and consistency. (Corral and
Patai 13)
Here, the charge of opportunism is brought to the forefront, since charges of
incompetence or confusion are less likely to find purchase among the established
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scholars these editors seek to dethrone. In short, the editors of Theory’s Empire
attack the ethos of theorists, hoping to convince readers that these scholars’
motives are selfish and insincere, and that their methods are lacking in
professionalism.
In fact, Wayne Booth calls such a view of discourse “motivism.” Those
who take this view believe that “anyone’s justification for an action is always
suspect and often merely self-serving” (Covino and Jolliffe 55). Patricia RobertsMiller writes in her book Deliberate Conflict that such an “interest-based model of
discourse” assumes that the primary motivation of communication is selfishness
and therefore conflict “should not be settled through argument as much as
through bargaining” (5). Roberts-Miller also states that such a model of
communication is “likely to have come from the agonistic tradition in rhetoric” (5).
Motivism thus positions rhetors in competition with one another, without the
necessary tolerance for alternate viewpoints or for incommensurable language
games that many have argued is a requirement for living in contemporary
society. Because they do not focus on commonalities among positions and
communities, but rather take a polemical view of discourse, motivists find it
difficult to discuss values or to endorse any reasons that could be used
effectively in the public sphere to generate consensus among discourse
communities.
Not all attacks on scholars of the enthymeme rely on ethical claims. Bower
Aly’s verdict combines the two faults of confusion and incompetence when he
writes that “philosophers generally, I have come to suppose, either have not read
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or do not understand the Rhetoric of Aristotle” (266). Richard Lanigan advocates
the former as well when he claims that the “historical controversy generated by
logicians and rhetoricians over the definition of the ‘enthymeme’ appears to
derive from a confusion of causality and persuasion” (207, emphasis added).
Edward Madden impugns logicians in particular when he writes that they
reproduce willingly a simplistic definition of the enthymeme based on the
syllogism, “falsely suggest[ing] a uniformity in views among philosophers which
neither existed historically nor . . . exists currently” (“Crossroads” 368).6
One might say that the redefinition of the concept of the enthymeme has
become so commonplace that it requires some effort to make such a well-trod
path appealing to readers. One essay inaugurates its investigation into the
enthymeme as a form of confession. In “Enthymemes: the Story of a Lighthearted Search,” Aly writes:
Now for a confession: I am no longer confident that I know what an
enthymeme is. When I was an age of the youngest of you here, I could
have told you neatly and precisely that an enthymeme is a truncated
syllogism. This kind of innocence I forfeited long ago. (266).
Although seemingly unique in its approach, Aly’s essay perhaps underscores the
association of indulgence with the study of the enthymeme that has led Poster to
label the modern state of theory on the enthymeme an “embarrassment of riches”
(4). Due in part to this sense of excess, the desire of scholars to redefine the
enthymeme is sometimes associated with vanity or weakness. Conley, in his
survey of various scholars’ approaches to the enthymeme, warns that it is
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“always risky to record the consensus of a group of scholars, for scholars like to
have their own positions on issues, distinct from others” (168). Divesting himself
of the status of what Lacan calls the “subject supposed to know,” Aly begins his
essay with a self-admitted lack. But this admission of lack may also be an
obsession with lack which calls to mind Foucault’s description of the practice of
confession:
. . . the confession lends itself, if not to other domains, at least to new
ways of exploring the existing ones. It is no longer a question of asking
what was done . . . but of reconstructing, in and around the act, the
thought that recapitulated it, the obsessions that accompanied it, the
images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure that animated it.
(Technologies 63)
In some sense, the confession is itself a genre of exigence, one motivated by
desire for subjectivity, one that turns inward to explore new ways of
understanding existing domains. This last part at least seems a fair description of
the continual redefinitions of the enthymeme, a process that turns toward past
descriptions of the enthymeme in a quest for insight.
In Aly’s case, his essay is a transcription of a speech given to an audience
of students and peers, and is thus an interesting divestment of the position of
knowing subject. In part, Aly admits this lack of knowledge, only to spend the rest
of the speech working on his lack of knowledge, a public display of what Foucault
might classify as a “technology of the self”—an activity that
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. . . permit[s] individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or
immortality. (Technologies 18)
Whereas the other opening lines above identify a lack in others (in their
competence, intent, or understanding), Aly identifies a lack in his self that
prompts further reflection. That Aly uses the topos of confession, titles his speech
a “light-hearted search,” and that the confession is obsessed, in part, with images
and desires, holds much promise for the enthymeme as the crossroads of
persuasion, image, and emotion.
While a single performance of attempting to understand the enthymeme is
unlikely to prompt criticism, the large number of similar attempts to understand
the enthymeme, having little in the way of concrete results, makes theorizing the
enthymeme seem to some critics indulgent at best and, at worst, a form of
narcissism. Foucault’s claim that “confession is a ritual of discourse in which the
speaking subject is also the subject of the statement” would seem to substantiate
this view (Technologies 61). But making the subject of an enthymeme a speaking
subject also seems fitting to the exploration of the enthymeme, since the
enthymeme is a rhetorical event in which the audience’s “completion” of the
enthymeme is viewed as a commitment to or identification with a belief
considered already part of the self. The enthymeme thus may serve as a form of
self-identification or self-affirmation, vindicating one’s present beliefs by placing
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them in the context of a reasonable argument. Supporting this view of the
enthymeme as self-affirmation, George Kennedy has even claimed that the
enthymeme functions because it “flatters the vanity of those to whom one speaks
by leaving something to their intelligence” (297).
Imagining the enthymeme as a form of pandering or flattery surely
reinforces Plato’s accusations against the Sophists (and those who would learn
sophistic persuasion from them) that they were more concerned with money and
status than in truth. In the Phaedrus, for instance, it states that the orator need
not “learn what is really just and true, but only what seems so to the crowd” (Qtd.
in Fish “Rhetoric” 123). In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates claims that the “orator need
have no knowledge of the truth about things; it is enough for him to have
discovered a knack of persuading the ignorant that he seems to know more than
the experts” (23). The enthymeme’s place as one of the primary means of
rhetorical performance thus indicts all of rhetoric as being unconcerned with
truth. A caricature of (sophistic) rhetoric, even repeating the well-known charge of
making the worse appear the better, appears in Milton’s description of Satan in
Paradise Lost:
. . . up rose
Belial, in act more graceful and humane;
A fairer person lost not Heav’n; he seemed
For dignity compos’d and high exploit:
But all was false and hollow; though his Tongue
Dropt Manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels: for his thoughts were low; . . .
. . . yet he pleased the ear,
And with persuasive accent thus began. (II, 108–15, 117–18)
52

This passage, as Fish writes, is “recognizable as a brief but trenchant essay on
the art and character of the rhetorician” (“Rhetoric” 122). The focus of the scene
is on the actions leading up to the speech, since these allow Milton to contrast
the pleasing appearance and sound of the speaker with the unprincipled content
of the speaker’s arguments. Such an approach depends on a form-content binary
that has historically been used to denigrate rhetoric, or at least diminish its
importance.
In the sixteenth century, Peter Ramus contributed to such a diminishing of
rhetoric by claiming that issues of invention, arrangement, logic, and ethics were
the province of philosophy. Ramus instead circumscribed rhetoric to issues of
style and delivery—the mere performative aspects of persuasion. A similar
circumscription leads students to believe that writing teachers and writing center
personnel are most concerned with presentational aspects of writing such as the
mechanical correctness of spelling, grammar, and punctuation. This definition of
rhetoric as presentational rather than substantive or inventional continues to hold
sway in many uses of the word “rhetoric” in the public sphere, where it is
common to hear the accusation directed toward a political opponent that his or
her words are “just rhetoric”—the show or appearance of sincerity or truthfulness
that masks a deeper motive or deception.
One of the striking features of Milton’s caricature is the emphasis on the
senses. The devil is “fair” in appearance, he physically rises up even as his
thoughts are “low”, and he pleases the ear—in short, his actions reinforce binary
distinctions, such as that between surface/depth and exterior /interior expressed
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through Satan’s outward grace and internal emptiness. Similar binaries attempt
to separate the faculty of reason from passion. Thus, the critique of rhetoric as a
performance addressed to the senses is often also a critique of the role of ethos
and pathos in persuasion. In this way, vision has often been associated with an
attempt to bypass logos. As shown above, the enthymeme has also become
associated with the individual’s unseemly vanity or need for ego strengthening. In
the next chapter, the work of thumos as a type of “internal rhetoric” will expand
upon this notion of the subject as the subject of the statement within enthymemic
discourse, not in order to show the weakness or defect of those interested in
(enthymemic) theory, but to inquire into the interrelation of emotion and reason in
all persuasion.
Aristotle’s Legacy
“How for example shall we know what our author (Aristotle) means by the
term Enthymeme? This question goes to the very heart of the Rhetoric since
Aristotle tells us that enthymemes are the essential instruments of oratorical
persuasion” – Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle
It is clear that theories of the enthymeme that do circulate in the field of
rhetoric and composition (and literature) are primarily those derived form
Aristotle. Conley claims this quite forcefully when he writes that “all who write on
the subject [of the enthymeme] base their discussions on one author, the
‘inventor” of the enthymeme and its comprehensive expositor, Aristotle” (169).
This narrow range of sources is unfortunate, since there are enthymemic
traditions within sophistic works (often under the term enthymêma) that offer
alternative approaches to theorizing the enthymeme that do not focus on the
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enthymeme’s relation to the syllogism, as Aristotle’s does. In order to understand
the significance of these alternative approaches, it will first be necessary to
understand the place of the enthymeme in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, which
necessitates an understanding of Aristotle’s approach to discourse as a whole.
According to Aristotle, discourse can be divided first into that which seeks
scientific truth (a.k.a. apodeictic certainty), and that which seeks to establish
probable truth and instill belief. In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle details the use of
the syllogistic method as a means to attain truth through scientific demonstration.
The search for probable truth is separated into two methods: dialectic and
rhetoric. Dialectic is the traditional question and answer method used notably in
philosophical dialogues as a means of inquiry. Aristotle’s Topics develops a
catalog of the common, general, and special topoi which orators use to further
such inquiry (topics are not limited to use only in dialectic, however).
Rhetoric also deals with probabilities, and its end is thus belief, not truth.
Within the art of rhetoric, according to Aristotle, the two types of proofs, or pisteis,
utilized by rhetors are non-artistic and artistic ones (also known as “atechnic” and
“entechnic” proofs). Non-artistic proofs are those elements of persuasive
discourse that the rhetor does not create but are “preexisting: for example,
witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts, and such like”
(Rhetoric 1355b 37). Artistic proofs are “whatever can be prepared by method . .
. one must use the former and invent the latter.” Thus, the emphasis of many
textbooks on heuresis, or invention, can be attributed to Aristotle’s definition of
the artistic proofs necessary for effective rhetoric. These artistic proofs constitute
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the three species of persuasive proof that have been widely adopted in both
pedagogical and theoretical approaches to writing: ethos, pathos, and logos. Put
simply, ethos refers to the character of the rhetor performed or invoked, pathos
refers to the rhetor’s ability to invoke emotion in the audience, and logos refers to
the reasoned argument presented to the audience.
Aristotle places the enthymeme directly in the realm of logos when he
writes that all speakers “produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms
[examples] or enthymemes and by nothing other than these” (Rhetoric 1356b
40). Aristotle suggests in both the Rhetoric and in the Topics that the example is
an inductive form and the enthymeme is a deductive form, which solidifies the
enthymeme’s syllogistic pedigree. While it would be easy to regard the
enthymeme as a purely logical form of persuasion, this does not seem to match
Aristotle’s claim that the enthymeme is the substance of all persuasion.
James McBurney admits that, at first, the enthymeme may not seem appropriate
to persuasion through ethos or pathos, since the enthymeme is a “rhetorical
device and as such is dependent, so to speak, upon language symbols.
Persuasion arising from the personality of the speaker . . . is therefore clearly
outside the realm of the enthymeme” (62).
But McBurney goes on to write that ethical and pathetical appeals are
expressed in words, both make use of the topics, and “we are explicitly told that
these topics are the sources to which we may turn for the propositions to
compose our enthymemes” (63). In other words, Aristotle presents the
enthymeme as the foundation of all persuasion, not just logos established
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through “terms and propositions” (McBurney 62). If the topics are to be the basis
of persuasion, it is clear that one must consider how these topics may be
expressed visually as well.
So far, the enthymemic legacy of Aristotle has been presented as
relatively straightforward and consistent. But this conflicts with the approaches of
various scholars seen above that take as their starting point the inconsistency or
ambiguity within Aristotle. It would be convenient to believe that the lack of
agreement on the definition of the enthymeme is simply due to a lack of
understanding by modern scholars as to what Aristotle meant by the term. But
Aristotle is not as helpful in this situation as one might think. We have already
encountered Bitzer’s observation that “the reader of Aristotle’s Rhetoric will find
no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme” (399). The result of this
condition is that when scholars attempt to define the enthymeme through
Aristotle, the passage they cite is really dependent on what they already believe
the enthymeme to be.
In some sense, the process is itself enthymemic, since the reader finds
persuasive those statements that speak to his or her pre-existing beliefs
regarding the enthymeme. For instance, those who view the enthymeme as an
abbreviated syllogism often point to this passage from Aristotle’s Rhetoric: the
enthymeme is “drawn from few premises and often less than those of the primary
syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the
hearer supplies it” (Rhetoric 42). George Kennedy calls this passage the
“authority for defining an enthymeme as a syllogism in which one or more
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propositions are not expressed” (297). Thomas M. Conley suggests that a
tentative list of such authoritative statements might include the following from
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Topics:
“Everyone who persuades by proof in fact uses either enthymemes or
examples. There is no other way” (1.2, 1256b 5–7). “Enthymemes are
the substance of persuasion” (1.1, 1354a 14f.). “The enthymeme is a
sort of syllogism (syllogismos tis)” (1.1, 1355a 8). “Enthymemes and
examples deal with what is for the most part contingent” (1.2, 1357a
14f.). “An enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with . . . practical subjects”
(2.20, 1394a 25ff.). “The enthymeme must consist of a few
propositions, fewer than those which make up a normal syllogism. For
if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need to
mention it; the hearer adds it himself” (1.2, 1357a 16ff.). “We must not
carry (the enthymeme’s) reasoning too far back, or the length of the
argument will cause obscurity; nor must we put in all the steps that
lead to our conclusion, or we will waste words in saying what is already
clear” (2.22 , 1395b 24–8). “We must use as our modes of persuasion
and arguments notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in
the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience”
(1.1, 1355a 27 ff.; cp. Topics 1.2, 101a 30–4). (169–170).
Such a list lays bare statements that taken singly may seem “straight forward and
unambiguous,” but which, taken together, comprise a complex and contradictory
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web of possibilities (Conley 169). However, none of these “authoritative”
statements has achieved dominance over the others.
While some scholars such as James Raymond suggest that there does
exist a single authoritative understanding of the enthymeme that has been
“misunderstood, ignored, or denigrated” by the multiple attempts to bend it to
match individual scholars’ own needs and desires, it is unlikely that such an
authoritative account of the enthymeme has ever existed (140). It’s not that
theorists haven’t tried either. Solomon Simonson produced, perhaps
overconfidently, an essay titled “A Definitive Note on the Enthymeme.” Lanigan
authoritatively claims that “for Aristotle the enthymeme is best understood as a
speaker’s syllogistic method, not as a listener’s syllogistic response” (emphasis
added, 207). It’s not uncommon for scholars to claim that their approach to a
particular topic is useful in some intellectual or practical context. But in response
to Lanigan’s statement above, besides questioning what criteria makes
something best for Aristotle, one might also ask: why best for Aristotle? Why not
best for contemporary scholars? Or for student writers? “Best” seems to conceal
a particular set of interests which are primarily geared toward a certain type of
historiography, hermeneutic rather than heuristic (and definitely not heuretic).
Furthermore, one might point out that valuing certain approaches to
historiography is most likely to benefit certain historiographers, not their objects
of study who have been dead for over 2300 years.
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To better understand the “embarrassment of riches” represented by so
many competing definitions of the enthymeme, Poster categorizes textbook
definitions of enthymemes into the following types:
(a) abbreviated syllogism (one premise omitted)
(b) syllogism of which at least one premise is probable
(c) abbreviated syllogism of which one premise is probable
(d) informal deductive reasoning
(e) syllogism of which one at least one premise is a sign
(f) syllogism of which at least one premise is a maxim
(g) syllogism from premises in accord with audience’s world view (4)
The common factor in all but one of the above classifications is that the
enthymeme is a type of syllogism. This is pure Aristotle and a clear sign that
textbooks have generally embraced a structural approach to the enthymeme.
According to these texts, the heart of enthymemic rhetoric is a logical form, one
with an underlying structure that validates the connections made by the audience
using the premises presented to them. Such is Aristotle’s legacy.
Pedagogies of the Enthymeme
So far, it is clear that the enthymeme has received much attention in
theoretical attempts to explicate it. But how does the enthymeme fair in rhetoric
and composition pedagogy? Barbara Emmel writes that, “despite a growing body
of scholarship that positions the enthymeme at the very heart of the composing
process,” the enthymeme is “more likely to alienate composition teachers than to
attract their interest and attention” (132). Another scholar claims that the large
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amount of talk surrounding the enthymeme is “theoretically interesting but
pedagogically insignificant” (Madden “Treatment” 198).7 Popular texts based in
classical rhetoric such as Edward Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student seem to support this assertion. This text’s characterization of classical
rhetoric is thoroughly Aristotelian, and the sophists are mentioned as part of
rhetorical history without attempting to make use of their ideas pedagogically. In
this text, the enthymeme is discussed in the section on the three modes of
persuasion (ethos, pathos, logos), under the heading “The Appeal to Reason.”
Corbett presents a traditional perspective by describing the enthymeme as an
“incomplete” or “abbreviated” syllogism that produces “a tentative conclusion
from probable premises,” emphasizing the criteria of incompleteness and
probability (60).
Corbett opposes this enthymeme to the “normal syllogism” that leads to a
“necessary conclusion from universally true premises” (60). Understanding the
enthymeme as merely an incomplete syllogism provides little incentive to develop
students’ understanding of it. This subordinating approach is evident when
Corbett asks students, not to produce enthymemes, but to translate the
enthymemes presented by the text into complete syllogisms. This basically
positions the student as the audience in the rhetorical situation rather than as the
speaker. The subordination of the enthymeme to the syllogism is further evident
by the fact that Corbett’s text devotes over 40% less space to the enthymeme
than it does to the syllogism proper.
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Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee’s textbook, Ancient Rhetorics for
Contemporary Students, reverses this trend by devoting more space to the
enthymeme than to the syllogism (although the enthymeme does not garner a
listing in the index). But much of this section in Crowley and Hawhee’s book is
taken up by an analysis by Kathleen Hall Jameison that portrays the use of the
enthymeme as one of the unethical “dirty tricks” that political campaigns employ
to lead voters to “draw conclusions that [are] not true” (Qtd. in Crowley and
Hawhee 143, 145). Crowley and Hawhee even write of this example that, “[f]rom
a rhetorician’s point of view, however, [the enthymemic argument presented] is
an example of what Aristotle calls ‘false reasoning,’ because its premises were
not true.” They disregard the “winning candidate’s point of view,” in which the
enthymeme might be valued as a technique of effective rhetoric and instead
focus on the logical characteristics of the enthymeme (Crowley and Hawhee
145).
By locating the enthymeme in sections devoted to their chapters on logical
reasoning, Crowley and Hawhee (and Corbett) further entrench the application of
logical criteria to the enthymeme. Even though the enthymeme is treated as a
form of rhetorical proof productive of probable knowledge, textbooks often lead
students to subject enthymemes to the criteria of apodeictic logic: the ability to
arrive at necessary truth. Under this criteria, “what counts is ending rather than
continuing the discourse” (Covino 129). Also, by focusing on the presentational
structure of the discourse (i.e. the enthymeme, or the syllogism), textbooks
embrace what John Gage calls “empty forms” (“Towards” 6). A narrow focus on
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the forms, or shapes, that discourse can take can replace discussions of what
constitutes ethical persuasion, reducing the evaluation of rhetoric down to what
Wayne Booth calls measures of “skill, not knowledge or wisdom” (qtd. in Gage,
“Towards” 6). By not making this distinction, Booth warns, textbooks suggest that
the “goal of all thought and argument is to emulate the purity and objectivity and
rigor of science, in order to protect oneself from the errors that passion and
desire and metaphor and authority and all of those logical fallacies lead us into”
(Qtd. in Gage, “Towards” 6).
Crowley and Hawhee do make distinctions about the ethical qualities of
arguments, but it is interesting to note that the primary narrative by Jameson, and
the editors’ analysis of this narrative included in the section on enthymemes,
shows enthymemes being used unethically. A reasonable question is: why is the
enthymeme introduced primarily as an example of an underhanded method of
persuasion when the syllogism is not? Discussion of the syllogism includes
examples that are overreaching but benign, claiming that ghosts and vampires
are immortal creatures, politicians can not be trusted, and the death penalty
cannot be justified (Crowley and Hawhee 139). These might be considered
incorrect, but not underhanded. Most importantly, information about the syllogism
is embedded in a section titled “deduction,” thereby equating the syllogism with
reason itself. The effect of this characterization seems to be to reinforce a
positivistic and technocratic view of communication in which one’s success is
dependent upon the formal comprehensive linguistic display of premises that
obtain logically.
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Not all pedagogical uses of the enthymeme stress its logical pedigree.
Lloyd Bitzer’s 1959 article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech, “Aristotle's
Enthymeme Revisited,” has served as a springboard for many scholars
attempting to develop pedagogies of the enthymeme that focus attention on the
epistemic nature of knowledge and the collaborative nature of discourse. In his
article, Bitzer identifies three general schools of thought concerning the
enthymeme: that “the enthymeme is distinctive on account of (1) its basis in
probability, (2) its concreteness, and (3) its usual formal deficiency” (400). Bitzer
then goes on to show how each of these approaches “failed to name a truly
distinguishing feature” of the enthymeme that would separate it from other forms
of syllogism.
According to Bitzer, the single aspect of the enthymeme that sets it apart
from other forms of reasoning explored by Aristotle is that, in the enthymeme,
“the audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded. . . . [the
enthymeme’s] successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of
speaker and audience and this is its essential character” (408). Such a view
makes the social processes underlying the enthymeme and the relationship
between rhetor and audience central concerns, making it impossible to justify
allowing students to “write artificially for a fictitious audience” (Emmel 133).
Even those who do not explicitly cite Bitzer often adopt the focus on
process over structure, as Barbara Emmel does when she argues for the
usefulness of enthymemes in guiding “activities of inquiry—thinking, questioning,
defining, conversing, understanding, connecting, and concluding” (Emmel 133).
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Scholars such as Emmel have moved this undervalued aspect of enthymemic
discourse to the forefront of pedagogies that aspire to be “genuinely dialogic in
nature” by using the enthymeme as “a means of continuing that dialogue” begun
by the shaping of an argument (147).
Although Emmel begins by stating that the enthymeme is “not just a
logical paradigm . . . but a conceptualization of a rich set of relationships,” she
still adopts a fairly structural account of the enthymeme (132). Emmel’s approach
is one that adopts the enthymeme as an architectonic principle of argument in
general. As she writes, the enthymeme “serves both as an heuristic for the
thinking that leads to a recognition of the argument and as a paradigmatic
schema of the key ideas and premises that create a progression toward a
complete argument” (147). For Emmel, the enthymeme represents not just a
model for the product of writing but for the process of writing. She claims that the
enthymeme is representative of the “processes of thought that are inherent in
reasoned discourse and of the organic connections that exist among those
processes, the process of writing a paper, and the final structure of that paper”
(Emmel 133, emphasis added).
This does have the advantage of embedding the enthymeme in the
dialogic space of the classroom, in which students articulate, defend, and amend
their discourse to better accommodate the response of their (classroom)
audience. In this way, Emmel transforms the imagined dialogue of the rhetor and
audience in which enthymemes circulate into the actual dialogue among students
in which enthymemes are developed, discarded, and built upon. But Emmel’s
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classroom, in which students “offer assertions or claims that they want their
classmates to accept and when questioned, they offer additional statements (or
claims) in support of those initial claims,” simply restages the fundamental scene
of dialectic, turning authority for what is correct to the class rather than to a single
speaker (134).
While such passing of authority may, ideally, be dialogical, it also puts the
force of the group’s endorsement behind the logical connections drawn between
statements. If students simply adjust their claims to produce ones acceptable to
the class, then it is hard to see how such a pedagogy is an advance over forms
of collaborative learning advocated by the likes of Kenneth Bruffee, the critiques
of which have well established how such scenes stage cultural reproduction as
learning.8 The ensuing “predictable pattern” of student discourse in Emmel’s
classroom where “claims naturally lead to enthymemes” may simply reinforce
logos as the sole quality of good arguments. If it is only “[w]henever a line of
reasoning is offered in support of a claim, an enthymeme ensues,” then we have
not moved far from the notion of the enthymeme as a pseudological device
modeled on the syllogism (134).
Just as Emmel promises to take students beyond the traditional definition
of the enthymeme, Gage’s textbook, The Shape of Reason, presents the
enthymeme to students as a way to refer to the “relationship created between a
reason and a conclusion” that is “more open and flexible” than models from
formal logic (58). But just as Emmel’s approach returns to a basically formal
conception of the enthymeme (albeit one that provides structures at more than
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just the level of the sentence), Gage’s enthymeme reduces down to an
unregulated relationship between an assumption, a stated reason, and a
conclusion. Gage emphasizes the enthymeme’s flexibility and, indeed, in the
span of a few pages, Gage’s enthymeme appears as a form of implicit reasoning,
as two ideas connected by a “because,” as a thesis statement, as a way of
generating an essay’s structure, and as the grouping of an assumption, a stated
reason, and a conclusion (Shape 77–80 ). What is flexible here seems to be the
manner in which Gage describes the enthymeme, but not necessarily the
structure being described.
The structural legacy of Gage’s enthymeme is unquestionable considering
its placement in a chapter titled “Developing Structures” and filled with subtitles
such as “The Structural Enthymeme” and “From Enthymeme to Structure.” Again,
the enthymeme appears in a metonymic relationship to the overall structure of an
essay, the frame of which is presumed to consist of interconnected enthymemes
that provide the “outline of ideas” that is not a mere list of topics, but a chain of
claims and reasons that flow in a sequence (Shape 80). While Gage denies any
formulaic method for “generating a structure of ideas from the parts of an
enthymeme,” he does say that using enthymemes produces a “responsibility” in
the writer to the “several potential structures implicit in the enthymeme” (Shape
81). These structures are seemingly self-revealing, as they unfold logically from
prior statements according to underlying rules of reason and decorum. As Gage
writes in “Teaching the Enthymeme: Invention and Arrangement,” it is possible to
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obtain from Aristotle the notion that the “structures of whole arguments can be
seen to derive from a single enthymeme” (39).
These pedagogical approaches do differ from classical definitions of the
enthymeme as a truncated syllogism by identifying in enthymemes a process of
structuring embodied in the activity of the rhetor, and not just a formal structure of
words. But it is exactly because these more flexible conceptions of the
enthymeme simply extend the structural form of the enthymeme—finding in it an
alternative to more rigid formulas of essay-writing—that they transform a
structure of expression into a dynamic of thought. Of course, these theorists
would not deny that this is what they are doing, but would defend the transfer of
the structural definition of the enthymeme into a “metonymy for the whole
rhetorical activity of discovering a basis for mutual judgment,” arguing, for
instance, that such approaches are useful because they are more flexible and
less prescriptive than traditional approaches, and therefore teach students, not to
adhere to rigid linguistic models, but to engage in a process of dialogic
performance (Gage “Adequate” 157).
One inflexible feature of Gage’s enthymeme is its embodiment as a purely
linguistic structure. Gage’s conceptualization of the enthymeme, (like many
others derived from Aristotle’s technical descriptions), is a type of linguistic
relationship, calling upon the audience to provide language that provides a bridge
between a “stated reason” and a “conclusion.” This is still a considerable status
upgrade from the appearance of the enthymeme in other textbooks. But even
Corbett’s exercises already conceive of the syllogism as a linguistic relationship
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between two statements. While the focus on the relationships among words is
unsurprising in a writing class, it is also unfortunate since this attention tends to
devalue ethos and pathos, since these are often presented in these texts as
arising from non-linguistic sources.
Although the textbooks above include the enthymeme to differing degrees
as part of their approach to writing (with Gage’s text being the most
incorporative), many writing textbooks ignore the enthymeme altogether. It is
possible that textbook authors find that the flexibility of the enthymeme or its lack
of a necessary conclusion make it unsuitable for writing instruction (at least for
current-traditional writing instruction with “clarity” as its primary goal). But it is
also possible that textbook authors don’t believe classical rhetoric to be
applicable to modern contexts, or that they are simply unacquainted with the
enthymeme. It could still be true today that, as Kathleen Welch states in the
opening sentence of her 1987 article, “Ideology and Freshman Textbook
Production: The Place of Theory in Writing Pedagogy,” that “[o]f the hundreds of
pounds of freshman writing books produced each year, few are constructed with
any overt indication that composition theory has ever existed” (269). In their
introduction to the collection (Re)Visioning Composition Textbooks: Conflicts of
Culture, Ideology, and Pedagogy, Fredric and Xin Liu Gale identify a
“conspicuous lag of textbooks behind the changes” in the field of rhetoric and
composition. But this lag cannot be blamed entirely here, since revivals of the
enthymeme have been ongoing throughout the last century (4).
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It is also possible that the absence of the enthymeme from composition
textbooks is related to the general devaluation of emotion in textbooks. In her
essay “The Pathos of Pathos,” Gretchen Flesher Moon examines how
composition textbooks’ treatment of emotion is characterized by two (negative)
positions toward pathos: either the little attention pathos is given associates it
with the fallacies and other unreasonable or unethical methods, or “pathos as a
rhetorical appeal to the reader’s emotions, values, and beliefs” comprises the
textbook’s entire treatment of emotion (35). Each of these positions toward
pathos enacts an explicit or implicit critique of the role of emotion in judgment,
subordinating emotion to reason and often portraying the effects of emotion as
“potentially unsavory” (Moon 35).
Moon goes on to chronicle the many ways in which textbooks disparage
the role of emotion in persuasion, and how they advocate an affectively neutral
discourse free of “crude emotionalism” (36). The enthymeme is the target of a
similar devaluation. For instance, the enthymeme is often chastised exactly for its
ability to admit into discourse passionately held beliefs that are “self-evident to an
audience” regardless of their validity (Crowley and Hawhee 146). In Ancient
Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, the editors Sharon Crowley and Debra
Hawhee write the following:
Enthymemes are powerful because they are based in community beliefs.
Because of this, whether the reasoning in an enthymeme is sound or
whether the statements it contains are true or not, sadly enough, often
makes little difference to the community’s acceptance of the argument.
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Enthymemes work best when listeners or readers participate in
constructing an argument . . . . The audience will enjoy supplying the
missing premises for themselves, and may be more readily persuaded by
the argument because they have participated in its construction. (145–46)
Here, the enthymeme is responsible for allowing into discourse beliefs shared by
community members that do not meet some external (if not universal) notion of
truth. Also, there is a potentially moralistic critique present of the enthymeme as
supplying pleasure to the audience (presumably because it will make the
audience overlook the lack of truth in the enthymeme). This hearkens back to
Milton’s warning in Paradise Lost that Satan “pleased the ear” even as he spoke
falsehoods (II, 117). These indictments parallel Moon’s discussion of pathos in
that both are assumed to contaminate a neutral discourse of rational beings and
reasonable arguments by allowing into an argument elements that do not meet
standards of reasonable and ethical behavior. Thus, the anxiety over the use of
the enthymeme may likewise be an anxiety over the role of emotion in
persuasive discourse, since it is possibly through the enthymeme’s ambiguous
functioning that passionately held beliefs may enter discourse. Recovering a
notion of the enthymeme grounded in one’s capacity for emotion (i.e. thumos)
thus faces a dual opposition from those already wary of both enthymemes and
emotions as insignificant components of, or actual impediments to, successful
writing pedagogies.
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Joyce’s “Technic Enthymemic”: Or, Bloom Blows It
“I cannot possibly do this mechanical part with my wretched eye and a half”
– James Joyce, quoted in Gottfried’s Joyce's Iritis and the Irritated Text

If the enthymeme’s status as a pedagogical method is small, it’s
acknowledged usage as a literary technique is microscopic. Admittedly, scholars
such as Doug Hesse have considered the role of enthymemes in the “narrative
dimension [that] underlies the text” (34). At this level, Hesse claims, the
“enthymeme shares the same epistemological ground as plot, both depending on
the configuration of wholes from parts through causal connection in time.” Hesse
identifies a narrative underlying Aristotle’s Rhetoric, arguing that Aristotle’s
arguments emerge over time, and therefore any conviction produced in the
reader can “hardly [be] the product of single arguments isolated in time" (32). The
recognition that persuasion is temporal is actually quite common. Robert Reich,
writing about the four stories that “Americans have been telling each other since
our founding“ argues that political arguments speak to four basic narratives
embedded in American culture and that these “four mental boxes are always
going to be filled somehow . . . because people don’t think in terms of isolated
policies or issues. If they’re to be understandable, policies and issues must fit
into larger narratives about where we have been as a nation, what we are up
against, and where we could be going” (17). Hesse’s and Reich’s observations
undermine the importance of individual instances of persuasion embodied in
demonstrative argument and look instead at rhetorical performance in a more
holistic way, as a process of accretion of evidence that enables eventual
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persuasion, or, perhaps, sustains adherence in the absence of evidence. Just as
"plot mediates between individual events and a story taken as a whole,”
enthymemes can motivate the audience through the articulation of ideas and
evidence experienced over long periods of time and embedded throughout a
work (Hesse 34).
Such a view of persuasion is more akin to Bakhtin’s description of the
dialogic novel, which “orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the world of
objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social diversity
of speech types and by the differing individual voices that flourish under such
conditions” (263). In some sense, Hesse is arguing that the selection of the
voices that are allowed into a narrative constitute the parts of the enthymeme.
Hesse’s statement that the enthymeme shares the same “ground as plot” might
also be taken as a directive to consider the relation of the narrative enthymeme
to Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope. While literally meaning “time-space,”
chronotope refers to the “the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial
relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (84). Such inquiry might
reveal that enthymemes are a widespread literary technique in which the physical
and temporal topography of the story is related to the structure of the enthymeme
being expressed.
Hesse’s description of enthymemes in literature is quite similar to Gage’s
belief that chains of enthymemes can be used to produce outlines for essays. As
Gaines states, this type of approach conceptualizes the “movement of a
rhetorical audience from its initial state to final judgment as requiring narrative
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emplotment by the rhetor” (15). This perspective removes some of the emphasis
off of the structure of the enthymeme, since Hesse’s enthymemes become
“events [that move the reader] towards the text’s conclusion” (emphasis added,
35). But these narrative enthymemes continue to serve structural purposes within
the process of reading and writing the text, as Emmel’s did, and thus do not
transcend their structural function.
The existence of structural enthymemes within narrative is not the same
as claiming that the enthymeme is a conscious literary technique. The one place
where the conscious use of the enthymeme has been a topic of attention is in the
seventh chapter of James Joyce’s modernist tour-de-force Ulysses, in a chapter
commonly referred to as the “Aeolus” episode because its contents correspond
to Ulysses’ encounter with King Aeolus in Book 10 of Homer’s Odyssey. Bloom,
one of the main characters, spends the novel wandering throughout Dublin, and
the Aeolus chapter is the only one where Bloom is seen working. According to
the stemma of the Aeolus episode transmitted to us through Joyce’s interlocutor,
Stuart Gilbert, we know the following about this chapter: the scene is the
newspaper, the hour is noon, the organ is the lungs, the art is rhetoric, the color
is red, the symbol is the editor, and the technique is enthymemic (177).
Many of these elements are easy to identify in Joyce’s text (“easy” at least
relative to the frequent obscurity of Joyce’s allusions). The setting is primarily the
office of the newspaper Freeman’s Journal and National Press and the hour is
reported as noon. Other elements are less straightforward yet still easy to divine.
The lungs are commiserate both with the emphasis on oratory in the chapter, the
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many references to “wind” or wind-related themes (Aeolus is the King of the
Winds), and the bluster of the Irish newsmen, particularly Miles Crawford (the
editor of the Telegraph and the Homeric counterpart of Aeolus, king of the
winds).9 The color red appears throughout (in the character of Red Murray and in
Stephen’s blushing, for example). And the editor is not only embodied in the
figure of Mr. Crawford, but is present through the insertion of the numerous
headlines into the chapter by an “external” editor.
Despite one critic’s claim that “The art of the chapter is rhetoric, a subject
that now seems tedious to nearly all readers, critics, and writers,” there may yet
be some value in considering the chapter’s relation to the enthymeme and
rhetoric more generally (Hodgart 121). There is a significant amount of
persuasive discourse in the chapter, although that attempted by Bloom generally
fails (hence, the wind-inspired subtitle above, “Bloom blows it’). Rhetoric as an
art is visible generally in the interactions of the characters and explicitly
presented in three speeches exemplifying the three main kinds of oratory
according to Aristotle: the deliberative, the forensic, and the epideictic. In short,
deliberative rhetoric is that of politics and future action; forensic rhetoric is judicial
speech and judgment of past events, and epideictic rhetoric is ceremonial
speech of praise or blame focused on the present. One of the speeches in the
Aeolus chapter—Mr. Justice Fitzgibbon’s epideictic speech concerning the
revival of the Irish tongue—is, interestingly, the only passage from Ulysses that
Joyce ever consented to make an audio recording of, strengthening this
chapter’s claim to realizing the art of rhetoric.
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While most of the stemma is easily identified, critics are routinely
confounded as to what it means that the episode’s technique is “enthymemic.” M.
J. C. Hodgart calls this “one of the most irritating minor problems in the
interpretation of Ulysses,” partially because “neither Joyce nor anyone else
seems to know what an enthymeme really is” (123). So far, all this tells us is that
Joycean scholarship suffers from the same confusion common to other
investigations of the enthymeme. The nature of the “technique” of Joyce’s text is
also unclear. Is it a technique of composing, in which Joyce himself employs the
enthymeme to develop the text? Is it a technique of interpretation, in which
readers employ the enthymeme to construct the text? Is it a technique evident in
the actions or dialogue of the characters? In short, exactly how is the chapter
technique related to the enthymeme?
Gilbert does little to resolve this question. Gilbert does attempt to catalog
every rhetorical scheme and trope active in the chapter, and does provide an
example of the enthymeme from the chapter, but never directly addresses the
issue of the enthymeme as a technique. While his catalog includes over ninety
examples of schemes and tropes from the chapter, Gilbert’s analysis of this
episode has been cited as “inaccurate and incomplete” (Tompkins 199). For
instance, Gilbert has difficulty with individual schemes and tropes. Although he
provides an extensive inventory, Gilbert omits two common devices from his list:
polyptoton and anatanaclasis.
Polyptoton (the use of multiple words based on the same root) is found in
the Aeolus chapter of Ulysses in the form of “imperial, imperious, imperative”
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(Joyce 108). Anatanaclasis (the use of a word twice in two different senses) is
found at least twice in the chapter, once on page 116 with the phrase “sitting in,”
and once on page 119 with the word “brawn.” The latter example is part of a
story that Stephen Daedalus tells titled “The Parable of the Plums,” in which two
elderly women climb to the top of “Nelson’s Pillar.”10 The two women first
purchase “one and fourpenceworth of brawn”—a type of sausage most often
made from the head of a pig (also known as “head cheese”). Later, as they
wearily climb the winding staircase to the top of the pillar, one asks the other
“have you the brawn,” using it in the more common sense of strength or
endurance. But none of this makes it into Gilbert’s account of rhetorical devices.
Considering the inexactitude with which Gilbert handled rhetoric within the
Aeolus episode, perhaps it is fortunate that he did not attempt to explain the
meaning of an “enthymemic” technique.
In truth, Gilbert’’s analysis of the chapter’s rhetorical features is not simply
incomplete, it is faulty. For instance, Gilbert identifies three examples of oratory
in the chapter as “deliberative,” “forensic,” and “expository” (188). Since the
Rhetoric is concerned with persuasive speech and standard translations of
Aristotle refer to this third type of speech as “epideictic” (the speech of praise or
blame, sometimes called “demonstrative” or “panegyric,” but not expository),
Gilbert’s use of “expository” rhetoric seems out of place, especially considering
that his example of expository rhetoric is the speech of Dan Dawson, which is
clearly epideictic in its praise of Ireland. To oppose Gilbert’s characterization of
this speech as expository, Phillip Tompkins points to the celebratory headline
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given to the speech by the external editor—“ERIN GREEN GEM OF THE
SILVER SEA”—and the contents of Dawson’s ensuing speech, which praises the
“peerless panorama of Ireland’s portfolio, unmatched, despite their wellpraised
prototypes in other vaunted prize regions, for very beauty, of bosky grove and
undulating plain” (Joyce 230).
The typical view of an enthymeme that Gilbert may be operating under is
that of the truncated syllogism—a syllogism with an omitted premise.
Understanding the enthymeme as a scheme of omission suggests other
“enthymemic” discourse in the Aeolus episode, since omission in a more general
sense is a common theme within the episode and the novel as a whole. Ulysses
is quite famous for omitting, among other things, quotation marks and other
punctuation. Schemes of omission such as apocope (removing the ending of a
word to form a new word, as in “morn” from “morning”), aphaeresis (removing the
beginning of a word to form a new word, as in “neath” from “beneath”), and
asyndeton (omitting conjunctions, as in Joyce’s “They watched the knees, legs,
boots vanish” [97]) also appear within the Aeolus episode.
Gilbert explicitly identifies examples of four other rhetorical devices of
omission: ellipsis, brachylogia, syncope, and synaloepha. Instances where
words are left off the ends of sentences, where spaces between words are
omitted, where letters are skipped, where names are shortened, where
conjunctions are excluded, and where acronyms are used are examples of
similar linguistic and typographical omissions. Other instances in which words,
individuals, or actions are “omitted” arguably exist (Bloom is excluded from the
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camaraderie of the office workers, for instance), though these are not
constructed in any truly enthymemic sense as discussed so far. One might even
read omission into the 3/4 time signature of the newspaper presses (which
“clanked in threefour time”) and of the Polish round dance that Lenehan performs
to lampoon Bloom, since this could be read as an “incomplete” 4/4 measure
(Joyce 98).
While Gilbert does not address the enthymemic technique of Joyce’s
chapter, he does give an example of an enthymeme in his list of rhetorical
devices active in the Aeolus chapter. Though there is no way to be sure under
what definition of enthymeme Gilbert was working, the example he gives is from
a short exchange between Bloom and Mr. Hynes, a reporter. The background
necessary to understand this scene is that Hynes owes Bloom money:
—Right: thanks, Hynes said moving off.
Mr. Bloom stood in his way.
—If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch, he [Bloom] said,
pointing backward with his thumb.
—Did you? Hynes asked.
—Mm, Mr. Bloom said. Look sharp and you’ll catch him. (Joyce 98–99)
Gilbert refers to the line “If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch” as
an enthymeme, presumably because the premise that Hynes could pay Bloom
the three bob that he owes him by drawing it from the cashier has been omitted.
This could match the formalistic conception of an enthymeme as a less-thanthree-part syllogism. But if this is just a part of the syllogism, what does the
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completed syllogism look like? Below is one possible formulation of a syllogism
that adequately summarizes the situation:
M:

Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes
him at the earliest convenience.

m:

The earliest convenience for Hynes to retrieve and give to Bloom
the three bob he owes him is right now.

C:

Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the three bob he owes
him right now.

This syllogistic formulation is hardly correlated to the dialogue above. The line
that Gilbert identifies as an enthymeme (“If you want to draw the cashier is just
going to lunch”) could be considered an approximation of the minor premise
above: “The earliest convenience for Hynes to retrieve and give to Bloom the
three bob he owes him is right now.” But what does it mean for an enthymeme of
this syllogism to exist? The loss of any one premise from the syllogism above
would still leave the three “terms” intact (the three terms being “the earliest
convenience”, “right now”, and “that Hynes should retrieve and give to Bloom the
three bob he owes him”). Furthermore, this idealized formulation only states what
Bloom believes should happen, but not what will happen. In other words, this is
simply an exhibition of Bloom’s own desire, not an attempt to engage the desire
of Hynes (to be a good neighbor, to act honorably, etc.).
The example above does not make use of the exact phrase that Gilbert
identifies as constituting the enthymeme. The following syllogism better captures
the information presented in Gilbert’s enthymeme example:
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M:

Hynes can pay back Bloom (by drawing money) if the cashier is still
available.

m:

The cashier is still available (i.e. just about to go to lunch).

C:

Hynes can pay back Bloom.

Again, what seems to be missing from this view of the enthymeme is the will to
act. Gilbert seems to mean by enthymeme the simple omission of information,
but what is more strikingly absent is any motivation embedded in Gilbert’s
example; there is no evoked ethical imperative regarding the relationship
between Bloom and Hynes. Without these, it is unlikely that Hynes will
spontaneously supply an enthymemic response that leads him to action.
Even if one does accept this exchange as enthymemic, one must admit
that it is a rhetorical failure: Hynes does not catch Bloom’s hint (or at least, he
does not let on that he does). It seems that Hynes was unable or unwilling to
supply the premise missing from the enthymeme. It’s unclear though that this
exchange can function enthymemically, since not only one premise, but the
conclusion is unknown. How this could be stated without the conclusion being
already given is unclear. Without Bloom telling Hynes openly that he should get
the money to give to him and then supplying Hynes with one of the premises that
would lead, through Hynes participation, to the realization of the previously stated
conclusion, no action seems likely, and in fact that is exactly what does (fail to)
happen. Without a reason for catching the cashier before he goes to lunch,
Hynes will not seek him out, and not simply because the knowledge of the given
conclusion is not shared between both the rhetor and the audience.
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There are more conventional examples of enthymemes than Gilbert
identifies. Bloom reasons that if he can get the ad design to Nanetti, he’ll “give it
a good place,” and Crawford claims that he knows Taylor did not prepare his
speech because “there was not even one shorthandwriter in the hall” (Joyce 100,
116). Each of these is a claim to knowledge (one about an event in the past, one
about an event in the future) that leaves out an assumed premise. Even similes
are like enthymemes. Bloom thinks of the newspaper men as weathercocks,
stating: “Funny the way those newspaper men veer about when they get wind of
a new opening. Weathercocks“ (Joyce 103). One could easily argue that the
simile, “Newspaper men are like weathercocks” is based on the premises that
“Weathercocks veer about in the wind” and “Newspaper men veer about in the
wind’” and, therefore, “Newspaper men are like weather cocks.” Of course, this is
only an enthymeme insofar as one adopts a structural view of what an
enthymeme is.
Bloom’s job as an ad canvasser is significant to the argument here
concerning the circulation of visual enthymemes. Bloom spends the greater part
of the episode attempting to get an ad placed in the Telegraph, the content of
which is “Two crossed keys here. A circle. Then here the name. Alexander Keys,
tea, wine, and spirit merchant. So on” (Joyce 99). When Bloom goes to sell the
ad to the foreman at the newspaper, he draws the foreman’s attention to the
conclusion offered by the ad’s illustration:
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—The idea, Mr. Bloom said, is the house of keys. You know, councilor, the
Manx parliament. Innuendo of home rule. Tourists, you know, from the isle
of Man. Catches the eye, you see. Can you do that?
Bloom locates the effect of this ad exactly in its “unstated” yet shared knowledge
regarding the meaning of the “house of keys” as signifying home rule, here being
used to promote drinking (ironically, Joyce associates alcohol consumption
exactly with the “g.p.i.” [general paralysis of the Irish], a state most unfavorable to
the establishing of home rule). That such an image “catches the eye” suggests
that there can be a visual trigger for enthymemic discourse. Visual discourse
saturates the newspapers at the Telegraph office. As Bloom points out, “It’s the
ads and side features sell a weekly, not the stale news in the official gazette. . . .
M.A.P. Mainly all pictures” (Joyce 98).
Bloom never does succeed in getting Keyes’ ad published, though this is
not the only ad that brings him grief. The jingle for “Plumtree’s Potted Meat,”
plagues Bloom throughout the day, reminding him as it does of his wife’s
possible infidelity with Blazes Boylan. This jingle states” What is home without
Plumtree's Potted Meat? Incomplete. With it, an abode of bliss.” The
incompleteness of the home is offered as a reason for the consumption of the
product. This raises the question of whether all commercial discourse is
enthymemic in the sense that it proffers a lack that the consumer can then fill by
buying the product. Perhaps it is appropriate that Joyce’s chapter utilizing an
enthymemic technique occurs within the commercial scene of the newspaper
office.
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Reassessing the dialogue that Gilbert identifies as being enthymemic, it is
possible to see enthymemic structure functioning in another manner. Consider
the end of the exchange:
—If you want to draw the cashier is just going to lunch, he said,
pointing backward with his thumb.
—Did you? Hynes asked.
—Mm, Mr. Bloom said. Look sharp and you’ll catch him.
—Thanks old man, Hynes said. (Joyce 98–99)
Hynes unfinished question, “Did you?,” in view of Bloom’s subsequent imperative
to “Look sharp,” very probably was the beginning of the full question “Did you just
see him?,” to which Bloom’s answer is an affirmative “Mm.” The success of this
exchange, confirmed by Hynes’ appreciative “Thanks,” relies on Bloom’s
participation in supplying the unspoken words. The conclusion that Bloom
provides, that which would necessitate both Hynes’ question and Bloom’s
interruptive response, is Hynes’ desire to meet the cashier before he goes to
lunch. This conclusion has been handily provided by the earlier dialogue, though
the exact reason why Hynes desires to see the cashier proves not to be the
same as Bloom’s. This should give pause to those who might think that an
enthymeme based in emotion or images would be somehow more effective than
those using words. More likely, ambiguity and misreading will be the norm, as
one’s emotions are often not obvious to observers, nor even to those
experiencing them.
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Jacques Derrida, in an address given at the Ninth International James
Joyce Symposium in Frankfurt, (West) Germany in 1984, provides a meditation
on the word “yes” in the works of James Joyce, one of the most famous uses of
which comes at the end of Joyce’s Ulysses in Molly’s monologue. Derrida writes
that although “yes,” is something that
. . . names nothing, describes nothing, whose grammatical and semantic
status is most enigmatic, it seems at least possible to affirm the following:
it must be taken for an answer. It is always in the form of an answer. It
supervenes after the other, to answer a request or a quotation, at least
implicit, of the other, even if this is the other in me, the representation in
me of another word. Yes implies, as Bloom would say, an “implicit
believer” in some question put forward by the other. (34)
Since “yes” always arises in answer to a previous event in the context of a prior
discussion or relationship, Derrida suggests that one might question even calling
Molly’s speech a monologue (27). The recognition of the question put forth by the
other is for Derrida a critical moment because every utterance is at once
addressed to the other and to itself; it is a “dispatch to oneself, a dispatch
returned from oneself which both never leaves itself and never arrives” (66).
Such a conception of communication matches well with contemporary
descriptions of the role of affect as well. Massumi writes that affect is the field of
emergence for sensation, perception, and memory, a “complicating immediacy of
self-relation” (14, emphasis added).
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Bloom’s “Mm” in response to Hyne’s question of “Did you?” is just such a
dispatch, one that attempts to affirm a complex relation between Bloom and
Hynes not limited to the linguistic display of premises, but dependent instead on
the remembered ethical responsibility underlying the act of communication. Thus
Derrida finds in the repeated yes’s in Joyce’s works the “always already
implicated affirmative of any statement” which questions the “independent status
of ‘subject’ and ‘object’” (Bernstock 71).The meaning of an utterance is always
dependent on one’s relationship to an Other, a relationship maintained
“[w]ith or without words, taken as a minimal event, yes demands a priori its
own repetition, its own memorizing . . . . The memory of a promise begins
the circle of appropriation, with all the risks inherent in the technique of
repetition, of automatized archives, of gramaphony, of simulacrum, of
wandering deprived of an address and destination. (Derrida 68)
This allows a reconsideration of Gilbert’s example of the enthymeme in which
Bloom attempts to remind Hynes of his debt. Derrida’s discussion of the “yes” in
Ulysses establishes dialogic conditions that we might apply to the enthymeme by
asserting that the enthymeme relies on a type of prior affirmation of premises, of
a social or ethical commitment that is an essential element of the recognition that
precedes not simply the completion of an argument, but the event which is the
presupposed “yes” that is called for by the premises, as well as the “yes” that is
the result of the enthymeme.
For Derrida, this posterior “yes” is not merely embodied in a linguistic
structure, for the event of language is one in which “Only another event can sign,
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can countersign to ensure that an event has happened. This One, that we naively
call the first One, can only affirm itself in the confirmation of the Other: a
completely different event” (70). In Bloom’s case, this event never happens, for
there is no recognition by Hynes of the ethical obligation between them, and
therefore, one might argue, no enthymeme. In his essay “Discourse: Structure or
Event?”, Michel Pêcheux doubts the usefulness of any interpretive method in
which the eventfulness of discourse is ignored and, rather, discourse is reduced
to a structure “without any other or real” (648). The latter is precisely what the
conventional approach to identifying enthymemes does when it is expressed in
the structure of the syllogism’s major premise, minor premise, and conclusion.
Pêcheux warns that
“. . . the act that consists in inscribing a given discourse in a series, in
incorporating it in a corpus, always risks absorbing the event of this
discourse into the structure of the series insofar as this series tends to
function as a historical transcendental reading grid or anticipatory memory
of the discourse in question.” (648)
The syllogistic structure used to delimit the enthymeme’s corpus imposes a grid
upon the discursive act that screens out all but the linguistic relationships
between utterances. Such a “structural conception of discursivity” leads to the
“obliteration of the event.” Treating the enthymeme as an event rather than as a
structure invites one to recognize the host of elements left out of the traditional
model of enthymemic argument, such as the visual and emotional aspects of
persuasion. Claiming the enthymeme as a completable structure (completed by
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expansion into a syllogism) is one way of “denying the act of interpretation at the
very moment it occurs” because such an approach locates the telos within the
structure presupposed by the enthymeme. Rather, one might locate the
enthymeme as the effect of the “yeses” of the “implied believer” that Derrida
identifies, and which are the “effects of identifications that are [conventionally]
assumed” (or ignored), but which a model of the enthymeme based in thumos
attempts to make explicit (Pêcheux 648).
The enthymeme as event recognizes that its claim to existence “can only
affirm itself in the confirmation of the Other“ who interprets that event (Derrida
70). By doing so, it returns the enthymeme to the sphere of rhetoric, and thus to
ethics, since only if every event is motivated by an Other can discourse become
“a matter of ethics and politics: a question of responsibility” (Pêcheux 648). This
is not the “responsibility” Gage identifies, which is a responsibility the writer holds
to the “several potential structures implicit in the enthymeme” (81). Gage’s
responsibility is the accountability of words to other words, of subjects to
predicates or verbs to objects. Derrida’s and Pêcheux’ notion of responsibility is
that which one accepts for others engaged in ethical and political struggle. The
enthymeme can become truly rhetorical, but it must transcend its structural
history to do so. It must exist as event.
The Enthymeme: Two Paradigms
“It is in ambiguity that we develop the capacity to change”
- Janet Bean, “Manufacturing Emotions”
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So far, most of the familiar disciplinary definitions provided of the
enthymeme and the pedagogies built upon this concept focus on the enthymeme
as a (syllogistically) structured entity, one that can be extended as a structuring
principle to the whole process of writing. Even those approaches that do attempt
to forego comparison of the enthymeme to syllogisms still focus on the
enthymeme’s structural characteristics. Therefore, the most common definition is
not one in which a premise is provided via the audience’s previously held
knowledge in a context of ethical obligation, or one that evokes other responses
in the audience, but one that defines the enthymeme in terms of content, in which
a premise is lacking which would otherwise make the structure a true syllogism,
irregardless of the audience’s reaction.
This latter approach to the enthymeme will be called here the “structural”
approach following the work of Gaines and predecessors such as Lawrence
Green, whose essay “Enthymemic Invention and Structural Prediction” claims
that enthymemes can not only provide structure to an argument but to an entire
discourse as well, and claims that the enthymeme is possible only because of a
predetermined structural relationship among its premises. In order to show that
there is always an assumed syllogistic relationship enabling the enthymeme,
Green writes that the
. . . relation between the writer's conclusion (the thesis) and the writer's
basic strategy (the minor premise) is enthymematic in the Aristotelian
sense because it always implies the existence of a second premise that
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joins the two clauses. This second and implicit premise is the major
premise of the enthymeme. (624)
Thus, according to Green, no one can establish a causal relationship between
two elements without employing enthymemic structures. The enthymeme thus
becomes an architectonic principle applicable to all levels of discourse (this
approach is evident in pedagogies such as that of Emmel discussed above).
Green’s willingness to base his account of invention on the Aristotelian
enthymeme was not unrelated to the recovery of classical rhetoric that was
stimulated by the publication of Edward P. J. Corbett’s 1965 textbook, Classical
Rhetoric for the Modern Student and James L. Kinneavy’s 1971 work, A Theory
of Discourse, both of which relied heavily on Aristotelian concepts to construct a
modern view of rhetoric. Together, these two texts provided an Aristotelian
foundation for both composition pedagogy and composition theory.
Green’s work was influential as well. As Gaines notes, the “theory of
structural enthymemes developed by Green was quite influential on subsequent
attempts to provide compositional precepts for the classroom“ and was adopted
in pedagogical approaches developed by John T. Gage, Maxine Hairston, Martin
Jacobi, Barbara Emmel, Hiu Wu, Marshall Gregory, Wayne Booth, Linda BenselMeyers, and others (12). These “applications of the enthymeme stressing its
architectural features” found purchase in diverse areas, including teaching
argument, professional and business writing, ethics, and public speaking, often
as an inventional method designed to both work backwards from established
syllogisms and to work towards intended theses (Gaines 12).
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The other approach to the enthymeme that Gaines identifies remains
nameless, although he does associate it with those who, like Kinneavy, have
“attempted to advance composition theory” (12). Gaines associates this
alternative approach with the work of scholars such as Lisa Ede, Andrea
Lunsford, Robert Connors, Jasper Neel, and John T. Gage. Admittedly, John T.
Gage was associated with the structural approach as well, but this is mainly
because his work has been employed by several scholars to advance a structural
view of the enthymeme, and thus his influence falls within both camps. By
connecting their reading of Aristotle to a more social and epistemic view of
communication and knowledge, scholars such as the ones Gaines lists
emphasized the enthymeme’s social nature—that it supplied an inventional
method in the “rhetor's search of mutually agreeable grounds for probable
knowledge” (Gage “Adequate” 157). This approach will be called here the
“rhetorical” approach to the enthymeme.
The division of the enthymeme into structural and rhetorical approaches to
the enthymeme is not unlike other attempts to define theoretical approaches to
discourse and culture. One can see clear parallels to these divisions, for
instance, in Stuart Hall’s discussion of cultural studies in his well-known essay
“Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms.” In this essay, Hall identifies two ways of
practicing cultural studies that he labels “culturalist” and “structuralist” paradigms.
Hall associates the culturalist paradigm with the work of Raymond Williams and
E.P. Thompson, whose works understand culture “not as a set of privileged texts,
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but rather as the systems of meanings embodied in all social practices” (Katz
43).
This approach to social practices values the individual’s experience of the
world, and is thus often associated with “humanism and experientalism.” On the
other hand, the structuralist paradigm that Hall associates with scholars such as
Claude Levi-Strauss and the Louis Althusser “decenters experience by showing it
to be an effect of social structures which cannot be reduced to the ‘materials’ of
experience” (Katz 43). By looking outside the subject for the root of subjectivity,
structural approaches are sometimes criticized for denying the possibility of
individual agency. Thus the Marxist desire to develop a scientific approach to
history is sometimes viewed as an attempt to read “human will and agency out of
history” (Trimbur, “Articulation” 38).
Such “limited” agency is complicated by Michel Foucault’s view of power
in his earlier works which stresses the circulation of power through all levels of a
structure. One’s placement within such structures is indicative of one’s access to
“power-knowledge”—Foucault’s term for the way in which regimes of power are
constituted through systems of knowledge. Also, access to such powerknowledge contributes to one’s perception as to what exactly constitutes agency
in any situation, thereby further limiting possible action. Whatever the
weaknesses inherent in such approaches, the more structural that one assumes
the world to be, the greater predictive value these theories hold. As Stuart Hall
writes, the “great strength of the structuralisms is their stress on ‘determinate’
conditions” (67, emphasis added). But determination has rarely been a success
92

story of even the most orthodox structuralisms. As Raymond Williams wrote, "No
problem in Marxist cultural theory is more difficult than that of determination" (83).
Halls’ attempt to negotiate the role of determination in culture without
depending exclusively on either of these two approaches led to the development
of his theory of articulation, which John Trimbur describes as an attempt
. . . to formulate a model of determination that avoids, on the one hand,
the traditional Marxist view of a fixed and necessary correspondence
between cultural practices and social structures and, on the other, more
recent poststructuralist views of the indeterminancy or necessary noncorrespondence and incommensurability of discourses, practices, and
structures. By looking at how particular ideas, discourses, and practices
are linked—or articulated—to particular conjunctures in the social
formation, Hall has sought to define a "Marxism without guarantees," a
guide to action that relies not on the predictive certainties of classical
Marxist theory but on a reading of those linkages and how they articulate,
at specific times and places, interests, subjectivities, and social forces.
(“Articulation” 39)
This approach allows Hall to avoid the extremes of either the structuralist or the
culturalist approach, and to recognize that, since power is reproduced at every
level of a structure, so too is the possibility for resistance to that structure. The
degree and type of determination will therefore always depend upon historical
linkages, for instance, among discourses and artifacts, and among ways of
knowing and modes of production. Hall’s project is bolstered by what Williams
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calls the "extraordinary linguistic complexity" of the term "determine" (84).
According to Trimbur, the historical roots of this term that Williams unearths show
that “determine” can be used to refer “not only to an external force or authority—
whether history or God—that decides or controls the outcome of an action but
also to the way limits are set and pressures exerted by the momentum of the
social process itself” (“Articulation” 38).
This more contextual and fluid sense of determination is perhaps what
underlies Carl Holmberg’s essay “Dialectical Rhetoric and Rhetorical Rhetoric,” in
which he argues that “rhetoric can be determined and grounded rhetorically
instead of dialectically determined” (232). According to Holmberg, the past two
thousand years of rhetorical history reveal that “what has been called rhetoric . . .
has been a dialectical rendering of rhetoric and, hence, not pure rhetoric.” A
dialectical rendering of rhetoric (represented most clearly in the Platonic dialectic
seeking to verify that which is already known) would have us view reality in “only
one way,” while a rhetorical rendering of rhetoric would have us experience “one
of the many views” that are possible (Holmberg 236, 237). Dialectical rhetoric
assumes that “Being is determinate, physical, and morphic,” while rhetorical
rhetoric assumes that “Being is indeterminate, not necessarily physical, and
amorphic” (238). Holmberg identifies strongly with the Sophists, since it is in their
view that reality was “basically relativistic” and the “means of describing reality
were contradictory” that he finds a kinship with his own views of rhetoric as an
“ambiguating way of speaking” (236, 239).
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Dialectical rhetoric does not value ambiguity. The two main characteristics
of dialectical rhetoric are that “[s]peaking and writing are to be clear and correct if
truth is to be ascertained,” and, since only one of the various experiences of
reality can ever be the correct one, the goal of the rhetor is the “conversion of
experiencers who are ‘incorrect’ to the ‘correct’ view” (Holmberg 238). Dialectical
rhetoric might be viewed as discourse committed to what Gary Olson calls the
“rhetoric of assertion” (7). According to Olson, the English studies model of
composing “has always seemed to be associated with asserting something to be
true.” Olson claims that this “rhetoric of assertion” is “masculinist, phallogocentric,
foundationalist, often essentialist, and, at the very least, limiting” (9). At the least,
the perspective in which the truth of discourse is born from assertion is one in
which the enthymeme can not occupy any position except that of an obstruction
to clarity and closure.
But this dialectical perspective ignores the history of rhetoric as a
“philosophy of composition that exploits writing as a mode of avoiding rather than
intending closure” (Covino 130). This “revisionist history” is the topic of Covino’s
The Art of Wondering, which argues that the “formulary obedience” of rulesbased interpretations of classical rhetoric is part of the perennial codification of
rhetoric into rules and systems, a practice that ignores that, to reiterate Covino’s
observation, the ways modern rhetoricians and the “major figures of classical
rhetoric—Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as the
elaboration of ambiguity” (2). The alternative to the dialectical model of rhetoric is

95

to “delay answers, postpone closure, avoid assertion, looking instead for more
open-ended, dialogic methods of inquiry—a non-assertive rhetoric” (Olson 10).
By refusing to make an assertion that is necessarily true, the enthymeme
may be a key element of a non-assertive rhetoric faithful to the dialogic inquiry
that Olson calls for and the tradition of ambiguity that Covino identifies as active
in classical and modern rhetoric. As Holmberg writes: in rhetorical rhetoric,
“[s]peaking and writing are enthymemic . . . [enabling] various and equally correct
interpretations . . . [made possible by the] duplicity or ambiguity of expression
and nonconventional syntax” (238–239). Images are enthymemic for these
reasons as well, and it is only by associating rhetoric with the dialectical
demands of clarity, or “duplicity or ambiguity of expression” with maliciousness,
that one can justify excluding them from the canon of persuasive method in their
most rhetorical forms.
It is telling that Blair, in his attempt to argue that a cartoon by British
cartoonist David Low is a visual argument, takes pains to reassure the reader
that “there is no ambiguity or vagueness whatsoever about Low’s meaning”
(“Rhetoric” 48, emphasis added). Ironically, this is in a section attempting to
refute the claim that the “vagueness or ambiguity [of images] make visual
argument impossible” (“Rhetoric” 46). Blair’s refutation of this claim is that
1.Words are ambiguous, not just images, and that 2.Images (as shown by the
Low cartoon) can achieve the clarity (i.e. lack of ambiguity) commonly attributed
to words (45–49). In other words, ambiguity is in Blair’s portrayal one of the
“risks” that all communication must negotiate, a flaw that must be overcome
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(“Rhetoric” 47). For Blair, visual argument is possible because “not all visual
communication is vague or ambiguous” (59, emphasis added). Blair is thus able
to accept that images can be arguments without altering his sense of what an
argument is.
If we accept Holmberg’s argument that a rhetorical approach to rhetoric
embraces the enthymeme and the ambiguity through which it functions, then it is
hard to see Blair’s approach to the enthymeme as anything but an expression of
dialectical rhetoric. The construction of rhetoric as dialectical in the sense of
logical determination helps account for the academic interest in the structure of
visual argument, because it is only by adopting the uncompromising structure of
the syllogism that one can determine what visuals mean. If one values the
ambiguity necessary to rhetorical exchange, then images become legitimate
rhetorical arguments, without any need for the apologies scholars often offer in
light of their tendency to lack propositional content, to evoke emotions, and to
incorporate numerous and even contradictory appeals. Mirzoeff writes in An
Introduction to Visual Culture that we must move beyond the idea (which he
attributes to semiotics) that “visual images succeed or fail to the extent that we
can interpret them successfully” (Mirzoeff 13). To do so would be to enact
another iteration of a dialectical approach to images. Approaching enthymemes
as examples of rhetorical rhetoric forces one to see enthymemes as robust axes
of rhetorical forces, as entities that are not “simply statements of probable fact
but reflect values and attitudes as well. That is, enthymemes, viewed in their

97

rhetorical context, function not just as logos but involve ethos and pathos as well”
(Conley 169).
Ambiguity is key in discourses of emotion, and the enthymeme’s ability to
express and incorporate ambiguity thus holds promise for its ability to draw
attention to the affective elements of discourse. Megan Boler, in Feeling Power,
develops what she calls a “pedagogy of discomfort” in which students, along with
instructors, are invited to explore the “emotional dimensions of [their] cognitive
and moral perception” (xxiv). By asking students to engage in the “discomforting
process of questioning cherished beliefs and assumptions,” Boler hopes to get
individuals “willingly to inhabit a more ambiguous and flexible sense of self” (176,
emphasis added). Approaching rhetoric as the “elaboration of ambiguity” and as
a way of engaging with discourse both ethically and politically complex enables
one to develop an understanding of the enthymeme that is amiable to the role of
images and emotion as fundamental elements of belief and persuasion, rather
than as distracting or disingenuous tactics of unethical rhetors (Covino 2). Thus,
the ambiguity of the enthymeme is its greatest asset, and the ambiguity of
images makes them likely candidates to be enthymemes.
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Chapter 3
Recovering Thumos in Rhetoric
In order to justify the recovery of thumos in rhetoric, it is necessary to
consider the place of emotion in discussions of enthymemic discourse and in the
field of rhetoric and composition more generally. Many of the pedagogies
described earlier, especially those based on Bitzer, value foremost the
participatory aspect of the enthymeme. How does one establish, however, not
just the social character of the enthymeme, but its emotional character as well?
Aristotle may be a more useful source in this regards than might be expected.
First we can look at, as Arthur Miller and John Bee state, “Aristotle’s rationale for
viewing the enthymeme as the primary engine for rhetorical proof and practical
reasoning” (201). Bitzer’s answer would likely focus on the collaborative method
of enthymemic production, arguing that “[b]ecause they are jointly produced,
enthymemes intimately unite speaker and audience and provide the strongest
possible proofs” (408).
But Miller and Bee claim that “the affective component inherent in the
enthymeme is the essence of Aristotle’s concept of the enthymeme as practical
reasoning” (they define the affective component as denoting the “area of feelings
and emotions”) (201). Miller and Bee locate the enthymeme’s claim to affective
structure in the etymology of the word enthymeme, which they note is from
thymos, the basic meaning of which is “soul, spirit, as the principle of life, feeling
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and thought, esp. of strong feeling and passion” (201). Thus, the roots of the
enthymeme in thumos show that “enthymemes inherently involve an affective
component that operates from a base of feelings and emotions” (Miller and Bee
202). It is this affective component of discourse which addresses both mind and
appetite that “gives the enthymeme force as rhetorical proof, pisteis, and thus as
the substance of rhetorical persuasion” (Miller and Bee 205). Even a more
traditional conception of the enthymeme could incorporate some affective
aspects, if one acknowledged the following: that reasoning is not a solely rational
operation and therefore emotion is an active part of practical reasoning; and that
the audience can “complete” the enthymeme, not just by supplying a linguistic
proof, but through an affective response. In fact, the conventional focus on the
logical structure of the structural enthymeme might be attributed, not to a
dismissal of passion, but to a passionately held attachment to logic.
Reuniting Cognition and Emotion in the Enthymeme
Though they have often been opposed to each other, emotion and reason
are not discrete processes. As Ellen Quandahl shows, pointing to the work of
scholars such as Jeffrey Walker and Martha Nussbaum, “emotions are not only
not fully separate from reason, but involve reason or cognition—and thus also
language—in crucial ways” (12). Some scholars even reverse the traditional
hierarchy of rationality over emotion. George Marcus claims in his book, The
Sentimental Citizen, that “people are able to be rational because they are
emotional; emotions enable rationality,” ultimately arguing that sentimental
citizens are the only ones capable of functioning as political subjects (7). Antonio
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Damasio even provides a neurological basis for the role of emotion in the
maintenance of consciousness, suggesting that “Biologically, emotion makes
consciousness possible, and consciousness translates emotions into feelings,
from which spring language and reason” (Kerr 28). It is thus difficult to maintain
the “false dichotomies between reason and emotion, mind and body, text and
person” that underlie the structural approach to the enthymeme.
The notion that an enthymeme can require an affective rather than
linguistic response is not overly difficult to accept if one looks at the goal of
persuasion as moving people to action. The Latin root of emotion, motere means
“to move,” and Aristotle, in his model of the soul, suggests that desire was
important to moving people to action (Jacobs and Micciche 3). Miller and Bee
reinforce this notion that the realm of emotion is where one moves people to
action, by stating that, according to Aristotle “mind, by itself, is never sufficient to
originate action or movement. For action to occur there must be appetite” (203).
In other words, “Action requires an affective state” (204). For those who maintain,
as Blair does when describing visual argument, that “Assertion is a kind of
action,” it becomes clear that the affective is operational at all stages of
persuasion, including the original assertion, not just in the audience’s reception of
the argument (“Rhetoric” 44). Forming arguments requires emotion.
It might seem strange, considering the vast literature on the nature of the
enthymeme, to find little on its relation to thumos. This oversight might be
considered part of the general disdain for emotion that is evident in so much
academic discourse. There is no doubt that the enthymeme remains an active
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rhetorical concept, both in pedagogical and theoretical discourses, although it
mainly persists in its structural form. The relationship between the enthymeme
and thumos has mostly been ignored by modern scholarship on the enthymeme
as well as recent scholarship on thumos.11 This ignorance of the relationship
between enthymeme and thumos might be seen as part of the long-standing
desire to characterize argument as a rational enterprise, and to banish emotion
to the periphery of the public sphere.
By adopting the paradigm of the enthymeme as a quasi-syllogism with an
underlying logical structure complete, scholars have been able to accept the
social aspect of enthymeme formation while denying the role of emotion in this
process; in other words, it allows them to value argument while devaluing
persuasion. Such policing of public discourse to limit the role of emotion recalls
Jürgen Habermas’ conception of the “ideal speech situation,” which has been
criticized for, among other things, its “assumption that emotions undermine
rationality” (Marcus 6). Rather than explore the context that always exceeds the
logocentric structure of argument, such approaches embrace the notion that
rationality is the standard for public discourse since "[o]nly reason can make its
claims explicit, available for public discussion and deliberation" (Marcus 19).
Alternately, the ignorance of the relationship between enthymeme and
thumos might be seen as related to the general belief that “strong emotion is
inconsistent with poststructuralism” as well as the resistance to emotion within
discourses that critique subjectivity (Terada 1). This perspective allows one to
deny the role of emotion in enthymeme formation as well, but for different
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reasons than above. From this post-structural perspective, scholars committed to
such postmodern views are understandably wary of the approach to emotion of
scholars such as Sondra Perl, who hopes that attention to emotion will favor
embodied ways of knowing that challenge postmodernism and enable “genuine
expression” and “full experiencing” (59). By recasting disciplinary debates over
the status of the enthymeme within the pre-Aristotelian framework of thumos, I
hope to illuminate the relationship between images, persuasion, and emotion in a
way that neither maintains any hierarchy between rationality and emotion, nor
reinforces notions of subjectivity that see emotion, perception, or belief as
markers of an essential self.
Fredric Jameson famously wrote in Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic
of Late Capitalism, of what he calls the “waning of affect in postmodern culture”
(10). According to Jameson, the “modernist thematics of alienation, anomie,
solitude, social fragmentation, and isolation” found in art such as Edward
Munch’s painting The Scream is not merely an expression of a certain type of
emotion, but participates in “a virtual deconstruction of the very aesthetic of
expression itself” (11). The loss of the concept of expression in the postmodern
era, Jameson argues, is marked by the “end, for example, of style, in the sense
of the unique and personal” (15). This brings with it the “’death’ of the subject
itself—the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual” and the
“end of the psychopathologies of that ego.” What follows for Jameson is that the
“liberation, in contemporary society, from the older anomie of the centered
subject may also mean not merely a liberation from anxiety but a liberation from
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every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do
the feeling.” In light of such statements, many accounts of poststructuralism have
assumed that “[post-structural] theory does not have an account of emotion”
(Terada 3).
This post-structural dismissal of emotion is not unchallenged (and by
challenge, I do not mean here a return to the centered subject or to belief in the
primacy of expression). Rei Terada, in her book Feeling in Theory: Emotion after
the “Death of the Subject,” writes that postmodern theory has often seemed to
take a dim view of the persistence of emotion in postmodern subjects. But she
argues that emotion is not proof of subjectivity at all. Rather, Terada states that
“we would have no emotions if we were subjects” (4). In other words, Terada
rejects the notion that “only subjects feel” and takes the existence of emotion
instead as proof that we are not autonomous subjects (3). She looks, for
instance, to the passions, which are “often portrayed as expressions of a subject
imposed upon a subject, as when someone is seized by remorse or surprised by
joy” (5, emphasis added). Alison Jaggar, in her essay “Love and Knowledge:
Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” observes as well that the “common way of
referring to emotions as the ‘passions’ emphasized that emotions happened to or
were imposed upon an individual, something she suffered rather than something
she did“ (146).That we conceive of ourselves as the object of emotion is one way
in which the existence of emotion is characteristic of the “nonsubjectivity within
the very notion of the subject” (Terada 5). In this way, emotion might be
considered a central method in enabling students to move towards the goal of
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critical pedagogy in which they are encouraged to “develop a relationship of nonidentity with their own subject positions” (Giroux 129)
For Terada, the death of the subject does not destroy the possibility of
emotion; rather, “emotion entails this death,” providing the grounds for selfdifference (3). This self-difference is not simply cognitive, as in F. Scott
Fitzgerald’s definition of a “first-rate intelligence” as “the ability to hold two
opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function"
(69), Nor is it merely deceptive, as in George Orwell’s definition of “doublethink”
as “[t]o know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while
telling carefully constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which
cancelled out, knowing them to be contradictory and believing both” (35). Such
duplicity seems like a recipe for inaction, but Fitzgerald at least attempts to
alleviate this concern when he gives as an example of the ideal response to
holding opposed beliefs that one should not just be able “to function,” but “be
able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them
otherwise” (69). This self-difference is the effect of our embodied selves as the
field of emergence for sensation, perception, and memory, a “complicating
immediacy of self-relation” that Massumi calls “intensity” (14).
More important to the argument for recovering thumos in rhetorical
studies, Terada writes that the “’poststructuralist’ dissatisfaction with the subject
appears in classical thought about emotion: theories of emotion are always
poststructuralist theories” (3, emphasis added). Terada claims that the dominant
discourse of emotion defines it as “nonsubjective experience in the form of self105

difference within cognition.” It is exactly this cognitive experience of selfdifference which I believe is visible in the Greek notion of thumos. As stated
earlier, thumos is used nowadays, in its broadest sense, to refer to an individual’s
capacity for emotion and is thus directly implicated in one’s capacity to be moved
by discursive and non-discursive phenomena—to respond to rhetoric. It is
variously translated from the Greek as “spiritedness” or “mind” or “passion” or
“heart,” although these words do not fit without difficulty into the variable models
of the psyche active in ancient Greek thought. It is, as Caroline Caswell writes in
her extensive work, A Study of Thumos in Early Greek Epic, the “most-used
psychological term in Homeric diction,” but has received “little attention” in the
twentieth century (1). Those seeking to translate it into English have been forced
to use words ranging from “soul” to “mind“ to “anger,” to encompass all of the
faculties and situations in which one finds this word being used, for instance, in
Greek epic.
The multiplicity of associations that thumos invokes is evident in its
etymology. Throughout Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Jeffrey Walker
consistently uses “thymos” rather than “thumos” in order to stress its relation to
other Greek terms such as thymoo (to “make angry” or “impassion”),
thymoumenon (“passion”), enthymeomai (to “lay to heart, ponder, consider, form
a plan, infer, conclude, be concerned or angry at,” and enthymêmata (the
“emotively charged reasons” invoked in the audience’s thumos) (171–72; 175).
This choice might be best understood in contrast to Walker’s choice to use
“enthymeme” rather than the Greek “enthymêma.” Walker chooses “enthymeme”
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because his work is an intervention into the ongoing disciplinary debate over the
term “enthymeme,” not over disciplinary debates over the term “enthymêma.”
Using both of these terms provides Walker an easy way to differentiate between
the rhetorical tradition which draws on Aristotle’s account of the enthymeme and
the sophistic discourse in which enthymêma was a “nontechnical term in
common use” (171).
In terms mentioned in the introductory chapter, this allows Walker to move
between the poles of historical and rational reconstruction in order to “develop a
general notion of ‘enthymeme’ for which both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian
approaches offer some lines of description” (184). Walker admits that to
reconstruct a pre-Aristotelian notion of enthymêma would require access to a
“sophistic discourse that is no longer fully available to us” (171). The use of
thumos rather than thymos throughout this dissertation is based on a similar
ambition—to mobilize thumos in order to understand the role of emotion in
contemporary imagistic discourse rather than to reconstruct a classical notion of
thymos.
A Skeptical View of the Desire for Emotion in Rhet-Comp
While there is important intellectual work being done and to be done in the
study of emotion, and while the study of thumos done here is intended to further
the conversation regarding the relation of emotion to rhetorical studies, it may be
fruitful to ask why emotion has become interesting to scholars in rhetoric and
composition right now, for asking: to what degree is the study of emotion fed by
emotion itself? The centrality of emotion to the study of rhetoric is currently being
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promoted by work in several disciplines and by many scholars, particularly those
influenced by feminist studies. The recent collection, A Way to Move: Rhetorics
of Emotion and Composition Studies, is representative of the scholarly attention
now being given to emotion in the field of rhetoric and composition. The editors of
this collection, Dale Jacobs and Laura Micciche, note that their articles are
broken into three types: those that “develop theories of emotion that work out of
classical rhetoric, feminist studies, and cognitive neuroscience,” those that
“explore the specific ways in which emotion shapes and is shaped by our
teaching practices,” and those that focus on the “relation between emotion and
the our professional roles as teachers and administrators” (2). To the commonly
cited theory-practice binary—oft represented by the contrast of the transient, lowpaid, unsatisfied composition teacher to the tenured, better-paid, satisfied
professor of literature (or nowadays, perhaps, of cultural studies)—Jacobs and
Micciche add a third term: management.
The addition of management as a significant division of interest is
unsurprising when one considers the changes in English departments over the
last two decades, which have placed many scholars with degrees in rhetoric and
composition studies as writing program administrators in charge of large
numbers of graduate teaching assistants and other temporary faculty. With this
new division in mind, I would offer that the role of rhetoric and composition
professors as managers—as what James Sledd and others have called “boss
compositionists”—has precipitated the interest in emotion in composition studies.
This is because, within a context of “flexible, mobile, and precarious labor
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relations,” it is primarily emotions that these professionals must manage (Hardt
and Negri 112). It is in these relationships that professors increasingly face
“emotionally laden ethical dilemmas” as they recognize that the programs they
manage depend on exploitative labor practices and “structures of entrenched
inequity for teachers” (Gillam 113; Peters 136).
Labor itself undoubtedly contains an emotional aspect. Marxist theorists
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri see proficiency in such “affective labor” as one
of the “primary skills employees need” in today’s global service economy and
which they classify as any “labor that produces or manipulates affects such as a
feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion” (108). In the
context of writing program administration in English departments, “emotion work”
has been defined as:
. . . responsive attention to the emotional aspects of social life, including
attention to personal feelings, the emotional tenor of relationships,
empathy and encouragement, mediation of disputes, building emotional
solidarity in groups, and using one’s own or others’ outlaw emotions to
interrogate structures. (Holt et al 147, original emphasis).
Efforts to change structures are thus conventionally seen as developing out of an
(subversive) emotional response, a position that is often grounded, as it is above,
in Allison Jaggar’s notion of “outlaw emotions.” According to Jaggar,
“unconventional emotional responses” can be used as the basis “for forming a
subculture defined by perceptions, norms, and values. By constituting the basis
for such a subculture, outlaw emotions may be politically (because
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epistemologically) subversive” (144). Laura Micciche writes as well that anger
can become a “necessary response to inequity” that has historically functioned
“as a catalyst for collectively organized social movements” (34).
The differences between the two conceptions of emotional labor above
are telling: one sees such labor as constitutive of the service orientation in
modern capitalism in which legal assistants, flight attendants, and fast food
workers provide service with a smile (Hardt and Negri 108). The other sees such
labor as the basis for subversive and critical activity. The first sentence in one of
the chapters of A Way to Move states the author’s response to his recent firing
as “I got angry. . . . losing a job hurt. I was at turns angry, sad, pitiful, and funny.”
(Wright 124). He resents that he “had believed many of the encomia to
community,” and he resents the call for “’No hard feelings,’ which we were told
more than once, [and which] came to mean ‘no feelings at all.’” The downsized
author seems to value an emotional labor grounded in anger even as he resents
the emotional labor that previously made him feel at ease in his position as a
supposed member of a community. His belief that the “official discourse of
letters, meetings, and pronouncements” called in fact for “no feelings at all”
seems to suggest that any emotion is here considered an outlaw emotion, a
claim that may render moot Jaggar’s distinction of outlaw emotions as
“unconventional.”
What the author characterizes as “no feelings at all” could be seen, not as
the absence of emotional labor, but as a failed attempt at the emotional labor of
the type that Hardt and Negri focus on—the labor to produce feelings of ease,
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well-being, and satisfaction. When the author later calls for “a theory of
workplace pathos,” it’s unclear how the “line[s] of comfort” and other forms of
supportive and indignant pathos that he dismisses at the beginning of the essay
differ in any way from the expressions of “mirth, anger, and sympathy” that he
longs for at the end of the essay (Wright 124–25, 134). Any theory of workplace
pathos should consider that emotional labor will not always serve the interests of
what he calls the “potential heroes,” but what he calls the “potential villains” and
“minor devils” as well (Wright 128). Likewise, academic work on emotion will not
necessarily be subversive, but could lead to potentially more effective forms of
emotional labor that better placate those, for instance, with legitimate bitterness
toward inequitable conditions. Insight gained from such work may make WPAs
better managers who are better able to manage the emotions of those who work
under them, and better able to empathize with and excite employees within
today’s corporatized university.
Among “boss compositionists,” the inequitable conditions of English
departments may be more likely to evoke guilt rather than anger, at least if one
agrees with the prediction embedded in the title of an essay by Mark Bousquet
and published in JAC that composition is becoming “A Discipline Where Only
Managements Gets Tenure.” In a 1998 essay in the online journal Workplace,
Cary Nelson wrote that many literature faculty thought of composition teachers
as part of the “Rhet/Comp Droid assembly lines,” who simply “beep and whir and
grade” and who therefore need no reduction in teaching loads because they are
not trained (or expected) to do research (section 18). It is such sentiments that
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Joseph Harris claims shows the “routine contempt that English still holds for
intellectual work in composition” (44). Such observations draw attention to the
diversity of emotions that attend hierarchized departmental structures where,
perhaps, the feelings of ease or security experienced by one group of
professionals depends on the denial of these to other groups.
The “sad women in the basement”—as Susan Miller labels the dominant
image of composition teachers—is another routine acknowledgement, not just of
the low status and poor conditions of adjuncts and graduate students, but of the
differential distribution of emotion throughout English departments (121). Ira Shor
comments as well that English departments and composition courses in
particular are increasingly staffed by an “army of underpaid, overworked writing
instructors (largely female) [that] marks our field's continuing shame” (Interview
by Parascondola, section 2). It is possible to argue then that the material
conditions of English departments have provided a strong stimulus for the study
of emotion, by placing professionals within a set of unequal relationships that
hosts a large mass of low-status and disenfranchised individuals whom these
managers exercise power over, conditions that seat professors with strongly felt
ethical and emotional obligations.
That these obligations contribute to an increased desire to study emotion
may say little about the efficacy of emotional labor, subversive or not. Asking
individuals to act on such obligations means asking them not just to embrace the
(righteous) anger of those opposed to inequity and/or the shame of those who
benefit from it, but to embrace the feelings of anxiety and disempowerment that
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the dismantling of institutional hierarchies would likely induce in those who
previously held positions of security. Until calls for action consider the emotional
consequences of change and not just the emotional motivation for change, real
structural changes seem unlikely. Regardless, there may be a strong degree of
what might be called “emotion hope” embedded in scholarship on emotion.
Stanley Fish’s notion of “theory hope” posits that most attempts to generate a
theory have been grounded in the possibility that knowledge claims could be
made that could be objectively justified without reference to the context of those
making the claims. In this traditional view of theory, the hope is that by providing
a generalizable account of how things work, it can “reform practice by
neutralizing interest” (Fish Doing 319, emphasis added). Emotion hope is not the
same as theory hope. In the case of theorizing emotion, a recurrent view seems
to be that one can reform practice by stimulating interest. While Fish’s work
suggests that theory can have no consequences outside of the practice of theory
itself, emotion hope seems to be based in the desire that theory can have social
and political consequences.
As the editors of A Way to Move write, they want to conceive “emotion as
a basis for professional and social action” that produces a “galvanizing force to
create social and institutional movement” (Jacobs and Micciche 5, 6). But this
may underestimate the degree to which emotion is also attendant to professional
and social inaction. If emotional labor is not recognized as being active in both
the act of resistance and the act of complicity, attempts to reform academia by
calling for increased attention to emotional structures may accomplish little. In
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Textual Carnivals: The Politics of Composition, Susan Miller warns us that it is
possible that such “’reforms’ in fact re-form tradition by sustaining its root
metaphors and masking what was at stake” in the original structure (10). Such
reforms may ignore the deep ideological power of emotions—their ability to
define the stakes which academics are willing to defend and the structures they
are willing to change.
In her afterword to A Way to Move, Lynn Worsham cites Toni Morrison’s
“distinction between feeling ‘touched’ and being ‘moved’” as being critical to
understanding the ideological function of emotion (161). “Feeling touched” is the
appeal to emotion that “goes nowhere and accomplishes nothing except a
confirmation of the distance between self and other.” It is the triggering of
emotion in ways beholden to dominant ideologies. “Being moved” goes “beyond
mere sentimentality” to become a “vehicle for critical consciousness.” The desire
for emotion in rhetoric and composition studies may lead to critical interrogation
of the role that emotion plays in the formation of subjectivity through a form of
“paideia, the whole social education of members of a culture” (Quandahl 11).
This “schooling of emotions,” as Worsham calls it, allows us to see that “all
education is sentimental, that all education is an education of sentiment” (163).
But if scholarly interest in emotion simply touches us, if the experience ends at
(re)forming our own subjectivity, then political action is unlikely to occur, and our
positions will remain unmoved.
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Interdisciplinary Contributions to the Study of Affect and Emotion
As indicated earlier, article authors in A Way to Move find support for their
inquiry from scholars in other fields. The work of Damasio in neurobiology, as
stated earlier, is used to establish a biological basis for the central role of
emotion in the maintenance of consciousness. Damasio’s work is used to argue
that emotion is critical to all conscious thought, including language and reason
(Kerr 28). In his investigations into patients with brain lesions, Damasio found
that patients who had lost the ability to feel emotion had also lost their ability to
make simple decisions. It was not that these patients could not employ reason,
but that in situations where there were no strict reason-based criteria on which to
base a decision, the patients were unable to reach a conclusion. For instance,
patients could not schedule appointments in the future by choosing between a
Monday or a Tuesday. Lacking any absolute criteria on which to choose one day
over the other, the patients were unable to make plans. What Damasio’s
research perhaps best exemplifies is the degree to which emotion is “embedded
in the social and institutional fabric” of everyday life and the decisions we make
using seemingly logical criteria (Jacobs and Micciche 3).
The inability of Damasio’s patients to make simple decisions recalls the
philosophical paradox commonly referred to as “Buridan’s ass.” Jean Buridan
was a French priest and philosopher of the 14th century, and this paradox is
associated with him even though he never directly writes of it. In fact, the
situation described in the paradox is referenced in book 2 of Aristotle’s De Caelo.
In Aristotle’s version, a man is placed equidistant between food and drink, and is
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both hungry and thirsty. In the version attributed to Buridan, a donkey is hungry
and standing equidistant from two equally matched bales of hay. In both cases,
the actor lacks a rational basis on which to choose one object over the other, and
therefore no action occurs. This is sometimes used as a way to discredit theories
(such as those posited by Buridan), that one should always choose the greater
good. But it is also possible to see this inaction as a failure of emotion, not a
failure of logic. As Aristotle wrote, choice is a function of “desire and reasoning
with a view to an end” (qtd. in Miller and Bee 204). Reason alone is never the
origin of decisions.
Damasio’s work corresponds well with the work of scholars such as
Martha Nussbaum, Jeffrey Walker, and John Cooper, all of whose work suggests
that “emotions are not only not fully separate from reason, but involve reason or
cognition—and thus also language—in crucial ways” (Quandahl 12). Such work
makes it difficult to maintain the “false dichotomies between reason and emotion,
mind and body, text and person,” suggesting a more complex relation between
desire, rationality, ethics, and emotions (Kerr 28). For scholars such as Ellen
Quandahl, any conceptualization of emotion “belongs in the ethical sphere” and,
therefore, she finds thumos closely associated with Aristotelian virtues (arêtes)
(13). She notes that virtues for Aristotle are “dispositions toward praxis and
pathos, toward acting and being acted upon, doing and feeling” (15). Aristotle
says as much in the Nicomachean Ethics when he writes that “the virtues have to
do with actions and emotions” (1104b).
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The connection of thumos to ethical action through virtue is one reason for
making the distinction between emotion and affect. Emotion typically refers to a
psychological event that is at least “minimally interpretive” (Terada 4). The
physiological aspect of this experience is affect. Brian Massumi emphasizes the
linguistic nature of emotion, arguing that “An emotion is a subjective content, the
sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of experience which is from that point onward
defined as personal” (28). Thus, affect is always that which is in excess, the
supplement that escapes the letter of emotion, the repressed energy that returns,
the complexity that is reduced to a knowable emotional state.12
Despite the complexity of affect, the reduction of emotion to affect would
leave little room for a rhetorical interest in emotion. As Elizabeth Spelman writes,
“we could not regard our emotions as very interesting facts about us—in
particular, as deeply connected to ourselves as moral agents—if emotions were
simply events, things happening in us like headaches or bleeding gums” (222).
Based on the definitions of emotion and affect above, the configuration of thumos
as the capacity for emotion places it at least on par with other forms of linguistic
discourse in terms of its importance to the liberal arts. Thumos is the foundation
of our capacity to be moved by discourse—to respond to rhetoric that calls upon
our reason and emotion. Politics would not function, nor would everyday
instances of persuasion and cognition, without this element of “effective rhetoric”
(Jacobs and Micciche 3). To reiterate Quandahl’s call to rhetoricians: “this heartword [thumos] ought to become a key term for rhetoric” (14).
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What is Thumos?
Defining thumos is not an easy task. Even though it is “the most-used
psychological term in Homeric diction” efforts to develop a coherent definition of it
have mainly succeeded only as far as they have ignored the high degree of
variation in its uses (Caswell 1). Even in its primary role as a term to describe
inner experience in Homeric epic, its uses are so varied and cover “almost every
important aspect of inner human experience, that it seems possible only to
translate each occurrence as is fitting to that passage without attempting
consistency.” Issues of translation have also proven difficult, and one finds
thumos translated as “soul” or “spiritedness” or “mind” or “passion” or “heart.”
Scholars such as Caroline Caswell, rather than seeking a “universal [English]
equivalent” of thumos, have sought instead to enumerate its “semantic
associations”—the functional contexts in which references to thumos appear in
Greek literary texts. Caswell identifies five of these contexts:
1. Loss of consciousness/death
2. Intellect/cognition
3. Emotion
4. Inner debate/conflict
5. Motivation (49–50)
Thumos thus links together the realms of cognition, affect, emotion, and
perception. As Caswell writes, “Homeric diction does not compartmentalize the
physiological and the psychological” (16). In addition to these functions, thumos
is often associated with breath, storms, and wind, especially when “inner turmoil .
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. . [is] compared to violent storms and winds on the water” (50). (This is also yet
another reason to reconsider Joyce’s choice of the enthymeme as the technique
of his Aeolus chapter.)
Thumos is distinctive from some other rhetorical concepts in that it was an
active term within ancient Greek poetics. But the various words now used in its
place must be contextualized within an understanding of how thumos was
situated within the Greek psyche by different thinkers. Especially significant is the
reduction of the scope of thumos by Plato, who downgrades thumos to one of
three parts of the unified soul (reason, spirit, and appetite) which should ideally
be ruled by reason, or logos. Rather than hierarchize the parts of the soul by
insisting that one rule over the other, Homer presents thumos as the seat of
emotions in order to explore the psychic interior of the characters in his epic
poem, Iliad, the very first line of which focuses our attention on the anger of
Achilles. While for Homer the thumos was not associated with any specific
emotion, but was rather the “site, location, the interior mental but quasi-physical
part where emotions happen,” later writers have tried to restrict the scope of
thumos to the emotion of anger (Koziak 43).
The strong association between anger and thumos is understandable,
since the paradigmatic emotion of representative texts such as the Iliad is anger.
And following these early Greek epics, this association is reinforced by Plato and
Aristotle, who do not simply ignore thumos, but severely restrict its rhetorical
potential. As Koziak writes, “Plato’s Republic gives an especially meaty role to
thumos,” but one that “concentrates almost exclusively on the experience of
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anger” (39). Such interpretations of thumos continue to modern times with
scholars such as Allan Bloom, who argues in The Closing of the American Mind
that the ancient concept of thumos establishes the paradigm of the “ambitious,
warlike, protective, possessive character” of men; this “central natural passion”
he renames “machismo” (129). But Koziak has effectively shown that such a
definition of thumos does not match with the illustrations of thumos in the Iliad.
While Homer does most often associate anger, this is not true in all cases. Anger
is most often associated with the thumos of men and sorrow is most often
associated with the thumos of women, but both genders have thumoi that host
not only sorrow, anger, and fear, but “the desirable, pleasurable emotions of
delight, gladness, and love” (Koziak 42).
Plato’s well-known division of the soul into reason, spirit, and appetite in
book 4 of the Republic differs from earlier accounts by insisting that thumos
(spirit) is ideally ruled by reason. The relationship between the three parts is
“more coercive than dialogical,” as evidenced in Socrates’ second speech in the
Phaedrus, where the tripartite soul is compared to a charioteer guiding two
horses (Neinkamp 31). Put simply, the noble white horse (spirit) aligns itself with
the charioteer (reason) to control the ignoble dark horse (appetite). In this model,
the alignment between reason and spirit is so close that some have even argued
that this in fact a bipartite soul, since the aims of the charioteer and the white
horse are the same (Robinson 117).
What sometimes goes unnoticed in this model is that reason and emotion
are not opposed but dependent on each other. As Jaggar writes, this model of
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the soul suggests that the “split between reason and emotion was not absolute,
therefore, for the Greeks. Instead, the emotions were thought of as providing
indispensable motive power that needed to be channeled appropriately. Without
horses, after all, the skill of the charioteer would be worthless” (145). Granted,
emotion is portrayed here as subordinated to reason, but this scene can also be
used to support the “complete interdependence of reason and emotion in moving
action” (Moon 34). Moon argues that the Aristotelian view that being moved to
ethical action is only possible when “one’s emotional state is ready for rational
guidance” should be read against the many warnings found in composition
textbooks against succumbing to non-rational appeals, as well as the tendency
for textbooks to treat logos, ethos, and pathos separately (another variation of
the dividing practices that Vitanza writes against). None of the twenty-five
textbooks Moon looks at include examples that “explicitly illustrate the effective
combination of all three appeals” used together (36).
The trivial role given to thumos in the Platonic soul is unlike earlier
articulations of thumos, such as those found in Homer’s epic poem, the Iliad.
Rather than hierarchize the parts of the soul by insisting that one rule over the
other, Homer presents thumos as the seat of emotions as a way of narrating the
psychic interiors of his characters, as he does when he opens with Achilles’
anger. But thumos is just one part of Homer’s version of the psyche which is to
modern readers a “strange collection of interior elements, some neither purely
organic nor purely psychic—kardia and ētor meaning heart, phrenes meaning
lungs, or diaphragm, or mind, noos meaning mind, plan, or purpose, psuchē
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meaning a breath that flees the body at the point of death, and thumos” (Koziak
37). Furthermore, Homer indicates that emotions are “in” the thumos, that
emotions emerge “out of” the thumos, and that one can affect one’s thumos
emotionally (for instance, by gladdening it) (Koziak 43).
Considering thumos’ malleability, it is not surprising that Plato’s and
Aristotle’s more systematic formulations of the soul would downgrade the role of
thumos. Luckily, thumos is not being introduced here for its ability to provide
systematic coherence to the process of persuasion or to the structure of the
psyche. The feature most relevant to the functioning of the enthymeme is that the
Homeric thumos is not merely a container for emotion, it also participates in
deliberation. It is in the thumos that “one considers things, draws inferences,
becomes impassioned, forms desires, has intentions, and makes plans” (Walker
173). Consider Homer’s exposition in the Iliad of Odysseus’s mental state as the
Trojans advance upon him:
And troubled, he spoke then to his own great-hearted thumos:
“Ah me, what will become of me? It will be a great evil
If I run, fearing their multitude, yet deadlier if I am caught
Alone; and Kronos’ son drove to flight the rest of the Danaans.
Yet still. Why does the thumos within me debate on these things?
(11.401–12)
While some have argued that Odysseus’ ultimate decision to stand his
ground in the face of the Trojan assault is a triumph of reason over emotion,
Koziak argues that this ignores the fact that Homer shows that “both the emotion
and the reason seem to reside in the thumos” and that, rather than reason
winning over emotion, it is true instead that “one package of a reason and
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emotion wins over another.” (51). As later lines in the Iliad show, the emotion of
fear is packaged with the reason that Odysseus is badly outnumbered, and the
emotion of anger is packaged with the reason that this is an opportunity to win
honor as a warrior. By siding with the latter, Odysseus “both reasons and feels
himself into staying” (Koziak 51). That this articulation of emotion and reason into
action occurs in the thumos suggests rich possibilities for the enthymeme as a
site of the persuasive function of the collaboration between pathos and logos.
Jean Nienkamp argues that the model of “mental divisiveness” evident in
Homer “necessarily constitutes what James J. Murphy calls the ‘rhetorical
consciousness’” and what she calls “internal rhetoric” (Nienkamp 11). In her
book, Internal Rhetorics, Nienkamp argues that “people persuade themselves
into certain decisions or actions” and that these deliberations can form the basis
of a study of “internal rhetoric” (7). She begins with Classical formations of
internal rhetoric, arguing that the activity of the thumos as described in works
such as the Iliad is a form of internal rhetoric where “heroes talk to themselves in
order to clarify situations, reinforce convictions, or make decisions in the midst of
battle” (Nienkamp 37–8).
It is such “rhetorical moments of the epic” that Susan Jarratt uses in
Rereading the Sophists to argue against claims that “there is in Homer no
genuine reflexion, no dialogue of the soul with itself” (15; Snell 19). Jarratt claims
instead that the “mythic discourse” of Greek epic contains the “beginnings of a
‘rhetorical consciousness’” and that this consciousness “expresses itself both
through public argument and internal debate” (35). Jarratt’s assertions are a
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response to scholars who identify in the fifth century B.C.E. a “shift from mythos
to logos as a major restructuring of cognition resulting from the growth of literacy”
(xxii). In effect, these scholars try to divide mythic consciousness from rhetorical
consciousness, claiming that the preliterate or oral consciousness of the “mythic”
world is unsuitable to the “introspection or critical distance presumed necessary”
for “elaborated syllogistic logic” (Jarratt 31).
Walker corroborates Jarratt’s defense of pre-literate rhetorical
consciousness by identifying in Greek lyric poetry an enthymeme-suffused
“rhetorical poetics”—poetic discourse as the “oldest and original type” of
epideictic rhetoric (6). The deliberating function embodied by thumos therefore
serves to connect the study of rhetoric back through poetic discourse, not only to
highlight the argumentative function of poetics, but to illuminate how the
rhetorical tradition is related to a poetic tradition in which Dionysius of
Halicarnassus could say the best orations were “like the mightiest poems and
lyrics,” and Aelius Aristide could assert that the best poetry was that which
“comes nearest to rhêtorikê,” where rhêtorikê is understood as an “art of
eloquently reasoned argument” (Walker 154–55).
This debate is important to the defense of a thumos-based enthymeme
because some scholars dismiss the working of thumos and the pre-Aristotelian
meanings of the enthymeme as being relics of pre-rational discourse from before
the “progress toward non-narrative philosophical prose” (Jarratt 45). The favoring
of logos over mythos leads many scholars of the enthymeme to restrict their
attention to the works of Aristotle in order to codify a narrow logic-based reading
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of the enthymeme that defines it primarily through its schematic relationship to
the syllogism (xxii). Covino’s The Art of Wondering exposes as “reductive
summaries” those attempts to reduce rhetoric to “tree diagrams of finite
categories or subcategories, or lists of rules and precepts,” as well as attempts to
construct unity out of a Rhetoric “rife with inconsistency, meandering, and
sketchiness” (9, 22). Covino claims that these scholars ignore the Aristotle for
whom “the principles of discourse are supple, inclusive, and finally indeterminate”
and construct instead a “rather tidy, decisive Aristotle . . . a codified, schematized
philosopher who gave us rules (24, 1–2, original emphasis). The return to a
sophistic notion of the enthymeme grounded in the deliberative function of
thumos denies that Aristotle’s enthymeme is one of the “fixed monuments in the
dust of progress”—“progress toward a comprehensive description of the art of
rhetoric” (Covino 5, 23, original emphasis). Rather, it recognizes that this history
is unstable and that “[h]ow we read the history of rhetoric, and what we read, and
the implications for teaching we derive, can change” (Covino 2). Thus, the
enthymeme of Aristotle is not necessarily superior to the enthymemes of
previous authors based on its situation in a “new” type of literacy represented by
syllogistic rhetoric.
Thumos as the Internal Dialogue of Ideology
Classical epic, Nienkamp claims, “portrays internal rhetoric in a variety of
circumstances and with a variety of types of reasoning, all pointing toward
initiating action at a crucial moment” (14).By initiating action at the opportune
moment, the activity of thumos may even be associated with the ancient concept
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of kairos, of due measure, fitness, or proper timing. Nienkamp argues that the
submersion of the internal aspect of rhetoric is primarily due to the focus of Plato
and Aristotle on (philosophy as separate from) rhetoric in the public sphere.
Nienkamp relies most heavily on Isocrates because of his refusal of the Platonic
bifurcation of thought and speech (and, therefore, between philosophy and
rhetoric, and between persuasion and clarification). This refusal allows him to
pursue both public argument and internal debate under the rubric of logos.
Isocrates’ belief in the continuity between philosophy and rhetoric is evident in
this excerpt:
With this faculty [logos] we both contend against others on matters which
are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are
unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others
when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own
thoughts; and while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a
crowd, we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems
in their own minds. (qtd. in Nienkamp 18)
Nienkamp believes that Isocrates, through his emphasis on kairos and his
understanding of a thumos-enabled internal rhetoric that “has both a positive
ethical evaluation in its own right and a role as the source of ethical behavior,”
provides a solid argument for rhetoricians to embrace the study of thumos (20).
Nienkamp’s support for the study of thumos as internal rhetoric depends
on the presence of an active dialogue in one’s mind. Susan Griffin, in an article
titled “The Way of All Ideology,” writes that “speculation about dialogue is also a
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speculation about ideology,” since the way we think is both dialogic and
ideological (274). Our experience of ideology as internal struggle may therefore
be similar to Neinkamp’s description of thumos as a type of internal rhetoric. As
Bakhtin writes in The Dialogic Imagination, our “ideological development . . . is an
intense struggle within us for hegemony among various available verbal and
ideological points of view, approaches, directions and values” (345–46). The
location of this struggle is arguably the thumos. Although she doesn’t use this
term “thumos,” Judith Goleman suggests that our ideological lives are guided by
our (shifting) investments in a range of discourses, and that, by structuring our
identifications, these discourses provide the basis for the internal hegemonic
struggle that is our experience of ideology.
It is possible to see Griffin’s essay as an attempt to narrate the workings of
thumos. By identifying the internal workings of thumos as separate individuals
arguing within her thoughts, Griffin anthropomorphizes the discourses that
constitute her own ideological (thumotic) struggle. At the least, thumos’
association with emotion serves to solidify the association of ideology with
emotion. Griffin begins her essay by figuring ideological thought as a type of
dialogue:
I speculate about ideology. About form. And then about dialogue. The
three phenomena occur to me at once. Forms: the form of hierarchies, of
institutions, of habits, the way things are done; the forms of language,
gesture, art, of thought, and equally, of emotion. What we say to one
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another being often what it is predictable that we will say; what I will say, if
you say that: Dialogue. (273)
The forms that Griffin identifies implicate both rational and emotional thought, the
body as well as the mind. Instead of the thumos as participant in deliberation,
Griffin envisions two internal presences, asking herself “Who are these two in
me? The ‘I’ with whom I identify, the ‘you’ whom I define as not ‘I’” (274). That
Griffin has already identified herself with one of these presences suggests
perhaps that much of our reaction to arguments is embedded in our past
relations to these internal forms, to these positions that we have occupied in the
past, and not as much to the cohesiveness to the discursive structure we are
facing. Through identification with one of these presences, Griffin enacts the
same sort of distancing that is evident in Terada’s view of emotions as
“expressions of a subject imposed upon a subject,” which Terada uses to
question the connection of emotion to subjectivity (5).
Griffin enacts a similar disconnection in her description of the shifting
identities of the figures that constitute her internal rhetoric—sometimes one is a
“nag, the dictator, the time and motion expert, the boss, the destroyer,” and
sometimes the other is “the authority, the good girl, the stable and predictable
one” (274). Regardless of the specific ideologies or identities that these figures
represent, it is through their “exhausting argument” that Griffin can say to herself
“I know I am split from myself” (275). In other words, Terada and Griffin both
identify an experience of internal otherness that marks the limits of understanding
the non-subjectivity of subjectivity—the experience of being a spectator to one’s
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thoughts and emotions. Such experiences are arguably connected to Bakhtin’s
views on the dialogic nature of language, in which our words are always
borrowed from the world around us. The internalization of that dialogue within the
thumos provides a model for how ideology works, even as it suggests ways in
which the critique of this dialogue can occur through identification with and in
opposition to these imagined speakers:
Slowly I begin to identify myself with the new thought. I split away from my
doubts, calling this doubting self ‘you.’ Now I project the doubting half of
my own inner conversation upon another. I supply her with her missing
part of the dialogue. As I argue with myself, I imagine I am arguing with
her. (Griffin 275).
Griffin’s meditation on ideology mirrors the participatory debate depicted within
the thumos in classical texts, and shows that affect and emotion, ideology and
reason, are part of the heteroglossia that underlie our beliefs and values. Griffin’s
essay also shows the usefulness of a concept of thumos in which reason and
emotion are not set at odds, but are considered constitutive of each “side” in the
internal debate of thumos. As Griffin writes, the Other with which she argues
“embodies all that is part of the natural, sensate life of the body and all of the
natural emotions which so often cause one to feel out of control, even frightened
of oneself” (275). Her example shows that ideology works to lead us to
conceptualize our own internal rhetoric through the restrictive binaries that
structure much of discourse—to see emotion as the Other to our rational selves.
Thumos may provide a way of referring to one’s “internally persuasive discourse”
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that is just unfamiliar enough to displace conventional understandings of what it
means to be a subject within ideology (Bakhtin 342).
Visualizing Thumos
The next chapter will address the ongoing debates over visual argument,
and make a case for understanding the visual enthymeme through its relation to
thumos. The choice here to recover the concept of thumos, not by exhausting the
history and uses of this term through a deep analysis of Greek texts, but by
developing a concept of the visual enthymeme, is directly related to the historical
usefulness that the enthymeme has shown in rhetorical studies. As Poster writes,
the changing definitions of the enthymeme are “typical of the process by which
rhetorical theorists of all ages seem to reinterpret Aristotle to bring his theories
into conformance with the dominant rhetorical thinking of their period” (6).
Recognizing that the enthymeme has always been used as a way to assess the
relation of Greek thought to contemporary rhetorical thinking, I see no reason to
not continue this process. In Defining Visual Rhetorics, editors Charles A. Hill
and Marguerite Helmers write approvingly of this timely practice of
reinterpretation that Poster identifies; they write: “every new turn in the study of
rhetorical practices reveals yet more possibilities for study, for discussion, for
wonder. The visual turn is just the latest of these” (21). The desire to redefine the
enthymeme as a visual and emotional structure thus proceeds from Poster’s
historicizing of the highly variable definitions of the enthymeme, an analysis
which shows that “rhetorical terms are not so much immutable entities with fixed
and unchangeable meanings, but rather methods by which a culture analyzes its
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own discursive practices” (1). That these practices are increasingly visual in
contemporary society is undeniable. One might even say that our historical
context invites a visual redefinition of the enthymeme. And as mentioned above,
one goal here is to avoid reinscribing the visual enthymeme as a structure, and
redefine it in terms of its eventfulness.
But how will this redefinition connect the enthymeme to events? As
shown, the majority of models of the enthymeme emphasize its relation to the
syllogism (stated variously as it being a truncated, abbreviated, or incomplete
syllogism), a portrayal that limits the enthymeme to being a “formally deficient”
structure (Bitzer 404). In comparison to the “complete” syllogism composed of a
major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, the enthymeme seems to be
lacking a premise. But as Brian Massumi writes in Parables for the Virtual, “the
effect of the mass media and other image- and information-based media simply
[cannot] be explained in terms of a lack” (43). Rather, Massumi focuses on what
he calls the “potential” embodied in the “image/expression events in which we
bathe. . . . images as conveyors of forces of emergence” (42–43). As Nicholas
Mirzoeff writes, visual culture is defined
. . . by the interaction between viewer and viewed, which may be termed
the visual event. When I engage with visual apparatuses, media and
technology, I experience a visual event. By visual event, I mean an
interaction of the visual sign, the technology that enables and sustains that
sign, and the viewer. (13, emphasis added)
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This event is the visual enthymeme, and is the basis of the “power of things
visually to persuade us” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 42). Since the “exemplary event is a
deferred completion,” the “incompleteness” of the enthymeme is its potential as
an event (Massumi 64). A theory of visual enthymemes must thus shift focus
from the propositional structure of traditional argument to a notion of argument as
event.
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Chapter 4
Re-Seeing the Visual Enthymeme for the First Time
As seen in the previous chapter, the enthymeme has a variable history
within rhetorical studies. But what is the view of the enthymeme from outside of
English departments? The current understanding of the enthymeme active in
visual studies is part of the disciplinary formations that have accompanied the
increased interest in the visual. Since Arguments and Advocacy’s special issue
on visual argument in 1996 there has been a substantial expansion in the
locations of visual studies in the academy. The list of disciplines in which
academic interest in the visual is currently thriving is long. Art History, Media
Studies, Humanities, Women’s Studies, English, Cultural Studies, Film,
Comparative Literature, Communication, Education, Philosophy, Sociology—
these are just some of the fields/departments in which some form of what James
Elkins calls “visual studies” has taken hold (8). The confluence of approaches to
the visual has led to a rich and somewhat overwhelming Burkean parlor of ideas
regarding the study of image-based discourse.
As James Elkins writes, the disciplinary homes of visual studies scholars,
the academic canons to which these scholars point, and the favored objects of
their studies seem “hopelessly miscellaneous or happily inclusive, depending on
your point of view” (36). The same year that A&A published its special issue on
visual argument, the journal October published responses to a questionnaire on
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visual culture in which the “general tenor . . . was that visual culture is a
disorganized, possibly ineffectual, illegitimate, and even misguided extension of
art history and other disciplines” (Elkins 18). Although the viability of visual
studies is today less questionable, the anxiety and irregularities emerging from
the interdisciplinary nature of visual studies remain.
Such disciplinary anxieties regarding the viability of visual studies have not
hindered the wide circulation of visual media, which have become “commonplace
in all aspects of contemporary public discourse” (McComiskey, “Visual” 188).
This is in no small way related to the cultural importance of the screens which
“have gradually so infiltrated our habits of being that their presence has become
normal for many citizens at work and play” (Welch, Electric 4). While we are most
likely to think of T.V. and computer screens, Anne-Marie Christin writes in
L’image écrite that we should define screens as any host medium of a sign, and
that these screens work to “screen thinking.” As Jan Baetens writes, screen
thinking is not simply the name for how viewers decode signs, but “a matter of
subjective evaluation of emergent networks of framed visuality. . . a way of
looking [that] becomes a way of thinking” (194).
Christin’s notion of “screen thinking” has much in common with what
Kenneth Burke calls “terministic screens.” According to Burke, our choice of
terminology functions as a screen that determines what can and cannot be said:
“even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as
terminology it must be a selection of reality, and to this extent it must function
also as a deflection of reality” (45). But such functions must apply to our
134

understandings of these terms as well, including the implied hierarchy among
reflections, selections, and deflections. The understanding of the enthymeme that
views it as an “incomplete” or “abbreviated” syllogism, producing “a tentative
conclusion from probable premises,” as opposed to the “normal syllogism” that
leads to a “necessary conclusion from universally true premises” is a screen as
well, focusing arguments, for instance, onto issues of technical difference
between probability and necessity (Corbett 60). Accepting any definition of the
enthymeme, or of visual studies for that matter, must necessarily “affect the
nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one
field rather than to another” (Burke 46). Re-seeing the enthymeme thus almost
requires the introduction of a term such as thumos, which is not an active term in
most of the debates over the enthymeme’s function.
The Visual Enthymeme in the Academic Mind
In a study of the various understandings of the enthymeme in academic
work, Lloyd Bitzer finds that the enthymeme is conventionally marked as
“distinctive [from the syllogism proper] on account of (1) its basis in probability,
(2) its concreteness, and (3) its usual formal deficiency” (400). Bitzer concludes,
however, that each of these approaches “failed to name a truly distinguishing
feature” of the enthymeme that would separate it from other forms of syllogism.
According to Bitzer, the single aspect of the enthymeme that sets it apart from
other forms of reasoning explored by Aristotle is that, in the enthymeme, “the
audience itself helps construct the proofs by which it is persuaded. . . . [the
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enthymeme’s] successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of
speaker and audience and this is its essential character” (408).
Bitzer’s argument has been influential across many disciplines, and is the
sole characteristic of enthymemes that authors typically invoke when they
announce the possibility of visual enthymemes. Past articles in Argumentation
and Advocacy contain several such statements. For instance, Cara Finnegan, in
her 2001 exposition of the “naturalistic enthymeme” active in documentary
photography, claims that “the enthymeme leaves space for the audience to insert
its own knowledge and experience; it assumes an audience of judges capable of
‘filling in the blanks’” (143). In “Can Pictures Be Arguments?” David Fleming
summarizes theorists who claim that “political cartoons are a kind of enthymeme,
relying on socially-sanctioned presuppositions to produce reasoned belief and
action in others. Cartoons, that is, argue for political positions by adducing
acceptable (albeit unspoken) reasons to hold those positions” (12). Even when
only alluding to the possibility of visual enthymemes in the opening to the A&A
special issue on visual argument, David Birdsell and Leo Groarke look to the
social sanctioning of ideas to authorize visuals, stating that “[s]tudents of
argumentation have accepted since Aristotle the influence of acculturation in the
production of verbal enthymemes. We are now arguing that the same allowances
must be made for visual commonplaces as well” (7). In each case above, the
participation of the audience in constructing the latent argument from socially
available premises is emphasized over all other possible characteristics of the
enthymeme.
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The dominance of this participatory aspect in the definition of the
enthymeme is not unrelated to the “social turn” that occurred in many disciplines,
and the development of reader-response theories that “formed an important part
of the wider concern with popular participation in the 1960s and early 1970s”
(Harkin 414). According to Harkin, the theories that focused attention on the role
of the reader in the meaning-making process now simply form the “foundational
assumptions” of much modern day scholarship (416). At one time, Harkin claims,
these theories were intellectually exciting, if not radical. Scholars could publish
articles, as Chris Anderson did, on the “rhetoric of gaps,” where he argues that
the reading experience “depends on the ‘gaps’ or ‘blanks’ in a text, the gaps
arising from dialogue, for example, or from unexplained events, delayed
revelations, and uninterpreted concrete images” (10).
Such approaches are often based on the work of Wolfgang Iser, whose
book The Act of Reading introduced many to the notion that “what is said only
appears to take on significance as a reference to what is not said” (168). In this
system readers are “assigned the tasks of filling in the ‘gaps’ between the fixed
points [within the text]” (Bérubé 15). This is precisely the view taken by Blair in
his recent essay “The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments.” In his essay in A&A ten
years ago, Blair was rather skeptical about the possibility of visual argument.
Diana George finds that Blair’s previous essay “just barely manages to agree that
visual argument, possessing all of the ‘salient properties of arguments,’ could
actually be said to exist” (29). Blair’s more recent essay affirms the existence of
visual arguments more forcefully, and, of particular interest here, it very clearly
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announces that “[v]isual arguments are typically enthymemes—arguments with
gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the audience” (“Rhetoric” 52).
This approach to the visual enthymeme repeats the participatory aspect
shown to be valued in Bitzer and reader response theories in general. Blair
ascribes to two related notions about enthymemes: that they leave a premise
unstated, and that the audience supplies this missing premise. As Blair states at
the beginning of his essay, the enthymeme is “a form of argument . . . in which
the arguer deliberately leaves unstated a premise that is essential to its
reasoning. Doing so has the effect of drawing the audience to participate in its
own persuasion by filling in that unexpressed premise” (“Rhetoric” 41). This
characterization of the function of the enthymeme is squarely based on the work
of scholars such as Iser in which gaps “draw the reader into the action” (168). To
better understand what Blair means by the term “visual enthymeme” (especially
in relation to the broader concept of visual argument), one can consider the
primary example he offers, which is a TV spot run during the 1964 presidential
race between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater.
In this ad, a little girl is seen picking a daisy apart while counting upward;
when the girl reaches “ten,” a voice over begins a downward countdown; at zero,
a mushroom cloud appears and we hear Johnson’s voice state “These are the
stakes, to make a world in which all God’s children can live, or go into the
darkness. Either we must love each other or we must die”; the screen then fades
to black and we see the words “On November 3rd vote for President Johnson”
(qtd. in “Rhetoric” 50). Blair claims that the purpose of this ad was to “suggest
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that Goldwater was trigger-happy about the use of the H-bomb, and thus that to
elect him would be to place the nation in grave peril” (“Rhetoric” 50). He goes on
to claim that the ad is “a kind of visual enthymeme requiring the viewing public to
supply Goldwater as the alternative to Johnson” (Blair “Rhetoric” 50). In addition
to some factual assumptions discussed below, Blair’s example ignores the
substantial critique of Iser and of the rhetoric of gaps, which effectively
demonstrates that the enthymeme, imagined as a structure with gaps
intentionally placed by the arguer, does not exist.
The Enthymeme Does Not Exist
In what Michael Bérubé calls the “Fish-Iser Debate,” which initially played
out in the pages of the journal diacritics, Stanley Fish claims that Wolfgang Iser’s
theory of reader response, which depended heavily on the notion that “some
features of texts exist prior to or beyond any scheme of interpretation, while other
features are variable and therefore susceptible to interpretation” was, to put it
simply, wrong (Bérubé 13). Iser believed that readers are “assigned the tasks of
filling in the ‘gaps’ between the fixed points” of the text, although he did allow for
a “certain degree of critical pluralism by acknowledging that different readers will
fill these gaps in different ways” (Bérubé 15). Blair makes a similar statement
when he writes that, in addition to the premises that he extrapolates from the
image, “a number of equally plausible alternative verbal renditions of the
argument are available” (“Rhetoric” 50). The assumption of both Iser and Blair is
that the argument is inherent in the original text, and not much changed by the
interpretation of viewers.
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Blair suggests that the role of the individual is to reconstruct the author’s
intentional argument implied by the gaps in texts, and that there is more than one
way to “correctly” verbalize this argument. This structural approach reduces
visual argument to a type of rebus—a visual puzzle where pictures represent
words—and is part of Blair’s distinction between “visual argument” and “visual
persuasion.” The former is “logical or dialectical,” while the latter is “rhetorical”
(“Rhetoric” 51). Blair’s approach submits the visual to a structural criterion that
relegates the “evocative power” of images to the realm of persuasion (“Rhetoric”
51). In this system, the audience’s participation in the argument is merely a
convenience, not a requirement. It may add “more force or immediacy” to the
expression of the argument, but it adds nothing to the structure of the argument
(“Rhetoric” 53). Thus, when scholars such as Blair talk about visual enthymemes,
they may reference rhetorical approaches to the enthymeme, but they seem
more concerned with structure. The discussion of visual argument thus becomes
an analysis of underlying propositional structures to which people might or might
not respond (depending supposedly on whether they are capable of constructing
the propositions from the images presented). Presenting these visual arguments
as enthymemes is a way to affect a concern with the social aspect of rhetoric
without disrupting one’s devotion to a structural approach to argument.
The development of critical theory led to the realization that gaps could be
found in every part of the text, not just in those places intentionally predetermined by authors. Fish’s devastating conclusion was that “what follows from
the possibility that ‘gaps’ are everywhere is the conclusion that ‘gaps’ are only
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where you—that is, where your interpretive assumptions—find them” (Bérubé
16). In short, (the gaps that signal the presence of) enthymemes are produced in
the act of reading, and thus are not realizations of some hidden meaning
implanted by the author, and are not either true nor false, but only more or less
interesting or compelling to other readers. Individual interpretations of an image
are not, as Blair claims, “equally plausible,” since this would mean that individual
interpretations would only be capable of recognizing gaps in texts, but not
creating them. Instead, each interpretation is subject to the standards of what
Fish calls “interpretive communities,” which he defines as a “set of practices that
are defining of an enterprise and fill the consciousnesses of the enterprise’s
members” (“Yet” 36). If the enthymeme is constructed through sets of interpretive
practices embodied by different communities of readers, there can be no
identification of author-intended gaps.
For instance, take Blair’s claim that viewers of the “Goldwater” ad, based
on the girl picking apart the flower, would believe that “Goldwater might, on
something as arbitrary as a whim (the mere chance of which petal was plucked
last), engage the nation in a nuclear holocaust, thus causing the destruction of
everyone, including the innocent children who pluck daisies playing ‘s/he loves
me; s/he loves me not’” (“Rhetoric” 50). Some readers could point out that the girl
in the ad, somewhat obviously, is not playing the loves-me-loves-me-not game.
She pulls off petals while counting upwards (imperfectly) to ten, and proceeds
until a male voice begins a countdown from ten to zero, at the end of which we
see a nuclear explosion. From another perspective (a possibly more compelling
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one to some interpretive communities), there is no erratic dynamic in the image
of the girl from which to extrapolate that it stands for an arbitrary whim of any
sort, only a forceful and direct movement and counter-movement.
Could it be argued that Johnson’s invocation that we must “love each
other” or die supports the existence of a “loving/not-loving” motif amenable to
Blair’s interpretation? Of course. Do viewers construct meaning from images in
ways that are “radically contingent, radically situational” (Olson 9)? Surely. But
this only means that these interpretations will never be more than localized acts
of interpretation situated in a visual culture’s ways of seeing and thinking. If
nothing else, Blair’s next sentence—“The inference that it would be a danger to
the national interest to elect Goldwater follows straightforwardly”—grossly fails to
qualify the rigidity of the interpretation offered, and thus fails to interrogate to
what degree his “verbal argument is consistent with the visual presentation”
(consistency is yet another textual property that is constructed through
discourse), or the degree to which the context is amenable to this interpretation
(Blair, “Rhetoric” 49, emphasis added). The “gap” that Blair identifies as existing
in order to forward this interpretation does not exist (as a gap) prior to Blair’s
identification of it as such, and therefore, there can be no such thing as a visual
enthymeme that exists prior to a viewer’s awareness of it.
Naturalizing the Enthymeme
“True philosophy is to learn again to see the world.”
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception
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One essay in A&A since the 1996 special issue on visual argument
directly affirms the possibility of the visual enthymeme: Finnegan’s “The
Naturalistic Enthymeme and Visual Argument: Photographic Representation in
the ‘Skull Controversy.’” In this article, Finnegan finds that documentary
photographs of the 1930s use their “perceived relationship to nature” as an
argumentative resource (135). In other words, documentary photographs are
persuasive by virtue of their (presumed) “realism”—the audience’s assumption
that the image portrays a real or natural setting (Finnegan 136). Finnegan
ultimately finds that this “naturalistic enthymeme” in which the audience assumes
the realism of the photograph, although ultimately vulnerable to challenge, is
often so embedded in a culture’s way of seeing that individuals prefer to argue
over what level of realism is acceptable rather than challenge the very possibility
of realism in representation. John Berger, following Walter Benjamin’s argument
in “The Work of Art in the Age of Reproduction” that art has lost its “aura,” writes
that our ways of seeing constitute a “language of images” and that, since “The art
of the past no longer exists as it once did. . . [its] authority is lost. In its place
there is a language of images. What matters now is who uses that language for
what purpose" (33). Finnegan’s analysis of the naturalistic enthymeme suggests
that, although high art had lost its aura, a function of its distinctiveness and
individuality, photography retained something of its aura in its claim to absolute
realism.
While Finnegan’s analysis of the debates over the persuasive use of
images is compelling, there are a few difficulties here in understanding this as an
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enthymeme. First, Finnegan’s “naturalistic enthymeme” names an assumption of
the audience that exists prior to the image and is used to authorize the use of the
image in an argument. This seems to me to simply be another way of referring to
what Stephen Toulmin calls the “backing” in the structure of an argument. In The
Uses of Argument, Toulmin establishes a six-part system of argument
description: to the familiar data, claim, and warrant (which are roughly similar to
the three parts of a syllogism common to analytical argumentation) he adds the
qualifier, rebuttal, and backing. In Toulmin’s terminology, the backing is
composed of “other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would
possess neither authority nor currency” (103). The “visual culture of realism” that
Finnegan identifies could be considered the backing that allows one to connect,
using one of Finnegan’s examples, the image of a bleached cow skull with the
drought conditions depicted in the photograph (136).
What does calling this process an enthymeme add to Toulmin’s
description, except to draw attention to the fact that Toulmin does not include
images in the examples he gives of his system? “Visual backing” would seem
just as descriptive a term for an underlying assumption that supports the use of
images in some argumentative context, and might not carry so much disciplinary
baggage as the term “enthymeme.” Gaines writes similarly that although theorists
adopt a notion of the enthymeme that is generally “consistent with Aristotle’s
view. . . . upon close inspection, it appears equally consistent with other views of
practical deduction—not least those recently offered by Toulmin and Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca” (16). Also, the philosopher Douglas Walton writes in his
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book Informal Logic that "determining enthymematic premises is a pragmatic task
of argument" (115). This linking of the enthymeme to practical argumentation
suggests that this approach to the enthymeme treats it merely as the backing to
more structured (i.e. “real”) arguments.
Also, Blair writes recently that the “reasons [arguments] use are
propositions,” and since these “propositions are standardly expressed in
sentences” that have a “truth value,” visuals can be persuasive but cannot be
arguments (“Rhetoric” 44). But people rarely speak of images as being true or
false. This suggests to me that Finnegan’s “naturalistic enthymeme” is really a
way of describing how statements about images to which we can attribute a truth
value (i.e. “This image is realistic”) affect our interpretation of images, and not
really about images themselves as visual enthymemes.
By her own admission, Finnegan’s enthymeme is of limited use since the
naturalistic enthymeme is only active in images that make a claim to realism and,
thus, much of modern imagery is beyond the scope of this resource. Contrary to
what might be expected, Finnegan claims that public anxiety over the
manipulation of images shows the continued strength of the naturalistic
enthymeme, not its demise (147). Truly, it is only when we are no longer anxious
about the “specter of digital fraud” that the naturalistic enthymeme will lose its
potency (Baron 28). But while continued anxiety does maintain the specter of a
realistic image, this also shows that the source of Finnegan’s “naturalistic
enthymeme” is the degree to which manipulation of the image is expected or
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authorized in the context in which the image circulates. At best, these are
enthymemes about visuals, not visual enthymemes.
The Political Work of Visual Enthymemes
The focus on contradiction as a quality of enthymemic discourse might
raise doubts about the possibility of visual enthymemes, and does raise the
question of negation. Typically, images are assumed to be incapable of
embodying the negative, which is reserved for language. As Kenneth Burke
writes, “The negative is not picturable, though it can be indicated . . . . It is
properly shown by a sign, not by an image. For a ‘negative image’ would be a
contradiction in terms” (430). This is a standard view of images, but it does not
restrict the functioning of an enthymeme. Contradiction need not be negation,
since visual elements may make use of visual binaries that are considered
oppositional without necessarily negating each other. Darkness and light, for
example, can be used to establish visual contradiction. Such a strategy may
even be active in the Goldwater ad that Blair examines, since the intense light of
the nuclear explosion is followed by a “fade to black” that is reinforced by
Johnson’s voice warning the audience of the possibility that they may “go into the
darkness” (qtd. in “Rhetoric” 50).
The visual opposition of dark and light is a powerful binary that is
employed in many persuasive contexts. In a review of how democrats can “win
back the heart and soul of the [American] electorate,” Robert Reich writes that
democrats “have to speak to the basic stories that have defined and animated
the United States since its founding,” narratives such as the triumphant
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individual, the benevolent community, the mob at the gates, and the rot at the top
(16). Reich admonishes to politicians that “Speak to these four stories and you
resonate with the tales Americans have been telling each other since our
founding—the two hopeful stories rendered more vivid by contrast to the two
fearful ones” (17). These narratives explicitly invoke the oppositions that Walker
identifies as enabling enthymemes (in this case, the four stories present the
various combinations of the oppositions of individual/group and good/evil). It is
reasonable that their imaging would deploy opposition as well.
Reich notes that in the “mob at the gates” story, “the United States is a
beacon light of virtue in a world of darkness, uniquely blessed but continuously
menaced by foreign menaces” (16). The image of the U.S. as a beacon of light
was often used in speeches by President Bush following September 11, 2001.
Since 2002, and as recently as the 2006 Armistice Day celebration at the Korean
War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., Vice President Dick Cheney has
referenced a high-contrast satellite image taken at night of the Korean peninsula
that makes use of this opposition. This image shows South Korea awash with
lights, while only one pinpoint of light comes from North Korea, from its capital
city. In an address to Korean War veterans in San Antonio, Texas, in 2002,
Cheney stated:
Because so many sacrificed [in the Korean War], South Korea is today a
land that enjoys progress and prosperity, its people free from repression,
scarcity and starvation; the daily conditions of life in North Korea.
President Bush has observed, on a number of occasions, that satellite
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photos of the Korean Peninsula at night show the North in almost
complete darkness.
South Korea, on the other hand, is bathed in light; a vibrant
enterprising society, a prosperous democracy, sharing ties of commerce
and cooperation with many nations all over the globe, a peaceful and
talented people who have built the third largest economy in Asia.
We look to the day when the light of freedom and progress covers
all of Korea and stability on the peninsula rests on a foundation of
peaceful reconciliation. Until then, stability will be maintained by our great
military alliance.

That the “enthymeme’s power lies in its use of emotively significant oppositions”
speaks to the potential of this passage and image (Walker 178). Specifically,
Cheney invokes oppositions such as prosperity/scarcity, light/darkness,
cooperation/isolation, and freedom/repression to “motivate audience adherence”
to both the validation of past U.S. military ventures in Korea but to present ones
in Iraq as well. Cheney’s speech holds much in common with the style of
Isocrates’ Panegyricus, in which Isocrates famously called for a “‘Hellenic’
identity” that could be shared by all those who shared in Greek culture.
Nowadays, the call is for the spread of democracy, but persuasion still requires
that “reasons [be] embodied in the network of emotively significant, evaluative
oppositions” communicated through enthymemes (Walker 178). The above

148

narratives not only tap into affects of fear and hope and into the spirit of
American nationalism, they are intensely visual as well.
To reduce these combinations of image, narrative, and affect to syllogistic
logic would be to remove the very heart of what makes them powerful. To call
them “persuasion” rather than “argument” is to ignore how individuals experience
arguments as enthymemic events in which they are called to produce and
identify with a number of propositions both spoken and embodied in emotions
and images. The strength of the non-Aristotelian enthymeme is that it does not
separate persuasion from argument, nor does it portray a disinterested structure
as the standard by which to measure the efficacy of visual argumentation. It does
not reinforce the disciplinary anxieties about the role of emotion or the body in
persuasion, nor does it retreat to a Ramus-like circumscription of rhetoric to
issues of style and delivery.
Imag(in)ing the Enthymeme
“We desperately need a political economy of the image.”
– Mark C. Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies

The scene opens with snow-covered hills beyond a sea of icy blue-green
water, a cold wind blowing clouds across the screen. All-caps lettering floats in
front of the polar landscape calling upon us to “Save the Greenbacks,” and a
voice states that the “plight of the greenbacks continues.” It then cuts to a figure
standing in the snow wearing a red jacket with a high-contrast patch on the chest
on which can barely be made out the shape of a whale. A close-up follows of a
dollar half buried in ice and snow. The individual bends down to retrieve the
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dollar, which is in two pieces, and declares that “this [dollar] barely stood a
chance . . . but together we can save thousands just like it by taking part in Kia’s
‘Save the Greenbacks’ program.” Two other “activists” join the first in examining
the torn dollar (their whale patches now clearly visible) and they raise a
handmade “Save the Greenbacks” banner (with amateurishly off-center lettering)
before we are shown a fan-shaped (whale tail-shaped?) group of Kia vehicles on
which we can save money if we “hurry” and buy “today” (Kia Motors America,
“Arctic”).
The television ad described above undoubtedly alludes to the efforts by
groups such as Greenpeace to draw media attention to environmental concerns.
This ad most directly evokes the activist movements to stop hunting of baby harp
seals and to rescue animals following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill off the
Alaskan coast. Another Kia ad in the same campaign shows individuals gathering
dollars on a beach and collecting them into a rubber raft—a craft strongly
associated with Greenpeace’s efforts to ban commercial whaling—while warning
us that “greenbacks are disappearing at an alarming rate” (the similarity between
“greenback” and “humpback” is unambiguous, especially so in view of the whale
patch worn by individuals in both ads) (Kia Motors Amerida, “Beach”).
The rubber raft, the handmade banner, the concern with future events
(i.e., extinction), the call to action—all of these features are appropriated
generally from environmental activism and specifically from what Kevin DeLuca
calls “image events.” In Image Politics, DeLuca studies how “image events”—
staged acts of protest intended for media dissemination—emerged as the
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primary rhetorical tactic of environmental groups such as Earth First! and
Greenpeace (3–4). That the Kia ad designers can expect the audience to
recognize the appropriated form of their commercials is proof that the image
events of past activists continue to circulate in cultural consciousness.
Below, I will relate the circulation and success of image events to the
method of rhetorical argument known as the enthymeme. Loosely put, I am
arguing that image events aspire to be visual enthymemes. This formulation
might seem to establish an unfortunate hierarchy between the material event and
its argumentative structure, one in which words trump images. DeLuca
specifically criticizes the desire to make words primary in a discussion of image
events, and singles out Roger Aden’s essay, “The Enthymeme as Postmodern
Argument Form,” as representative of the “tendency in the discipline of rhetoric to
study television and other imagistic media by focusing on words to the neglect of
images” (18).13 While Aden does admirably show how political figures present
arguments that take advantage of the public’s “postmodern processing” of
enthymematic forms, his examples of enthymemes deviate little from the
common depiction of the enthymeme as an “incomplete” linguistic structure, a
“syllogism with one (or more) premises missing” (55; Simonson 303). He may put
this linguistic structure in the context of a broader of persuasive rhetorical
concerns, but ultimately Aden’s enthymemes are relations between observations,
generalizations, and inferences composed of words. My conception of the
enthymeme is not word-based, however. It is thumos-based.
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The image events that DeLuca discusses may be seen as calling upon an
individual’s capacity for emotion realized in that individual’s thumos. The
presence of thumos in ancient Greek poetics as well as sophistic discourse
suggests a performative aspect that fits DeLuca’s focus on the public protests of
environmental groups. Since most accounts of the enthymeme as a logic-ruled
linguistic structure are based on Aristotle’s systematic treatment of the
enthymeme, a thumos-driven conception of argument hopes to displace this
word-centric model by returning to a “sophistic, non-Aristotelian notion of the
enthymeme that is pervasive in the Hellenistic rhetorical tradition” (Lauer 53). In
this tradition, an enthymeme
“is not strictly propositional and may include among its ‘premises’ such
things as sense perceptions, mental imagery, memories, cognitive
schema, deepset beliefs and values (ideologies), bodily states, the
aesthetic effects of things like music or drugs, and existing emotional
predispositions . . . as well as explicit propositions or “ideas” overtly
present to the psyche” (Walker 174).
The adoption of this expansive notion of the available resources from which to
construct enthymemes is meant to endorse rather than dismiss the visual nature
of image events.
The idea that image events aspire to be visual enthymemes should also
not raise fears of word-centrism because this is basically a temporal distinction:
the formation of visual enthymemes occurs after the image event is
disseminated. As DeLuca writes, in the production of image events we “witness
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people acting passionately (‘irrationally’) on behalf of nature and place, [with]
commitments that owe as much to love and emotional connections as they do to
instrumental reason” (59). I would argue that in the reception of image events we
witness people forming enthymemes on behalf of emotion and reason, and that
these enthymemes can be constructed from visual resources that generate
action. As Jeffrey Walker writes in Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, the
“conclusion” of an enthymeme is “not a proposition or ‘thought’ but an action or
will to act. . . . a physically embodied will to act” (174, original emphasis). If the
conclusion of an enthymeme need not be a proposition composed of words, why
would we restrict its initiation in this way?
Image and Emotion in Rhetorical Theory
Aden’s account of postmodern argument as a “condensed, mediated”
recombination of “previously articulated fragments” would seem to describe the
Kia (and many other) ads well (55). But even by Aden’s account, it’s unclear
whether the Kia ad described above could be considered enthymematic. It is
surely a condensed and mediated argument, although the fragments of discourse
it recirculates are both verbal and visual. The emotions it seeks to evoke are less
clear, however (and, as we shall see later, the thumos is not only home to
emotional responses, but to debates involving both reason and emotion). Under
a thumos-based account of the enthymeme, this ad’s borrowing of features from
other texts—the “already said”—is simply not enough to be enthymematic. To be
an enthymeme, the ad would have to tap into the “already felt” as well. It may
seem here that I am being naïve by suggesting that ads don’t routinely make use
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of audience emotions. Rather, I am claiming that any description of these texts
as enthymematic is inadequate without a serious consideration of the emotion at
the heart of the enthymeme.
In Aden’s article, for example, even though he observes that the
arguments of political candidate and ex-KKK member David Duke found traction
by appealing to “frustration,” “anti-government sentiment,” and prejudices such
as “racial fear,” he introduces these as “cultural factors” (56–57). Aden writes that
“Duke’s rhetoric features subjects deeply ingrained in the American psyche” and
then he provides examples of enthymemes that make no explicit reference to the
emotions that make these subjects resonate in the first place (59, emphasis
added). This is a modified form-content bifurcation—emotions are associated
with the content of argument without ever being allowed to enter the structural
form of the enthymeme. If emotion is the reason for the audience accepting the
observation that is presented, then it is misleading to state that “Duke relies on
the ‘already said’ to provide both the political cover he desires and the political
response he craves” (Aden 60). By focusing on the verbal (the “said”), and by
using emotive words (“desires” and “craves”) to describe someone attempting to
appeal to the worst in people, the role of emotion is either ignored or demonized
by Aden. Granted, Aden’s article is a potent analysis of persuasive method, and
the enthymeme here is at least recognized as a powerful tool of persuasion, but
the article does these things without integrating emotion into the structure of the
enthymeme.
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In fact, Aden seems to overall devalue the role of emotion in public
discourse. He writes that a greater understanding of enthymemes will help critics
to “identify both the unsaid/already said and [reveal] the means by which public
figures attempt to further their own ends at expense of . . . the societal good”; this
understanding will also help break the “cycle of cynicism” in public discourse
(Aden 61, 62). Aden associates the condensed enthymematic form with immoral
intent by stating that it is the “enthymeme that allows Duke to appeal to prejudice
without overtly doing so” (57). His statements that public argument should be
more “open” and “explicit,” and “public officials [forced] to clarify their arguments”
suggest that the influence within public discourse of “unsaid” factors such as
people’s fears, anger, and cynicism could be overcome by a greater commitment
to clear speech. (Aden 62).
The injunction to clarity follows from the standard belief that composing
must be an exercise in “asserting something to be true” (Olson 9). Gary Olson
claims that we should abandon this “rhetoric of assertion,” partially because it is
“masculinist, phallogocentric, foundationalist, often essentialist, and, at the very
least, limiting” (9). Also, Aden’s goal of eliminating ambiguity from argumentation
ignores William Covino’s observation that “major figures of classical rhetoric—
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero—define and demonstrate rhetoric as the elaboration of
ambiguity” (Covino 2). Arguably, the enthymeme depends upon a degree of
ambiguity to initiate audience participation in its completion. Furthermore, the
resistance to ambiguity makes it difficult to take seriously either emotion or
images in arguments. The immateriality of emotion makes unambiguous
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description difficult. And it is common for people to assume that “the visual is
inescapably ambiguous or vague” (Blair, “Rhetoric” 46). In Aden’s view of
clarified communication, the goal is to turn language into a static representation
of discourse. Dialogue is not valued, nor are more open-ended methods of
interpretation and assertion.
Despite a general distrust of emotion that stretches back to Socrates,
critical interest in emotion has increased significantly among rhetoricians in
recent years. Foremost in prompting this interest is the recognition that emotions
are not merely experienced privately, but can be understood “as evidence of
one’s position in social relations and as a form of social action” (Jacobs and
Micciche 4). In their introduction to A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and
Composition Studies, editors Dale Jacobs and Laura R. Micciche find the
potential for rhetoric to enable social change embedded in the word “emotion”
itself:
[A] key term for us is move. We take, as our starting point, the Latin root of
emotion, motere, which means “to move,” suggesting that a tendency to
act is implicit in every emotion. Movement, or repositioning oneself in the
face of ever-changing situations, is a central goal of classical and
contemporary rhetorical theory. Effective rhetoric is dynamic rather than
static; effective rhetoric moves us towards new ways of knowing and
creates avenues for social change. In our book, linking emotion with
movement underscores the rhetorical nature of emotion as a mode of
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articulation by which thought and action are moved, or are always in flux,
and are a source of moving others. (3)
These scholars explicitly connect emotion with moving people to action, a central
goal of activists. Arguably, this emphasis on action is evident in Aristotle as well.
Larry Arnhart claims that the connection between emotion and action is always
assumed in the Aristotelian enthymeme “since enthymematic argumentation is a
practical form of reasoning, its aim is to move men not just to think, but also to
act; and arguments cannot move men to action unless it somehow elicits the
motivational power of emotion” (10). While many approaches to argument (and,
indeed, politics) have generally de-emphasized the role of emotion, or, less
kindly, associated it with distraction, fallacious reasoning, or deception, these
scholars suggest that a social capacity for emotion must be the warrant of any
form of rhetoric that claims to be “effective.”14
In a manner similar to the way in which emotion has been dismissed,
image events have also often been dismissed by theorists “as gimmicks or the
antics of the unruly . . . [or reduced] to flares sent out to gain the attention for the
‘real’ rhetoric” (DeLuca 17). Even in classroom practice, where “visual literacy is
an old and perennial” concern, images are often conceived “as a problematic,
something added, an anomaly” (George 13). In these classrooms, image
analysis is common but image production is not considered a serious rhetorical
practice, despite the fact that images have become “commonplace in all aspects
of contemporary public discourse” (McComiskey, “Visual” 188). The lack of
instruction in the rhetorical uses of images, and in how to take advantage of
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media to disseminate visual arguments, is unfortunate, especially considering the
common notion that teaching argumentation is “necessary for the life of the polis”
(Roberts-Miller 3).
Admittedly, doubts exist as to whether visuals can constitute arguments in
more than a “non-metaphorical way” (Blair “Possibility” 23). But an image’s lack
of a formal propositional structure made up of a “linguistically explicable claim
and one or more overtly expressed reasons” should not condemn images to
dismissal from the rhetorical classroom. After all, images dominate the public
sphere because of the “power of things visually to persuade us, to shape our
attitudes, and even our beliefs and actions” (Blair “Rhetoric” 42). It is
unsurprising, then, that activists embrace the visual as central to the political
work enabled by mass media. For instance, the 2005 Live 8 concerts made
extensive use of visual media to disseminate Live 8’s anti-poverty message.15
This “political event,” as organizer Bob Geldorf calls it, functioned in at least one
way like Greenpeace’s naval confrontations with whaling boats: it did not
succeed primarily as a direct action but as an image event (qtd. in Tyrangiel 66;
see DeLuca 1–6). As activist-musician Bono of U2 stated, the fact that Live 8
organizers had moved on from the “tin-cupping of Live Aid” to applying “real
pressure” on world leaders —moved on from the direct action of raising money to
the orchestrating of events that raise awareness—was a sign that they had
“moved into real politics and real activism” (qtd. in Tyrangiel 66). This real
activism is no longer measurable in dollars contributed, but in people moved to
action.
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Since images and emotions often tend to be dismissed using similar
strategies, it is likely that a defense of the legitimate and necessary role of
emotion in argument and a defense of the legitimate and necessary role of
images in argument will be mutually supportive. If image events succeed when
they function as visual enthymemes, “moving thumos” can be considered an
effective strategy for the political work of activism. Addressing emotion is vital to
activism because, as mentioned earlier, the “mind, by itself, is never sufficient to
originate action or movement. . . . Action requires an affective state” (Miller and
Bee 203, 204). The widespread validation of the “emotive power of the image”
suggests that the production of images is therefore appropriate to responsible
rhetorical pedagogies (LaGrandeur 119). Once one accepts “emotion as a
central [and legitimate] ingredient in the act of persuasion,” it is easy to agree
that thumos should be recovered in the field of rhetoric (Jacobs and Micciche 2).
If thumos ought to become a key term for rhetoricians, “visual enthymeme”
ought to become a key term for activists as well (Quandahl 14).
Arguing against the Structure of the Visual Enthymeme
Scholarly skepticism of the possibility of visual argument rests less on
denying the rhetorical force of images and more on a restrictive definition of what
constitutes an argument. J. Anthony Blair, for instance, has published multiple
articles on the possibility of visual arguments. Indeed, his claim that “[v]isual
arguments are typically enthymemes” would seem to be ideal support for this
chapter (“Rhetoric” 52). But Blair’s depiction of visual argument is, I believe, too
focused on structure to be useful in developing a concept of the visual
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enthymeme. As George observes, Blair “just barely manages to agree that visual
argument, possessing all of the ‘salient properties of arguments,’ could actually
be said to exist” (29). Even if Blair does allow for the possibility that visual
arguments exist, his discussion of visual arguments does not advance a sophistic
understanding of the enthymeme that recognizes the role of thumos. By defining
enthymemes as “arguments with gaps left to be filled in by the participation of the
audience,” Blair ultimately subordinates the visual enthymeme to the verbal
structure of traditional argument by positing visual arguments as complete, but
not fully expressed, structures that exist independent of the actions of those who
observe them (“Rhetoric” 52).
Blair’s approach to visual argument enacts another content-form
bifurcation. He focuses on the content of images to understand their
argumentative potential, hoping to derive from them propositions that will validate
the image’s status as argument. This stance adheres closely to the convention
that the “reasons [that arguments] use are propositions,” and that these
“propositions are standardly expressed in sentences” that have a “truth value”
(Blair “Rhetoric” 44). Blair’s test for whether a visual is an argument is “whether it
would be possible to construct from what is communicated visually a verbal
argument that is consistent with the visual presentation” (“Rhetoric” 49). All of this
suggests that the content of images cannot be considered part of the form of the
enthymeme until it has been translated into propositional content. Furthermore,
Blair states only situations in which the audience “consciously assents” can be
considered persuasion, and only situations in which the audience is presented
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with “reasons for accepting a point of view” can be considered argument
(“Rhetoric” 43–44).
Blair’s requirement that persuasion occurs only when we assent or “can
choose to comply” might be read alongside Aristotle’s claim in the Nicomachean
Ethics: “The origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that
of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (“Rhetoric” 43; qtd. in
Miller and Bee 204, emphasis added). In other words, choice for Aristotle
presumes the involvement of emotion, reason, and a concern with possible
outcomes. Choice for Blair seems merely to be an acceptance or rejection of the
argument as structured previously by the arguer. By focusing on the structural
qualities of visual arguments (regardless of whether he ultimately decides visuals
can or can not be arguments), Blair treats emotion as immaterial to the
determination of the possibility of visual argument. This is evident in the two
examples Blair provides two examples of situations that function as instances of
persuasion yet do not constitute arguments: one where a person is robbed at
gunpoint, and one where a man is seduced by the touch of a woman. Blair states
that you might hand your wallet over to an armed man, but “the robber has not
presented an argument for doing so just by pointing his gun at you. [Blair’s]
fantasy woman’s seduction might have been persuasive, but stimulating an
erogenous zone does not constitute an argument” (“Rhetoric” 43). What Blair
overlooks in these situations is the central emotional components of these
events, namely fear and desire.
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Blair’s dismissal of these events as non-arguments rests on a tidy division
between the rational and the irrational: emotions located bodily in the gut or in an
erogenous zone are considered outside the economy of reason and thus outside
the structure of the argument. One way this can be refuted is by recognizing that
emotions can be considered propositional. George Marcus, in The Sentimental
Citizen, defines an emotion as “sensation together with a meaningful
commentary” (10). Massumi writes similarly that an “emotion is a subjective
content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of experience which is from that
point onward defined as personal. . . . It is intensity owned and recognized” (28,
emphasis added). In other words, emotions can be propositions. As Quandahl
writes, “our access to emotion, finally, is in language.” In other words, emotions
are always already propositions; they are statements we make about ourselves
that have a truth value, such as “I am happy” or “I am fearful.” And since
emotions are always already language, they can be integrated into either the
structural or the rhetorical model of the enthymeme.
The realm of emotion and perception is not simply some unregulated
subjective realm; it is accessible to individuals through language that turns
affective states and sensory stimuli into internal propositions. When Blair argues
that “the arguer has to be able to predict the nature of the audience’s
participation,” and that the “visual arguer must be particular[ly] astute in reading
the audience,” part of this astuteness involves being aware of the emotions that
these visuals will invoke (“Rhetoric” 52). These emotions are predictable due to
the highly social dimension of emotion. Much recent scholarly work has
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highlighted how “emotion is schooled through cultural institutions such as the
family, the media, and all levels of the education system” (Jacobs and Micciche
4). This schooling ensures that emotions emerge in predictable ways conditioned
by social expectations regarding “how, when, where, and by whom emotions
ought to be enacted” (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 12).
The recognition of affective states as specific emotions transforms them
into a content of the internal rhetoric that we engage in continually (and which,
arguably, falls within the domain of thumos). If one insists that these arguments
need to be elaborated verbally, one could imagine the individuals in Blair’s
examples responding to the situation (i.e., the presence of the gun or the touch of
the woman) with the phrases “I am afraid” or “I am turned on.” It is not even
difficult to place these phrases into the enthymematic structure forwarded by
Nancy Harper:
Observation:

I am afraid right now.

Generalization:

When I am afraid, I should not put up a fight.

Inference:

I should not put up a fight right now.

In Harper’s system, an enthymeme is a “psycho-logical process of inference
based upon observation” connected by an often unstated generalization (306).
Harper differentiates the “causal” nature of the enthymeme from the “conditional”
if-and-then nature of the syllogism, which is a structural relationship that “can
only be valid or invalid” (309). A causal is a “combination of two or more
propositions joined together by a connective word or phrase such as because”
(305). Harper develops her definition of the enthymeme inductively by looking at
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examples provided by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics and the Rhetoric. What she
finds is that the enthymeme is an “arrangement of propositions in which one
proposition is presented as a claim and another . . . is presented as a reason, or
as evidence to support the claim. In other words, an argument and a causal
partake the same form.” Additionally, the reason supporting the inference is
“always something observable by the senses” (Harper 305). As causal
statements, enthymemes are obviously arguments. Blair’s position on visual
argument is limited because he is unable to account for the fact that “something
observable by the senses” is likely to evoke a proposition (Harper 305).
The linguistic fixing of emotion allows it to have a truth value. In fact, the
individualized experience of emotion is often used “as the ground of and warrant
for knowledge” (Worsham 163). Though unsophisticated, we know something to
be true because we feel it to be true. In what Rei Terada calls the “content
approach” to emotion, emotions are “less sensations that happen to one than
thoughts that one pursues” (19). Edmund Husserl provides the
phenomenological foundation of the content approach: “We do not merely have a
presentation, with an added feeling associatively tacked on to it, and not
intrinsically related to it, but pleasure or distaste direct themselves to the
presented object, and could not exist without such a direction” (qtd. in Terada 19,
original emphasis). In this view, the emotion is an intention directed toward the
object. Therefore, the emotion would not occur without the object’s presence. By
presenting the gun, then, the robber in Blair’s example could be considered to be
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presenting the reason for the emotion. Blair is searching for the truth value in the
content of the image rather than in the emotion of the audience.
Since Blair insists that the reason is given by the arguer and that this
reason supplies the content for the argument, he is more interested in the
“creator of the visual expression” than in the package of reason, emotion, and
expected outcome involved in the choice being, presumably, internally debated
by the audience (“Rhetoric” 53). Blair’s claim that visual arguments do not exist
because the “essential components [of] arguments—propositions—cannot be
expressed visually,” disregards the possibility that propositional content arises
through the interaction between individuals, rather than simply being transmitted
by one party and assented to or rejected by the other (“Rhetoric” 47, emphasis
added). Specifically, he does not consider the possibility that an object presented
for observation can constitute the reason for a proposition.
Blair’s resistance to visual argument is based on approaching argument
as structure rather than approaching argument as event. This impasse is akin to
what Lyotard calls the “differend,” in which the “success (or the validation) proper
to one genre is not the one proper to others” (136). But in order for emotion and
images to matter, arguments may have to become events. Massumi writes that
the “primacy of the affective in image reception” does not guarantee any
“correspondence or conformity” between the content of an image and its effect
(what Masumi calls the image’s “qualities” and “intensity”) (24, original
emphasis). Rather, the “primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between
content and effect” (Massumi 24, original emphasis). Approaches that look only
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at the content of visual arguments exist, but what such approaches “lose,
precisely, is the expression event—in favor of structure” (Massumi 27). If Blair (or
others) situate their definition of (visual) argument in effect rather than content,
then the possibility of visual argument will be difficult to deny.
The Sophistic Contribution to the Visual Enthymeme
Although DeLuca writes that image events fall “outside the domain of a
rhetoric traditionally conceived,” the qualities of image events DeLuca identifies
resonate with a classical understanding of the enthymeme that is not exclusively
Aristotelian (xii). Certainly, Aristotle is responsible for much of the scholarly
attention given to the enthymeme, since he called it the “body” or substance of
persuasion in the opening of the Rhetoric (1354a). In fact, Poster writes that the
“only universally agreed upon notion of why the enthymeme is of any but
historical importance” is that it is “central to Aristotle’s Rhetoric” (5). But beyond
the affirmation of the importance of the enthymeme, Aristotle is not as helpful as
one might think. As Lloyd Bitzer observes: “the reader of Aristotle’s Rhetoric will
find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme” (399).
Even within textbooks, which should be “conservative recapitulations of
the agreed upon assumptions of an academic discipline,” Poster categorizes
seven competing definitions of the enthymeme (1). Out of the seven, six make
explicit reference to the syllogism, reproducing the narrow reading of the
enthymeme as a logic-based linguistic structure (the divergent one defines the
enthymeme simply as “informal deductive reasoning”) (Poster 4). But a thumosbased conception of the enthymeme draws attention to those aspects that
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engage emotion most directly. According to the approaches introduced below,
enthymemes are: 1.stylistically kairotic, 2.composed of oppositions or
contradictions, 3.premonitory (future-oriented), and 4.amenable to visual
resources. These are all qualities that successful image events possess as well.
From Isocrates and Anaxamines, two philosophers roughly contemporary
with Aristotle, one encounters the first professional and technical descriptions of
the enthymeme. Although some claim that Isocrates use of enthymeme suggests
merely a “well-turned phrase, a well considered-thought,” this downplays the
importance of kairos in Isocrates’ system of rhetoric (Poster 12). Kairos is
typically associated with right timing, or due measure or proportion (Kinneavy
85). Kairos is an important factor in the tactics of grassroots environmental
groups as well. DeLuca writes that the success of grassroots tactics “require
people close by who can seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves
at a given moment” (76). In Against the Sophists, Isocrates portrays the essence
of rhetorical skill as being the ability “to see what kairos demands, and speak a
discourse wholly wrought with fitting enthymemes” (16–17). Being kairotic, these
enthymemes will “in some sense come as a surprise” and therefore “will not be
fully predictable, will not follow as inevitable conclusions necessitated by the
‘premises’ preceding them” (Walker 179). In other words, the typical view of the
enthymeme as an audience’s expression of unstated premises that completes
the enthymeme ignores the stylistic force of the enthymeme’s presentation—of
the production of “what might be called an ‘enthymematic moment’ in the
audience’s experience” (Walker 175, original emphasis).16
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Anaximenes closely associates the enthymeme with style as well. Seven
of the thirty-eight chapters in his Rhetoric to Alexander are directly concerned
with style, and he begins this discussion be stating that an effective style is
“achieved in this way—you state half an enthymeme, so that the audience may
understand the other half for themselves” (qtd. in Walker 177). It is from a similar
perspective that George Kennedy writes in “The Concept of the Enthymeme as
Understood in the Modern Period.” that “abridging the statement, makes it
stronger and more lively” (297). The latter part of Kennedy’s statement points to
the stylistic efficiency or eloquence which many scholars believe an abbreviated
syllogism engenders. A similar deference to the stylistic demands of the
audience is contained in Raymond’s statement that enthymemes “are
appropriate to the audience of rhetoric because these lines of reasoning do not
tax the attention” of the audience (148). DeLuca’s observation that the “televisual
public sphere” is home to corporate and state “spectacles” as well as
counterpublic “performance of image events” reinforces the necessity of
considering style in public argument (21). By incorporating style as part of its
successful functioning, the non-Aristotelian enthymeme remains an appropriate
strategy in this era of “[c]ritique through spectacle, not critique versus spectacle”
(DeLuca 22).
To show how “all the grace” can be taken from an expression when it is in
stated in full syllogistic form, Kennedy looks at this line from Ovid’s Medea: “I was
able to save you: do you then ask if I could slay you?” (279). Expanding this to
include the premises “He who can slay can save” and “I saved you,” Kennedy
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writes, goes against the principle that one of the primary beauties of an
enthymematic statement is “to give an opportunity to the mind to form a thought
more extended than the expression” (298). Depriving the audience of such an
opportunity seems, not merely to disengage active attention to the argument, but
to oppose the aesthetic and communitarian sensibilities of those involved in
rhetorical exchange, who assume both a certain ability to construct arguments as
well as an appreciation of eloquent expression.
Part of the stylistic force of the enthymeme comes from its use of
opposition. Anaximenes writes that enthymemes are composed of contradictions
or “oppositions” embodied “not only in words or in actions . . . but also in anything
else” (qtd. in Walker 176). These contradictions can often be situated in
“principles of justice, law, expediency, honor, feasibility, facility, or probability” or
in “the character of the speaker or the usual course of events.” Anaximenes
places enthymemes within an “exetastic discourse” consisting of an “‘exhibition’
of inconsistencies or contradictions in someone’s intentions, deeds, or words”
(Walker 176). The emphasis on contradictions and inconsistencies challenges
the typical view of enthymemes as depending solely on accepted knowledge,
and suggests that enthymemes can be epistemic. Such deconstructive intent is
clear in the tactics of activists to “contest social norms and deconstruct the
established naming of the world” (DeLuca 59).
Contradiction is also a point of entry into critical discourse. As part of her
work to articulate counter-hegemonic teaching practices that avoid the tendency
of critical pedagogies to ignore the internal struggle of ideology that every
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individual faces (and never really overcomes), Goleman writes: “As writing
instructors, we need a concept of contradiction that will help us to accept and
accommodate this intense, ongoing struggle toward critical discourse among our
students, a struggle that leads them toward both a reproduction of social
contradiction and its critique” (85). Perhaps the concept(s) that Goleman seeks is
thumos, and the method appropriate to its functioning: the enthymeme. Griffin’s
conceptualization of this struggle as an internal dialogue which must ultimately
have a single winner may not sit well with critical pedagogues. The model of
discourse that Griffin presents is not one amenable to how critical pedagogues
often represent interaction in their classrooms. Griffin writes:
Here then is another aspect of ideological structure. Dialogue—which is
finally perhaps the form of all thought—must become a war. One must
lose and the other win. There must be a clear victor. One must be shown
to be wrong. And therefore, each kind of thought is pitted against the
other. (283)
This is not your teacher’s contact zone.16 But Goleman attempts to make a space
for the continuation of contradiction as a way to understand subjects within
ideology. Rather than eliminate this state of struggle, Goleman calls on students
to identify with it. By visualizing contradiction, images events may serve as useful
tools in such pedagogies, especially since the technologies of vision and
reproduction always call into question the extent to which manipulation is part of
discourse, and therefore, enables us to ask ourselves “to what extent are we
manipulating the direction of this struggle” (Goleman 85). By making the
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contradictions of ideology visible and available for critique, Goleman lays bare
the workings of ideology, since ideology “must insist that no other truth than its
own is possible. The very idea of an alternative suggests a search. But any
search might disclose the original lie” (Griffin 286).
Image events often make deliberate use of opposition to further critical
ends. For instance, the images distributed as part of Greenpeace’s efforts to stop
whaling operations regularly utilize the visual opposition between the rubber raft
(a small craft filled with smiling members of the progressive counter culture) and
the whaling boat (a “massive depersonalized, technical juggernaut of Soviet
communism”) (DeLuca 98–99). Images of activists chained to vehicles and lying
across or buried in roads evoke an opposition between action and immobility,
between helplessness and authority. Also, the “contrary images” presented when
grandparents are arrested while protesting (as opposed to the stereotype of
naïve twenty-somethings) derive their force from a similar set of “emotively
significant oppositions” that work to produce shame in viewers (DeLuca 10–11;
Walker 178). Based on the qualities advocated by Isocrates and Anaxamines,
the sophistic enthymeme emerges as a “concise emphatic statement of an
emotionally charged opposition” (Walker 177). This is also the foundation of
image events.
Thomas Farrell’s contemporary approach to the enthymeme stresses its
status as “premonitory” discourse, which he defines as “interested, unfinished
reference” regarding a “world yet to come into existence” (104). The call to action
embedded in image events is just such a kind of future-oriented discourse, and
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environmental groups display a “rich tradition of struggle that provides a spark of
hope for those confronting a daunting future” (DeLuca 163, emphasis added).
This concern with the future poses special problems for image events dealing
with environmental concerns. The distended timeline of environmental effects
can conflict with the intended kairos of the performance—the consequences of
inaction may simply seem too far off to be motivational. As DeLuca points out,
environmental groups must also contend with the powerful ideograph of
progress. By arguing that “humanity, by dominating nature through the use of
instrumental reason and technology, will achieve progress,” industrialists have
made it difficult to think of the future without the unrelenting exploitation of natural
resources (DeLuca 40).
It is clear that visuals are exceptionally well-suited to provide the sophistic
qualities of enthymematic discourse. The gestalt nature of images—their all-atonce-ness or “immediacy”—make them ideal for the “sudden, dramatic sense of
opening prospects” that characterizes enthymemes (Walker 179). Even Blair
recognizes that “one can communicate visually with much more force and
immediacy than verbal communication allows” (“Rhetoric” 53). The economy of
the image parallels the desire expressed by the sophists to create “enthymemes
that embody these oppositions as briefly and economically as possible” (Walker
176). Thus, the enthymeme Walker finds in sophistic discourse is one that affirms
the role of visuals in stimulating the senses and the emotions, while maintaining
the necessity of kairos in their presentation. The rhetorical rhetoric of the
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enthymeme anticipates the necessarily ambiguous and flexible nature of such
situationality.
What is referenced by enthymemes is the “mosaic of commonplaces,
conventions, traditions, and provisional interests making up the doxa [popular
opinion] of rhetorical culture” (Farrell 99). The corporate-centric control of the
production and distribution of mediated images has led to an association of
images with corporate interests. Kathleen Welch identifies a series of “visual
koinos topos,” or visual commonplaces, that infuse news media (Electric 165).
These specific visual topoi she claims are “sight bites . . . fragmentary . . . visual
shards that lead nowhere except to the visual similarity of the commercials”
(Welch, Electric 163). But it is also true, if visual commonplaces can be used, as
Welch argues, to “reduce the ability of any decoder in any discourse community
to absorb and assess what is going on,” that visual commonplaces can also be
utilized to improve the ability to decode and assess (and produce) meaning. After
all, rhetoric allows us to see the available means of persuasion, but does not
restrict us from the use of any particular appeal. The anxiety over the ability of
enthymematic images to persuade, and even to deceive, is understandable. But
only if one rejects the possibility that images can be used for a variety of
rhetorical ends.
At the beginning of Image Politics, DeLuca states “How are people
persuaded, moved? In a word: rhetoric” (xii). If the enthymeme is the citizen’s
proper rhetorical strategy, then citizens have at their disposal a wide variety of
resources that are already in circulation, “fragments” of discourse that
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characterize the postmodern condition in which “apparently finished discourse is
in a fact a dense reconstruction of all the bits of other discourses from which it is
made” (McGee, qtd. in Aden 55). Although aware of the necessary play of
language, and its usefulness in forming community, DeLuca is critical of Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s concept of “floating signifiers” as elements useful to
activists since their status as “relatively empty and ambiguous” cannot be the
basis for shared understanding of the material world (DeLuca 43). DeLuca favors
McGee’s notion of the “ideograph” instead, but the available elements of visual
discourse might also be located in Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of speech genres,
those textual types that originate and draw material from everyday life,
manifesting an organized yet heterogeneous system of relationships among
genres of writing. If such forms exist, then there is no reason that a parallel
system of “image genres” has not developed in our image-dominated media
culture, a type of shared visual knowledge, what Welch calls visual topoi, upon
which enthymemes can be built.
Activating Thumos
When activists seek to take advantage of the potential of image events,
they harness their enthymematic potential to move affect. There are really two
events here: the image event coordinated by activists to disseminate through
media, and the event realized in the reception of these image events. Whether
an audience responds to an enthymeme is “at least in part, connected with its
eventfulness,” but the scope of this event should not be limited to the original act
of protest (Farrell 102). As Massumi claims: “what the mass-media transmit is not
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fundamentally image-content but event-potential. A mediatized event has the
potential to transfer into new domains, and when it does it repeats its
eventfulness, with a change in its nature” (269, emphasis added). The
enthymematic function of image events demonstrates that the domain in which
the event is repeated is the domain of thumos.
Because thumos is not simply a specific emotional appeal, but the place of
rational/emotional deliberation, it is related to the classical notion of konoi topoi,
the common topics or common places of rhetorical argument. As Welch explains:
“A topos is not a what Greek keyword; rather it is a how keyword. . . . it is part of
informed performance. ‘Topos’ in Greek signifies place; it is a location where one
takes oneself in order to develop an issue” (Electric 114–15). In other words,
such places facilitate the invention and performance of arguments. The role of
the thumos in moving people to action suggests that the effective rhetor should
forefront “presentational and inventional concerns: the means by which
enthymemes can most effectively be generated ‘in’ a listener’s thymos” (Walker
175, original emphasis).
Emmel claims that “[t]he paradigm of the enthymeme is not a form
imposed on the process but rather a form representative of how that process
takes shape” (Emmel 137, emphasis added). Not just a structure, the
enthymeme might be seen as a method similar to what Gregory Ulmer describes
as that of the “chorographer, then, [who] writes with paradigms (sets), not
arguments” (38). Visual enthymemes are not simply examples of images
structured to have a certain effect on audiences, but a description of how images
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are both produced in kairotic ways, and how those images are received by
audiences through an interactive package of reason and emotion. Composing
image events with paradigms requires the articulation of the shared visual
elements of discourse. How both activists and scholars envision this process is
evident in the visual enthymemes they produce.
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Chapter 6
Touching Thumos
There is much hope attached to the study of emotion. The hope of some is
that the current interest in emotion will lead to understandings that propel
programs of social and individual change and will help realize the long-term
projects in composition studies that seek to develop students’ critical
consciousness and rhetorical ability. The editors of A Way to Move make claims
for emotion that range from the ambitious—it will “create a culture of
movement”—to the unexceptional—it will “move our discipline in new directions”
(Jacobs and Micciche 2). Others, such as Sondra Perl, seem to hope that
attention to emotion will favor embodied ways of knowing that challenge
postmodern accounts of subjectivity and, rather, enable “genuine expression”
and “full experiencing” (59). If nothing else can be said, it is at least true that
approaches to emotion and the purposes that motivate them are local and
diverse. The belief in the possibility of change, however, seems universal, as
does the anxiety over the failure to take advantage of the motivational power of
discourses of emotion. As Worsham states, it would be a “shame if the new
interest in emotion as a category of critical thought does not move us into a new
orbit of social and political possibility” (163). But she also warns of the possibility
that the study of emotion may simply reinforce existing boundaries and patterns
of discourse.
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In reference to Toni Morrison’s distinction between being touched and
being moved, the title of this chapter, “Touching Thumos,” suggests the difficulty
involved in the intellectual work of re-educating emotion, and in the ethically and
politically sound deployment of affect in public discourse. The title of this work,
“Moving Thumos,” represents the hope that this can be done in a politically
engaged and self-reflective way. It is not as if opportunities for reflection are rare.
Events we encounter daily trigger different affective responses—we may be
shamed by events at Abu Ghraib; disgusted by Morgan Spurlock’s 30-day
indulgence in fast food in the film “Super Size Me”; in awe at photos of the
human body’s interior landscape; indifferent to celebrity charity concerts; angry at
the money spent on our university’s latest re-branding effort; joyful at a sonogram
of a friend’s baby; bitter at the result of the latest televised trial; and, hopefully,
moved by the passionate commitment of other citizens. The primacy of the
affective in discourse is part of the momentum of its circulation. By connecting
the affective dimension of discourse to the paradigm of the enthymeme, it may
become clearer how citizens engage in the production of events that move
thumos, and how we interpret these events as calling upon us as certain types of
subjects, subjects who respond to discourse over time and through a range of
enthymemic modes that are not reducible to the linear structures of traditional
argument.
Movement in Theory
I return to the question of movement. Composition studies has had
difficulty theorizing subjects in motion. As Massumi writes, many “accounts of
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subject formation emphasize systemic structurings,” embracing a language of
positionality (location on a grid, an “oppositional framework of culturally
constructed significations”) and treating the body as merely the “local
embodiment of ideology” (2–3). The enthymeme, as shown earlier, has suffered
a similar fate—being reduced to a structuring that separates it from its potential
as a rhetorical event . Advocates of change (whether they embrace
expressivism, constructivism, growth theory, or some form of liberatory
pedagogy) often unintentionally idealize the individual subject’s capacity to
change at the expense of a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of
subjectivity. Recall Jacobs and Micciche’s claim that “[m]ovement, or
repositioning oneself in the face of ever-changing situations, is a central goal of
classical and contemporary rhetorical theory” (3). Here, the language suggests
that the situation changes and that individuals reposition themselves in relation to
external change. Representing this process as a repositioning—as movement
between positions—de-emphasizes the fact that subjects are always already
subjects-in-motion.
While the goal of this model and others may be to authorize “local
resistance in the name of change,” they authorize this potential for change by
first “subtracting movement from the picture” (Massumi 3). Critical models based
on ideologically structured positions between which movement takes place don’t
really theorize movement at all. They are Zeno’s paradox writ large. Zeno’s
paradox basically goes like this: when Zeno imagines an arrow being shot, he
thinks of its flight as a linear sequence of points that the arrow inhabits one after
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the other. But since in Zeno’s model there is an infinite number of intervening
points between each point, and since the nature of infinity is that you can never
reach its end, the arrow never actually moves from the point it currently inhabits.
This paradox has been disproven in several ways, one of the more well-known
being Diogenes simply stepping forward (i.e. moving) and claiming “thus I refute
Zeno.”
The problem with how Zeno imagines motion is similar to the problem with
how composition pedagogies often construct subjectivity. Zeno refuses to see
that the arrow moves because he imagines an infinite number of positions which
the arrow can inhabit. But it might be more accurate to say that the arrow is
never in any single point, it is in passage across them all. As Massumi claims, “A
path is not composed of positions. It is decomposable: a dynamic unity” (6). In
this “continuity of movement” intermediary positions only appear retrospectively
by being constructed through discourse (Massumi 6). The subject of composition
pedagogy is also in continuous movement, albeit one that cycles among favored
positions in response to recurring contexts.
Goleman warns that pedagogies based on restrictive models of
“situationality” threaten “merely to ratchet up expressionist modes of writing to
new heights of self-consciousness” by characterizing critical reflection as
increasing self-knowledge (Working 99). Her theory of “critical effectivity”
proceeds not from a denial of situationality, but from attempts to use
“contradiction and overdetermination” as “speculative instruments that give
students a nonfoundational language for the effectivity of a structure in its effects”
180

(99). The last part of this sentence refers to Althusser’s notion of structural
causality (what Goleman calls “structural effectivity”). In Reading Capital one
finds that, for Althusser,
[The object of structural causality] is precisely to designate the mode of
presence of the structure in its effects. . . . The structure is not an essence
outside the economic phenomena which comes and alters their aspect,
forms and relations . . . on the contrary . . . the structure is immanent in its
effects, is nothing outside its effects” (qtd. in Goleman 15).
To say that a “structure is immanent in its effects” is to recognize that “all
knowledge must be understood historically as the particular effects of a social
structure” (Goleman 14). Therefore, no transcendental subject exists to make
absolute knowledge available. Knowledge does not reside in objects where it
waits to be discovered. More importantly, being able to know something through
its effects (rather, than say, through its essence) allows Goleman to argue that
situated knowledge can be used to further the goals of critical pedagogy.
Goleman’s builds her theory of agency upon Althusser’s materialist
epistemology and Bakhtin’s theory of dialogic language and seeks to engage
students in a process of incremental change characterized by the “incessant
recognition of ideology’s effects and mechanisms” (20). Through this process,
ideology is not avoided or negated, but simultaneously reproduced and critiqued.
Movement is thus reconceptualized, not as movement outside of ideology, but as
movement within the multiple ideologies that we inhabit (or, in light of the
desubjectifying effects of emotion and thumos, the ideologies that inhabit us).
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Goleman’s critical effectivity recognizes that there are a host of positions within
these ideologies that can be used for self-critique. Of course, the idealization of
the possibility for movement can become its own justification and thereby
“radically truncate the possibilities of drama by eliminating action, reducing action
to sheer motion” (Massumi 10).
One effect of the critique of situationality is to help recoup the notion of
change in composition studies. It is impossible, of course, to predict in any
meaningful way specific changes caused by discourse. To do so would be to
automatize the dialogic struggle of discourse. But models of discourse or
subjectivity that deny the possibility of movement are much less useful
descriptions of subjects in discourse. But such discourses still recognize
difference as a key concept, and perhaps change is simply difference over time.
Descriptions that depend upon a subject incapable of change have simply
substituted another form of centered subject for previous models. Without the
possibility for change, there is no decentered subject. It is perhaps better to
describe this change as movement, and admit that we are all subjects in motion.
As Brian Massumi writes, although we think of the ground on which we stand as
stable, “ground is anything but,” and our recognition of it as a stable and
physically measurable space is “predicated on the capture of processes already
in operation” (11). Such is the self. The enthymeme, with its connection to the
Greek concept of thumos—our capacity to be moved—could become a key term
for discussing the role of affect in subject formation and the political organization
of subjects through the education of emotion. And the theorizing of visual
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enthymemes can contribute to our understanding of argumentation in
contemporary visual culture, and to the development of a rhetorical rhetoric of
images in which visual ambiguity is seen as an argumentative resource.
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Notes
1. To read Schiappa’s defense in its original context and the article by Scott
Consigny to which he was responding (itself a response to an earlier Schiappa
article) see Rhetoric Review 14.2. Schiappa cites the following articles to help
establish his “antirealist beliefs and commitment to antifoundationalist socialconstructionism”: “Burkean Tropes and Kuhnian Science: A Social
Constructionist Perspective on Language and Reality.” JAC 13 (1993):401–22.;
“Counterstatement: A Response to Thomas Kent, ‘On the Very Idea of a
Discourse Community.’” CCC 43 (1992): 109–10.; and “Dissociation in the
Arguments of Rhetorical Theory.” Journal of the American Forensic Association
22 (1985): 72–82.
2. To better understand the claims regarding the coherency of “sophistic rhetoric”
to which Schiappa is responding, see John Poulakos’ “Towards a Sophistic
Definition of Rhetoric” Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 35–48.
3. I believe the Bush administration currently faces a similar crisis of vocabulary
as when antifoundationalists put their trust in the community. For instance, the
Bush administration claims that it is quite interested in spreading freedom
throughout the Middle East by establishing democratic elections. But it is still
possible, as seems to be the case in Iran, that democratic choices by a
community can still lead to electing anti-democratic regimes. In the same way,
because standards for what counts as truth are always established within the
discourse of that community, it is entirely possible for a scholarly community to
adopt a foundational regime of truth, even in light of antifoundational critiques of
the inadequacies of foundationalism.
4. “Incommensurability” is a concept rooted in the work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul
Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and, perhaps most notably, Jean-Francois Lyotard.
5. The textual evidence for the centrality of the enthymeme to Aristotle is hard to
challenge, although some scholars seem to acquiesce halfheartedly: “I submit
that in Aristotle’s rhetorical system the enthymeme is the element or unit of all
persuasive discourse” (McBurney 63). This compunction might be read as
evidence that the enthymeme truly does not fit well into the “more prescriptive
and schematic treatments” of the Rhetoric (Covino 6).
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6. The arguments of Madden and Lanigan are both highly relevant to the
development of theories of the visual enthymeme out of the field of
communications. In particular, the distinction between causality and persuasion
that Madden recognizes is key to understanding how my own theorization of the
visual enthymeme differs from previous attempts. Rather than claim that scholars
confuse the two, as Madden does, I argue that causality has become the sole
standard for the discussion of visual enthymemes, leaving persuasion, and thus
rhetoric, out of the picture.
7. In the September 15, 2006 digest of WPA-L, a listserv for those interested in
writing program administration, which covers all messages sent in a 24-hour
period, a request was made for suggestions for the “’perfect’ rhetoric text to teach
the dreaded Aristotelian enthymeme.” The first three suggestions were for
textbooks discussed in this dissertation’s section on pedagogies of the
enthymeme: Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Crowley and
Hawhee’s Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, and John Gage’s The
Shape of Reason. That these were the primary texts recommended by multiple
respondents suggests that they represent accepted dominant approaches to
teaching the enthymeme. Other texts mentioned include the following: Joliffe and
Roskelly’s Everyday Use: Rhetoric at Work in Reading and Writing, and Dobyns
and Callaghan’s A Meeting of Minds.
8. Some of the significant names in the disciplinary conversation over the value
of collaborative learning in the composition classroom include Kenneth Bruffee,
John Trimbur, Xin Liu Gale, Greg Myers, and Patricia Bizzell. See especially
Trimbur’s "Consensus and Difference in Collaborative Learning."
9. In addition to the literal winds blowing through Joyce’s “Aeolus” chapter,
Hodgart identifies over 45 different allusions and metaphors dealing with wind.
As Hodgart writes, the wind embodies all types of high and low distinctions; it
“may be flatulence, over-blown rhetoric or false inspiration, but it may also be the
true inspiration of religion and art” (118). The significance of the relation of wind
to the chapter’s enthymemic technique may become clearer when the close
association between the wind and thumos is discussed in the next chapter.
10. “Nelson’s Pillar” is a common but incorrect reference to “The Nelson Pillar,” a
granite pillar raised in Dublin in 1808 with a statue of Horato Nelson at its top.
Horatio Nelson was an English Admiral made famous in the Napoleonic Wars.
The pillar, built against the wishes of the Dublin city council but pushed through
by the British Lord Lieutenant at the time, was reminiscent of Nelson’s Column, a
similar monument in Trafalgar Square in London, England. While opposition to
the pillar was steady after its construction and into the 20th century, the Nelson
Pillar remained standing until it was bombed by members of the Irish Republican
Army in 1966.
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11. While Arthur Miller and John D. Bee’s essay discussed above “Enthymemes:
Body and Soul,” which appeared in the journal Philosophy and Rhetoric, does
recognize the thumotic roots of the enthymeme, there article is exceptional in this
respect. Other recent works on thumos, such as Barbara Koziak’s book,
Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender, fail to connect
thumos to the enthymeme. Jeffrey Walker’s work provides one of the few
sustained articulations of the relationship between thumos and the enthymeme,
and will provide the foundation of much of the next chapter’s discussion of
thumos in relation to the enthymeme.
12. “Affect” is the term Massumi uses to refer to the “intensity” that becomes
emotion once fixed linguistically. The difference between affect and emotion is
critical to Massumi, who claims that “Affect holds a key to rethinking postmodern
power after ideology” (42). In most cases below, I will continue to use “emotion”
since this seems to better identify the recognized affective states that enter into
deliberation within one’s thumos.
13. DeLuca also cites the work of Kathryn Olson and G. Thomas Goodnight as
representative of analysis that “implicitly instantiates a hierarchy that privileges
the discursive (words) over the nondiscursive (images)” (18).
14. See Jameison’s Dirty Politics for a view of emotion as exploitative rhetoric.
See Walton for a book-length treatment of how emotion is associated with
fallacious reasoning and other “odious” rhetorical tactics (3). Although the book’s
first sentence claims that “The thesis of this book is that appeals to emotion have
a legitimate, even important, place as arguments in persuasion dialogue” the
book focuses on the latter half of this sentence, which warns that emotional
appeals “need to be treated with caution because they can also be used
fallaciously” (1). For Walton, the “value of arguments that appeal to emotion” is
ultimately based on the possibility that “emotional appeals can be reasonable
arguments in some cases” (255, emphasis added).
15. The Live 8 concerts and the debates surrounding them represent a rich
source of theorization regarding image events which, for the most part, lie
outside the scope of this essay. Watched by approximately 2 billion people and
accessible to roughly 80% of globe, it set a new standard for media
dissemination of political activism. The image-based interactive features
available to viewers were many, including the “G8 Gallery,” where supporters
were encouraged to submit images to Live 8 organizers which were printed and
placed along a 2-mile stretch of the “Long Walk to Justice,” the closing march to
Edinburgh. The actual marchers along the Long Walk to Justice, however, had to
deal with police taking pictures of them as well. Bono’s claim that the “The lingua
franca [of political momentum] . . . is not English—it's pop music” is evocative as
well, suggesting that the aural component of image events may benefit from
further attention (Tyrangiel 66).
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16. Again, Bono is prescient here. He states that “There's got to be a moment, an
explosive moment of concentration on [poverty]. The point of Live 8 is to provide
the colossal, dramatic moment where everybody gets to grips with it” (qtd. in
Tyrangiel 66).
17. For those who find this sentence confusing, it is a reference to the 1988
campaign by General Motors to revive interest in their redesigned Oldsmobile in
a younger demographic: "This is not your father's Oldsmobile."
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